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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of selected state and 
federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law from the year 2006.  They are neither 
comprehensive in breadth (several cases are omitted) nor in depth (many issues within 
individual cases are omitted).  Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an 
authoritative guide; rather, they are intended to alert the Alaska legal community about 
judicial decisions from the previous year.  The summaries are grouped by subject matter. 
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II.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Allen v. Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Commission  
In Allen v. Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Commission,1 the supreme court held 
that the Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Commission (“Commission”) applied the proper 
standard in denying a petition for a unitization order and that the superior court may deny 
a request for a de novo hearing on appeal from the Commission.2  The day before his oil 
and gas exploration leases were set to expire, Allen petitioned the Commission for a 
unitization order to combine his valueless leases with other highly productive oil fields.3  
After the Commission denied the petition, the superior court refused Allen’s request to 
hear his appeal de novo and affirmed the Commission’s decision.4  Allen appealed, 
arguing that the superior court incorrectly refused his request of a hearing and that the 
Commission applied the wrong standard in its denial of his petition.5  The supreme court 
held that the statute relied upon by Allen as entitling him to a de novo hearing had been 
impliedly repealed by legislative developments, and therefore the decision to hear an 
appeal de novo was left to the superior court’s discretion.6  The supreme court further 
held that the proper statutory standard for evaluating Allen’s unitization petition was the 
standard relating to involuntary unitization, since Allen’s petition was not seeking 
voluntary unitization.7  The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, 
holding that it was correct to deny Allen’s petition for a de novo hearing and that the 
Commission applied the proper statutory standard in rejecting Allen’s petition.8 
 
 
Brandal v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission  
In Brandal v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,9 the supreme court 
held that the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission’s (the “CFEC”) denial of a limited 
entry fishing permit was valid despite a twenty-two year delay.10  Brandal worked as a 
crew member on his father’s boat until 1972.11  He was a gear license holder in 1974, and 
applied for a limited entry permit in 1977.12  In order to receive a permit, an individual 
must accumulate twenty points for certain fishing related activities.13  Brandal’s 
application was denied for lack of sufficient points, and he was given an interim permit.14  
                                                 
1 139 P.3d 564 (Alaska 2006). 
2 Id. at 565–66. 
3 Id. at 565. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 567–72. 
7 Id. at 571. 
8 Id. at 572. 
9 128 P.3d 732 (Alaska 2006). 
10 Id. at 734. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 735. 
14 Id. 
 3 
Twenty-two years later, the CFEC officially denied his application.15  The superior court 
affirmed the CFEC’s decision.16  Brandal appealed, arguing that (1) he should have been 
awarded points for special circumstances, (2) CFEC was required to inform applicants 
that only partners of gear licensees in 1971-72 would be granted special circumstances 
points, and (3) the twenty-two year delay violated his due process.17  The supreme court 
held that Brandal’s first argument failed, because the special circumstances provision 
applied to former co-owners of boats, not crew members.18  Brandal’s second claim also 
failed because at least two individuals who were not partners of gear licensees in 1971-72 
did in fact receive permits.19  Finally, Brandal’s third claim failed because there was no 
risk of error based on the delay, and there was no evidence of prejudice.20  The supreme 
court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that the CFEC’s denial of 
Brandal’s limited entry fishing permit was valid despite a twenty-two year delay.21 
 
 
Benavides v. State  
In Benavides v. State,22 the supreme court held that legislative employees are not 
necessarily entitled to the same per diem allowance as legislators.23  Benavides, a 
legislative aide required to travel to Juneau for the legislative session, was not granted a 
per diem allowance for his time there.24  He filed suit, claiming that he was guaranteed a 
per diem equal to that given to legislators under Alaska Statute section 24.10.130(b).25  
The supreme court held that the plain language of the statute26 was consistent with the 
Alaska Legislative Council’s decision not to give Benavides a per diem allowance.27  
Additionally, a look at the legislative history was insufficient to rebut the conclusion that 
the plain language allowed the Council’s decision.28  The supreme court affirmed the 
decision of the superior court, holding that Benavides and other legislative employees are 
not entitled to the same per diem allowance as legislators.29 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 735. 
18 Id. at 737. 
19 Id. at 738. 
20 Id. at 739–740. 
21 Id. at 734. 
22 151 P.3d 332 (Alaska 2006). 
23 Id. at 333. 
24 Id. at 333–34. 
25 Id. at 334. 
26 ALASKA STAT. § 24.10.130(b) states that “[l]egislators and officers and employees of the legislative 
branch of government are entitled to a per diem allowance.” 
27 Benavides, 151 P.3d at 335–36. 
28 Id. at 336–37. 
29 Id. at 333, 338. 
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Flowline of Alaska v. Brennan 
In Flowline of Alaska  v. Brennan,30 the supreme court held that an injured 
employee who had worked for more than thirteen weeks was an ongoing, hourly worker 
entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.31  From November 1998 to March 1999, 
Brennan worked for Flowline of Alaska (“Flowline”) full-time, with intermittent breaks 
due to weather and equipment failure, among other things.32  When Brennan was injured 
in early March 1999, he requested workers’ compensation payments as an ongoing, 
hourly worker with thirteen consecutive weeks of experience.33  Flowline contested the 
classification before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”), arguing first 
that Brennan was an “exclusively temporary” worker and, alternatively, that Brennan was 
a seasonal hourly worker.34  The Board concluded that Brennan was an ongoing, hourly 
worker, and the superior court affirmed.35  The supreme court adopted superior court’s 
decision and held that Brennan was an ongoing, hourly worker, not a temporary or 
seasonal worker, because of his ongoing relationship with Flowline, the gross number of 
hours he worked, and the fact that he worked for more than thirteen weeks.36  The 
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that an injured employee 
who had worked for more than thirteen weeks was an ongoing, hourly worker entitled to 
workers’ compensation benefits.37 
 
 
State v. Grunert   
In State v. Grunert,38 the supreme court held that the Alaska Board of Fisheries 
(“Board”) exceeded its authority in promulgating an emergency regulation to create a 
cooperative fishery scheme and in allocating fishery resources within a single fishery.39  
Grunert, a non-participating salmon fisher, challenged the Board’s regulation authorizing 
a cooperative of salmon purse seine fishers.40  The superior court rejected the challenge 
but was reversed by the supreme court.41  The Board then promulgated an emergency 
regulation to again authorize a cooperative.42  Grunert challenged and the superior court 
entered final judgment for Grunert; the Board appealed.43  The supreme court held that 
the Board exceeded its authority in promulgating an emergency regulation to create a 
cooperative fishery scheme because the regulation was at odds with the Limited Entry 
Act and that the means employed by the regulation, in authorizing different equipment 
for the cooperative and open fishers, did not create two distinct fisheries.44  The 
                                                 
30 129 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2006). 
31 Id. at 881. 
32 Id. at 884. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 882. 
35 Id. at 881. 
36 Id. at 881–82, 886. 
37 Id. at 881. 
38 139 P.3d 1226 (Alaska 2006). 
39 Id. at 1229. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 1230. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1231. 
44 Id. at 1234, 1237. 
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regulation was at odds with the Limited Entry Act’s purpose to protect active, 
economically dependent fishers, because the emergency regulation required only some 
participation by the permit holders in the cooperative,45 allowing fishers who made the 
minimum number of deliveries to receive the same profit as those who made more 
deliveries.46  Also, the differences in gear authorized under the regulation did not create 
two distinct fisheries, and the Board therefore violated its authorizing statute by 
allocating fishery resources within a single fishery.47  The supreme court upheld the 
superior court’s decision in part and reversed in part, holding that the Board exceeded its 
authority by promulgating an emergency regulation to create a cooperative fishery 
scheme and that the means employed by the regulation were outside the Board’s 
authority to allocate fishery resources within a single fishery.48 
 
 
J & S Services v. Tomter 
 In J & S Services v. Tomter,49 the supreme court held that the Alaska State 
Procurement Code’s exclusionary provision expressly exempted a government agency 
from liability for civil damages, but that damages could be recovered from a government 
officer in an individual capacity so long as the officer was acting outside of the scope of 
regular duties.50  After losing a bid for leasing an airplane to the Department of Natural 
Resources, J & S Services (“J & S”) brought suit in superior court, alleging that Tomter, 
who headed the leasing project, and the procurement agency were liable for a number of 
torts relating to improper dealing in awarding the contract.51  The superior court 
dismissed claims against Tomter and the State, and J & S appealed.52  The supreme court 
held that the procurement agency was exempted from liability in a civil damage suit 
under the procurement code, but that officials acting outside of the scope of their official 
duties were not exempt from individual capacity civil suits.53  No exemption from civil 
suit is explicitly provided for individuals in the procurement code, and under traditional 
principles of official immunity, officials acting outside of the scope of regular work 
duties may be held individually liable in civil damages suits.54  The supreme court 
affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of claims against the State, but reversed the 
dismissal of claims against Tomter and remanded the case, holding that the procurement 
code expressly exempted a government agency from liability for civil damages, but that 
damages could be recovered from a government officer in an individual capacity who 
was acting outside of the scope of regular duties.55 
                                                 
45 Id. at 1234. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 1237–39. 
48 Id. at 1241. 
49 139 P.3d 544 (Alaska 2006). 
50 Id. at 548. 
51 Id. at 546. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 548. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 552. 
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Lewis v. State 
In Lewis v. State,56 the supreme court held that the Department of Corrections 
(“Department”) did not violate due process of a state prisoner in refusing her request to 
be examined by a physician of her choosing in order to prove a medical condition that 
would entitle her to be considered for executive clemency.57  Lewis, convicted of second-
degree murder, was not to be eligible for parole until 2011.58  Fearing she would not live 
until 2011 because of her poor health, she applied for executive clemency.59  The 
Department’s medical staff determined there were no medical grounds to support her 
request for clemency.60  Lewis filed a complaint against the State asking for a declaratory 
judgment on whether she should be allowed independent medical opinion evidence.61  
The superior court granted summary judgment to the State, finding that denial of Lewis’ 
request to see an independent doctor did not violate her due process.62  The supreme court 
applied a three-factor test to determine whether Lewis had a fair opportunity to make a 
factual showing to support her clemency application.63  The test balanced (1) the private 
interest affected by official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest 
because of the procedures used and the value of additional safeguards; and (3) the 
government’s interest.64  Under this test, the Department’s denial of Lewis’ access to an 
independent doctor did not violate her due process because Lewis did not demonstrate 
there would be any practical value in consulting an independent doctor.65  The supreme 
court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that the Department did not 
violate a prisoner’s due process when it denied her access to an independent doctor to 
prove a medical condition that would entitle her to be considered for clemency.66 
 
 
Lakloey, Inc. v. University of Alaska  
In Lakloey, Inc. v. University of Alaska,67 the supreme court held that the costs 
expended in preparing a bid were not recoverable when irregularities in the bid 
solicitation process were not shown to have caused any actual damages.68  In soliciting 
bids for improvements to its facilities, the University of Alaska (“University”) issued an 
addendum to the bid instructions on the day the bids were scheduled to be opened.69  
Lakloey, which had submitted a bid prior to the issuance of the addendum, protested, 
arguing that the addendum violated the instructions issued to bidders as well as relevant 
statutes.70  After the University rejected the two properly submitted bids, including 
                                                 
56 139 P.3d 1266 (Alaska 2006). 
57 Id. at 1267. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 1268.   
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 1268, 1270. 
64 Id. at 1270. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1267, 1272. 
67 141 P.3d 317 (Alaska 2006). 
68 Id. at 318–19. 
69 Id. at 319. 
70 Id. 
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Lakloey’s, it denied Lakloey’s bid protest without a hearing.71  On appeal, the superior 
court also rejected Lakloey’s arguments.72  The supreme court held that a successful bid 
protester must show actual damages in order to recover the costs of bid preparation and 
that, while the University violated Alaska law and its own instructions, Lakloey failed to 
show that these violations and irregularities caused it any additional expenses.73  The 
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that the costs expended in 
preparing a bid were not recoverable when irregularities in the bid solicitation process 
were not shown to have caused any actual damages.74   
 
 
City of Saint Paul v. State  
In City of Saint Paul v. State,75 the supreme court held that a Department of 
Natural Resources ruling that used the statutory definition of a boundary for tidelands did 
not address a boundary dispute and, therefore, properly left the issue open for judicial 
resolution.76  The City of Saint Paul (“City”) applied to the Department of Natural 
Resources (“Department”) for a conveyance of tidelands.77  The Department conveyed 
the tidelands in accordance with the current boundary, which was statutorily defined 
according to the current mean high water line.78  The City argued that by granting the 
tidelands according to the current boundary rather than an earlier line, it was adjudicating 
a boundary dispute.79  The supreme court held that the Department was not adjudicating a 
boundary dispute by issuing the tidelands, because the Department used the statutory 
definition, there were no evidentiary hearings, and the commissioner made it clear that 
the conveyance did not establish a fixed boundary.80  The commissioner conveyed the 
tidelands under a statute that does not require the commissioner to resolve the boundary 
dispute.81  The supreme court affirmed the Department’s conveyance, holding that it did 
not adjudicate the boundary dispute.82 
 
 
Western States Fire Protection Co. of Alaska v. Anchorage  
In Western States Fire Protection Co. of Alaska v. Anchorage,83 the supreme 
court held that, even under the rational basis standard of review, the decision of the 
Anchorage Board of Building Regulation Examiners and Appeals (“Board”) must be 
vacated where the Board has not addressed a critical issue in determining the appropriate 
outcome of the proceeding.84  Western States Fire Protection Co. appealed a decision of 
                                                 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 320. 
73 Id. at 321–23. 
74 Id. at 318–19. 
75 137 P.3d 261(Alaska 2006). 
76 Id. at 262. 
77 Id. at 263. 
78 Id. at 264. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 265. 
81 Id. at 266. 
82 Id. at 267. 
83 146 P.3d 986 (Alaska 2006). 
84 Id. at 991. 
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the Anchorage Fire Department that the sprinkler system in a school was inadequate.85  
The Board reversed the decision of the fire department, based on a narrow reading of the 
fire code, but without considering the adequacy of water coverage for fire prevention.86  
The supreme court held that rational basis review of the Board’s decision was appropriate 
and found the decision lacking in proper reference to the overall goal of the fire code:  to 
ensure the adequacy of water coverage of a potential fire hazard.87  The supreme court 
vacated and remanded the decision of the Board, holding that the Board had not 
addressed a critical issue in determining the appropriate outcome of the proceeding.88 
 
 
Wilson v. State, Department of Corrections 
In Wilson v. State, Department of Corrections,89 the supreme court held that the 
State’s policy of transporting released prisoners to the community nearest the “place of 
arrest” satisfies the Alaska administrative code’s requirement90 of a return to the “place 
of arrest.”91  Shortly before his release from prison, Wilson requested to be transported by 
airplane directly to his home and place of arrest, which was accessible only by footpath 
and airplane.92  The Department of Corrections (“DOC”) denied his request,93 and he 
filed an administrative grievance and appeal, arguing that the DOC was required by its 
regulation to transport him to his “place of arrest.”94  The DOC denied his grievance and 
appeal,95 the superior court denied his subsequent suit for declaratory relief and damages, 
and Wilson appealed.96  The supreme court held that the DOC could return released 
prisoners to the community nearest the “place of arrest” since the phrase “place of arrest” 
is ambiguous,97 there is no legislative history which helps define it,98 and the statute’s 
purpose to get prisoners home is achieved by the DOC’s interpretation, which was 
reasonable and not arbitrary. 99  The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior 
court, holding that the State’s policy of transporting released prisoners to the community 
nearest the “place of arrest” satisfies the Alaskan administrative code’s requirement of a 
return to the “place of arrest.”100 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 Id. at 988. 
86 Id. at 989. 
87 Id. at 989–91. 
88 Id. at 987, 991. 
89 127 P.3d 826 (Alaska 2006). 
90 ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.081 (2006); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 05.585 (2006). 
91 Wilson, 127 P.3d at 828, 834. 
92 Id. at 828. 
93 Id.  
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 830. 
98 Id. at 831. 
99 Id. at 832–34. 
100 Id. at 828, 834. 
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III.  BUSINESS LAW 
 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
Valdez Fisheries Development Ass’n v. Alaska 
 In Valdez Fisheries Development Ass’n v. Alaska,101 the Ninth Circuit held that a 
bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to interpret a settlement agreement in an adversary 
proceeding brought between two creditors after the underlying bankruptcy had been 
closed.102  Valdez Fisheries Development Association (“VFDA”) and Sea Hawk 
Seafoods, Inc. (“Sea Hawk”), its creditor, entered into a settlement agreement in the 
course of VFDA’s bankruptcy proceedings.103  The bankruptcy court approved the 
agreement and entered a final decree closing the bankruptcy proceedings.104  The 
bankruptcy court then claimed jurisdiction over an adversary proceeding between Sea 
Hawk and the State of Alaska prompted by the VFDA case.105  The Ninth Circuit held 
that the bankruptcy court (1) lacked “related to” jurisdiction over the resultant case, since 
the bankruptcy proceeding had been entirely closed prior to the adversary proceeding and 
could not, therefore, be impacted or altered by it and (2) lacked ancillary jurisdiction to 
“vindicate its authority” or “effectuate its decree” in the previous case, since the 
bankruptcy court had not explicitly retained jurisdiction or incorporated the terms of the 
settlement agreement as required for ancillary jurisdiction.106  The Ninth Circuit reversed 
the order of the district court, holding that a bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to 
interpret a settlement agreement in an adversary proceeding brought between two 
creditors after the underlying bankruptcy had been closed.107 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Alaska Construction & Engineering, Inc. v. Balzer Pacific Equipment Co. 
In Alaska Construction & Engineering, Inc. v. Balzer Pacific Equipment Co.,108 
the supreme court held that a lessor who succeeded on the primary issue in the case was 
the prevailing party and could therefore recover from a lessee the attorneys’ fees 
stipulated in the repossession provision of the lease, but could not recover its trial costs 
after repossession nor the higher interest rate printed on its repair invoices.109   Alaska 
Construction & Engineering, Inc. (“ACE”) leased rock-crushing equipment with the 
option to purchase from Balzer Pacific Equipment Co. (“Balzer”).110  ACE defaulted, and 
Balzer repossessed its equipment after posting a bond.111  At trial, the jury found that 
                                                 
101 439 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 2006). 
102 Id. at 546. 
103 Id. at 547. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 547–50. 
107 Id. at 546. 
108 130 P.3d 932 (Alaska 2006). 
109 Id. at 941. 
110 Id. at 934. 
111 Id. 
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ACE breached the contract and awarded $50,500 in damages to Balzer; it also rejected all 
of ACE’s affirmative defenses and three out of four counterclaims, awarding ACE 
$10,000.112  The judge ruled that Balzer was the prevailing party and was entitled to 
attorneys’ fees accrued before it recovered its equipment, but not after, and set the 
prejudgment interest at the statutory rate rather than the much higher rate specified on 
invoices Balzer sent to ACE.113  ACE appealed the prevailing party decision and Balzer 
cross-appealed the attorneys’ fees and interest rate decisions.114  The supreme court held 
that the lessor prevailed on the primary issue in the case and, as the prevailing party, 
could therefore recover from the lessee the attorneys’ fees provided by the repossession 
provision of the lease, but not its trial costs, nor the higher interest rate printed on its 
invoices.115  First, Balzer was the prevailing party because it prevailed on the main issue 
in the case, had the larger monetary award, and succeeded on greater and more significant 
portions of its claims than ACE.116  Further, the supreme court read the lease and option 
to purchase as separate agreements.117  Thus, the attorneys’ fees provision of the option to 
purchase was inapplicable since the option was never exercised, and the attorneys’ fees 
provided by the repossession clause of the lease only applied up to the time that Balzer 
obtained possession of its equipment.118  Finally, the court set the interest rate at the 
statutory rate rather than the eighteen percent printed on the repair invoices sent to ACE 
because Balzer did not show that ACE had knowledge of the eighteen percent provision 
or a reasonable opportunity to reject it.119  The supreme court affirmed the superior 
court’s decision, holding that Balzer was the prevailing party because it succeeded on the 
main issue and was therefore entitled by the repossession provision of the lease to 
attorneys’ fees incurred until repossession of the equipment, but not trial costs nor the 
higher interest rate printed on its repair invoices.120 
 
 
Anchorage Chrysler Center, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.  
In Anchorage Chrysler Center, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,121 the supreme 
court held that a statement can be fraudulent misrepresentation even if technically true 
and that a letter of intent is not necessary for fact-finders to determine the existence of an 
agreement.122  Anchorage Chrysler Center, Inc. (“ACC”) entered into an agreement with 
DaimlerChrysler Motors Co. (“DCMC”) that ACC would rearrange its showrooms so as 
to sell only Dodge brand cars in one building and Chryslers, Plymouths, and Jeeps in 
another building.123  ACC contended that this agreement included a DCMC promise to 
allow ACC to build another automobile dealership in the town of Wasilla and to disallow 
                                                 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 934–35. 
114 Id. at 935. 
115 Id. at 937, 941. 
116 Id. at 935–36. 
117 Id. at 937. 
118 Id. at 937. 
119 Id. at 940–41. 
120 Id. at 941. 
121 129 P.3d 905 (Alaska 2006). 
122 Id. at 915, 917. 
123 Id. at 907. 
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other new Dodge dealerships in the area.124  DCMC never provided ACC any Jeeps, 
arguing that ACC had failed to remodel its buildings per the agreement.125  DCMC also 
argued that although it had suggested that there were no plans for another Dodge 
dealership when ACC inquired, it did not break any promises when it allowed a new 
Dodge dealership to be built in the Anchorage area,126 and that despite talks concerning 
an ACC dealership in Wasilla, DCMC never delivered or signed a written letter of intent 
giving ACC rights to a new dealership.127  The supreme court held that even though 
DCMC’s statements that there were no plans for a new Dodge dealership were 
technically true, a true statement can be misleading and, therefore, can still be an 
actionable fraudulent misrepresentation if it induced actions that an informed party would 
not have undertaken.128  The supreme court also held that ACC did not need a new letter 
of intent for the Wasilla dealership to create an agreement and that whether or not there 
was an agreement at all is a question for the fact-finder.129  The supreme court vacated 
the dismissal of ACC’s contract claims, holding that a statement can be fraudulent 
misrepresentation even if technically true and that a letter of intent is not necessary for 
fact-finders to determine the existence of an agreement.130  
 
 
                                                 
124 Id. at 908. 
125 Id. at 909. 
126 Id. at 910. 
127 Id. at 909. 
128 Id. at 915. 
129 Id. at 917. 
130 Id. at 915, 917. 
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IV.  CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals  
 
Johnson v. Columbia Properties Anchorage 
In Johnson v. Columbia Properties Anchorage,131 the Ninth Circuit held that 
limited liability companies (“LLCs”) share the citizenship of all of their members for 
purposes of invoking the district court’s diversity jurisdiction; thus, the district court 
properly exercised jurisdiction over an Alaska state court case removed to federal district 
court by the defendant, an LLC whose members were not Alaska citizens.132  Johnson, an 
independent crane operator, provided crane services to Columbia Properties Anchorage 
(“Columbia”) between September 1998 and February 2000 and sent an invoice in 
January, 2002.133  Columbia did not pay134 and, in February 2003, Johnson filed suit in 
Alaska state court.135  Columbia removed the case to federal district court based on 
diversity of citizenship and moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the claims 
were time-barred by Alaska's three-year statute of limitations.136  The district court 
granted the defendant's motion.137  Johnson appealed, arguing that the district court 
should have remanded to state court based on the citizenship of the LLCs.138  The Ninth 
Circuit held that an LLC is a citizen of every state of which its partners are citizens.139  
Since none of the partners were Alaska citizens, the district court properly denied the 
plaintiff's motion to remove.140  The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court 
properly applied Alaska law by tolling the statute of limitations at the conclusion of the 
project, not at the submission of the invoice.141  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision 
of the district court, holding that LLCs have the citizenship of all of their members; thus, 
the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over an Alaska state court case removed 
to federal district court by the defendant, an LLC whose members were not Alaska 
citizens.142   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
131 437 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2006). 
132 Id. at 899. 
133 Id. at 897–98. 
134 Id. at 898. 
135 Id.  
136 Id.  
137 Id.  
138 Id. at 899. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 899–900. 
141 Id. at 900–01. 
142 Id. at 902.  
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Alaska Supreme Court  
 
In re Adoption of Erin G. 
In In re Adoption of Erin G.,143 the supreme court held that a father’s petition 
under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act to invalidate his daughter’s adoption was 
time-barred by Alaska’s one-year statute of limitations for challenging adoption 
decrees.144  Erin G. was born to an unmarried, terminally ill mother and an incarcerated 
father.145  In September, 2002, the superior court entered an adoption decree making the 
Grants the legal parents of Erin.146  David L., Erin’s father, spent more than a year 
appealing other issues in the case and seeking new counsel, but did not file a petition to 
invalidate Erin’s adoption until October, 2004, more than two years after the adoption 
order.147  The supreme court held that Alaska’s one-year statute of limitations on 
challenging adoptions applied to the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, thus barring David 
from entering his petition.148  Because Congress did not put a statute of limitations in the 
Indian Child Welfare Act, it was appropriate to adopt the local statute of limitations as 
long as it did not conflict with federal laws or policies.149  Here, there was no such 
conflict, and the one-year statute of limitations on petitioning adoptions provided a good 
balance between protecting the rights of Indian parents and protecting the rights of an 
adopted child.150  The supreme court affirmed the ruling of the superior court, holding 
that a father’s petition under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act to invalidate his 
daughter’s adoption was time-barred by Alaska’s one-year statute of limitations for 
challenging adoption decrees.151  
 
 
Blood v. Kenneth A. Murray Insurance, Inc.  
In Blood v. Kenneth A. Murray Insurance, Inc.,152 the supreme court held that the 
termination-of-coverage notice obligations of the insurer were satisfied by mailing 
multiple written notices to the last known address even though the notices were returned 
undelivered.153  Blood bought a six month renewable auto insurance policy from Kenneth 
A. Murray Insurance, Inc. (“KMI”) but did not pay the renewal premium.154  KMI mailed 
termination of coverage notices to Blood’s address which were returned undelivered. 155  
Blood was then injured and his claim was denied.156  The superior court found that even 
though KMI had satisfied its statutory duty by mailing the notices to the last known 
address, KMI had a separate, non-statutory duty of care and due diligence to inform the 
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insured of terminated coverage, though that failure was not the legal cause of harm to 
Blood.157  The supreme court held that KMI fulfilled its statutory duty by mailing notice 
of termination of coverage to his last known address and that the returned letters supplied 
sufficient proof of mailing.158  The supreme court also held that the superior court erred 
in holding KMI to a separate duty of care to inform the insured of termination; the 
separate duty of care which may be found in real estate forfeitures is not comparable to 
routine termination or non-renewal of automobile policies.159  The supreme court 
reversed the superior court’s finding of a non-statutory duty of care for KMI, holding that 
KMI satisfied its notice obligations by mailing multiple written notices to the last known 
address of the insured.160 
 
 
Brannon v. Continental Casualty Co.  
In Brannon v. Continental Casualty Co.,161 the supreme court held that the statute 
of limitations began running on an insured’s claim for breach of duty to defend against 
the insurer at the initial refusal to defend, but that the statute of limitations was equitably 
tolled until the underlying litigation was complete.162  Terry Pfleiger acted as a real estate 
broker for the Brannons in their purchase of franchising assets from investors.163  The 
Brannons and Pfleiger were sued by the investors.164  The Brannons, in turn, cross-
claimed against Pfleiger for breach of his fiduciary duty as their broker.165  Continental 
Casualty Co. (“Continental”), Pfleiger’s professional liability insurance carrier, refused to 
defend him in these suits in 1997.166  Pfleiger’s rights to sue Continental for breach of a 
duty to defend were later assigned to the Brannons.167  The Brannons asserted these rights 
by filing a complaint against Continental in 2002.168  The superior court granted 
Continental’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the three-year statute of 
limitations had begun running in 1997 and had expired.169  The Brannons appealed.170  
The supreme court held that, although the statute of limitations began running when the 
contractual duty to defend was breached, it was equitably tolled until the underlying 
litigation was resolved, because the duty to defend is ongoing and can be assumed at any 
time before final judgment.171  Tolling allows the insured to wait until he has finished 
litigating the underlying claim before filing a claim against the insurer.172  The supreme 
court vacated the superior court’s dismissal and remanded, holding that the statute of 
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limitations began running on an insured’s claim for breach of duty to defend against the 
insurer at the initial refusal to defend, but that the statute of limitations was equitably 
tolled until the underlying litigation was complete.173   
 
 
Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska v. Does  
In Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska v. Does,174 the supreme court held that 
Alaska Statute section 09.10.065, which eliminates any statute of limitations for claims of 
sexual abuse, does not apply retroactively, but declined to decide whether the discovery 
rule tolled the statutes of limitations for this case because it involved questions of fact.175  
Petitioner, Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska, appealed the superior court’s ruling 
against its motion for dismissal in a civil case arising from sexual abuse on the grounds 
that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations.176  Petitioner argued that section 
09.10.065 does not apply retroactively, meaning that the 2001 statute had no application 
to allegations of abuse from the 1970s and before.177  The supreme court held that section 
09.10.065 does not apply retroactively, because there is a presumption against statutes 
applying retroactively and because there was no legislative history indicating 
otherwise.178  However, the supreme court declined to dismiss the case, finding that 
whether the statute of limitations had tolled was a question of fact, necessitating 
discovery and further trial proceedings.179  The supreme court affirmed the decision of 
the superior court, holding that section 09.10.065 does not apply retroactively and that the 
question of the tolling of the statute of limitations was a factual one, deserving of further 
discovery proceedings.180       
 
 
Domke v. Alyeska Pipeline Co., Inc.  
In Domke v. Alyeska Pipeline Co., Inc.,181 the supreme court held that the superior 
court erred in a series of procedural decisions in a wrongful termination action.182  
Domke sued his employer (“Champion”) for wrongful termination as well as a customer 
of his employer (“Alyeska”) and the customer’s employee (“Disbrow”) for tortious 
interference with his employment contract.183  Champion counterclaimed for conversion 
and unjust enrichment.184  Domke and Champion each prevailed in part, and Domke 
appealed.185  The supreme court held that the superior court erred when it denied 
Domke’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict to hold Alyeska vicariously 
liable for Disbrow’s interference, because the record compelled this finding, as the 
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interference occurred within the scope of Disbrow’s employment.186  The supreme court 
also held that the superior court erred when it ruled that Champion’s counterclaims were 
compulsory and thus timely, finding that the claims were permissive because they were 
not logically related to Domke’s.187  The supreme court further held that the superior 
court erred when it entered judgment against Domke based on a jury finding that Domke 
had contributed to the interference with his contract, finding that this contravened the 
statutory definition of the cause of action.188  The supreme court affirmed the decisions of 
the superior court, but remanded for proceedings consistent with the three 
aforementioned holdings.189  
 
 
Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Interior Cabaret, Hotel, Restaurant & Retailers 
Ass’n 
In Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Interior Cabaret, Hotel, Restaurant & 
Retailers Ass’n,190 the supreme court held that it was an abuse of discretion to find that 
Interior Cabaret, Hotel, Restaurant & Retailers Ass’n (“ICHRRA”) was a public interest 
litigant, because it did not meet its burden of showing that it was not motivated primarily 
by economic concerns.191  ICHRRA initially filed suit in an attempt to block a 
referendum approving a five-percent retail-sales tax on alcoholic beverages from being 
placed on the election ballot, but amended its complaint after the tax proposal was 
approved by the voters, claiming that the tax violated another Alaska statute.192  The 
supreme court held that a litigant must satisfy four criteria in order to be considered a 
public interest litigant:  (1) whether the case is designed to effectuate strong public 
policies; (2) whether numerous people will receive benefits from the lawsuit if the 
plaintiff succeeds; (3) whether only a private party could have been expected to bring the 
suit; and (4) whether the litigant would have sufficient economic incentive to bring the 
suit forward even if the action only involved narrow issues that lacked general 
importance.193  The supreme court held that ICHRRA failed the fourth criteria because its 
members had a direct economic incentive to prevent a sales tax on alcohol and that the 
potential benefits to winning the lawsuit were not “insubstantial” or “diffuse.”194  The 
supreme court reversed and remanded the ruling of the superior court, holding that it was 
an abuse of discretion to find that ICHRRA was a public interest litigant, because it did 
not meet its burden of showing that it was not motivated primarily by economic 
concerns.195 
 
                                                 
186 Id. at 300–01. 
187 Id. at 301–03. 
188 Id. at 306–07. 
189 Id. at 308. 
190 137 P.3d 289 (Alaska 2006). 
191 Id. at 294.  
192 Id. at 291.  
193 Id.  
194 Id. at 294. 
195 Id.  
 17 
Hogg v. Raven Contractors, Inc. 
In Hogg v. Raven Contractors, Inc.,196 the supreme court held that a deferential 
standard of review applies to reviewing the superior court’s denial of a motion for a new 
trial following a jury verdict.197  Hogg sued Raven Contractors (“Raven”) for negligence 
after he suffered injuries from falling into a borough trash disposal unit.198  The jury 
decided that though Raven had been negligent, Raven’s negligence was not the legal 
cause of Hogg’s injury.199  Hogg moved for a new trial, arguing that the jury’s verdict did 
not follow court instructions on negligence and causation, and the superior court denied 
the motion.200  The supreme court held that review of a trial court’s decision to deny a 
motion for a new trial following a jury verdict is highly deferential and that the denial 
will be reversed only if the verdict was “plainly unreasonable and unjust” because the 
verdict was “completely lacking or slight and unconvincing.”201  The supreme court 
affirmed the superior court’s denial of a new trial, holding that under this deferential 
standard of review, there was an evidentiary basis for the jury’s decision and the verdict 
was not “plainly unreasonable and unjust.”202 
 
 
International Seafoods of Alaska, Inc. v. Bissonette 
 In International Seafoods of Alaska, Inc. v. Bissonette,203 the supreme court held 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the plaintiffs as a class, using a 
single verdict form, instructing the jury, sanctioning absent class members, and awarding 
attorneys’ fees.204  A group of salmon fishers from the Egegik district sued International 
Seafoods of Alaska, Inc. (“International Seafoods”) after it failed to match the major 
fishing buyers with the higher “bay price,”205 as the fishermen interpreted their contract 
to promise.206  At trial, a jury agreed with the fishermen that International Seafoods had 
breached its contract as to the class of fishermen, and the court awarded damages and 
attorneys’ fees to the class.207  The supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in certifying all fishermen who, in the year 2000, took salmon from the Egegik 
district and sold them to International Seafoods as a certifiable class, because the class 
was sufficiently numerous, shared common issues, and was adequately represented by 
counsel.208  Also, the trial court was within its discretion in declining to exclude members 
of the class who did not respond to discovery and instead limiting admissible evidence to 
that which was gathered from members who responded.209  Further, the trial court was 
authorized to use a single verdict form in this class action rather than a verdict form for 
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each member of the class.210  The jury instructions that assumed a single contract, rather 
than separate contracts for each fisherman, were acceptable because both sides argued 
and admitted the single-contract theory at trial.211  Finally, International Seafoods 
presented no authority for overturning the augmented attorneys’ fees.212  The supreme 
court affirmed the jury award, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
certifying the plaintiffs as a class, using a single verdict form, instructing the jury, 
sanctioning absent class members, and awarding attorneys’ fees.213 
 
 
Jarvis v. Ensminger 
 In Jarvis v. Ensminger,214 the supreme court held that the superior court properly 
granted summary judgment on contract claims, but had incorrectly granted summary 
judgment sua sponte on the misrepresentation and promissory estoppel claims.215  Jarvis, 
a former employee at a car dealership, sued his former employers regarding stock options 
provided in his contract of employment but never disbursed to him, claiming breach of 
contract, misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel.216  Jarvis’s former employers 
moved for summary judgment based only on the breach of contract issue;217 however, the 
superior court sua sponte granted summary judgment on the misrepresentation and 
promissory estoppel claims as well.218  The supreme court held that since a contractual 
condition had not been met, summary judgment was appropriately granted to 
Ensminger.219  Summary judgment was rendered in error on the misrepresentation and 
promissory estoppel claims, however, because Ensminger never moved for summary 
judgment on these issues, and, since the burden of showing any genuine issue of material 
fact never shifted to Jarvis, Jarvis’ claims should not have been dismissed for failing to 
do so.220  Furthermore, granting summary judgment was not harmless.221  The supreme 
court partly affirmed and partly reversed the superior court, holding that the summary 
judgment was properly granted on the contract claims, but incorrectly granted sua sponte 
on the misrepresentation and promissory estoppel claims.222 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
210 Id. at 571. 
211 Id. at 572. 
212 Id. at 573. 
213 Id. 
214 134 P.3d 353 (Alaska 2006). 
215 Id. at 355. 
216 Id. at 355. 
217 Id. at 357. 
218 Id. at 361. 
219 Id. at 358–59. 
220 Id. at 362. 
221 Id. at 364. 
222 Id.  
 19 
Jerry Kinn, Valley Motors, Inc. v. Alaska Sales & Service, Inc. 
In Jerry Kinn, Valley Motors, Inc. v. Alaska Sales & Service, Inc.,223 the supreme 
court held that an arbitrator who did not have financial ties to a party involved in 
arbitration was not evidently biased,224 and that because of the construction of a contract, 
the arbitrator had the authority to require the rescission of part of a property contract.225  
Kinn sold to Alaska Sales & Service, Inc. an automobile dealership and the property upon 
which it was located, in two separate agreements.226  After discovering that the land was 
contaminated, Alaska Sales & Service brought an arbitration action against Kinn.227  The 
arbitrator ruled in favor of Alaska Sales & Service, requiring Kinn to rescind the property 
contract, but not the asset (dealership) contract.228  Upon Kinn’s appeal, the superior 
court held that the arbitrator did have the authority to require rescission of the property 
contract, and that the arbitrator was not biased.229  Kinn appealed.230  The supreme court 
held that the ties between the arbitrator and the attorney for Alaska Sales & Services were 
not the kind of financial ties that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the 
arbitrator would be biased.231  Also, a reasonable person could understand the exchange 
to involve two contracts, thus the arbitrator was allowed to require the rescission of one 
but not the other.232  The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, 
holding that an arbitrator who did not have financial ties to a party in an arbitration was 
not evidently biased and that he had the authority to require the partial rescission of the 
property contract.233 
 
 
John’s Heating Service v. Lamb  
In John’s Heating Service v. Lamb,234 the supreme court held that the applicable 
two-year statute of limitations did not act as a bar to a suit arising from carbon monoxide 
poisoning, since the injured party filed suit less than one year after they were put on 
inquiry notice of the possible injury.235  On October 15, 1991, the Lambs called John’s 
Heating Service to inspect their furnace, which was not functioning properly.236  
Although John’s Heating Service did some minor work, the problem was not solved, and 
on January 31, 1993 the Lambs learned from another furnace repair service that the 
furnace was likely circulating carbon monoxide throughout the home.237  Later that year, 
the Lambs hired a lawyer, submitted to neurological tests which showed evidence of 
carbon monoxide poisoning, and filed suit against John’s Heating Service on December 
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23, 1993, more than two years after the initial service call.238  At trial, the jury returned a 
verdict for the Lambs, which John’s Heating Service appealed on statute of limitations 
grounds.239  The supreme court held that the suit was timely, because although the Lambs 
were on inquiry notice of the poor functioning of the furnace on October 15, 1991, the 
Lambs were not on notice of the possible health consequences until January 31, 1993.240  
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that the complaint 
arising from carbon monoxide poisoning was timely because plaintiffs were not on notice 
until they learned of the possible health consequences.241   
 
 
Kay v. Danbar, Inc.  
In Kay v. Danbar, Inc.242 the supreme court held that a plaintiff who elects to limit 
his damage claims under Civil Rule 26(g)243 may subsequently withdraw his request and 
that where there is at least minimally sufficient evidence that a Realtor assumed a 
responsibility to protect a tenant, a jury must decide whether or not that assumed duty 
was breached.244  Kay contacted a RE/MAX agent in an apartment search, moved into a 
duplex, and a month later fractured his ankle after slipping on loose carpet in the 
garage.245  In the suit that followed, Kay initially invoked Civil Rule 26(g), which caps 
damages at $100,000 but also provides for expedited discovery.246  However, after 
determining that damages would exceed that amount, he attempted to withdraw his use of 
Rule 26(g).247  The court denied his request and, despite a jury verdict of over $400,000, 
reduced the amount in accordance with the cap.248  The supreme court held that Kay 
could withdraw his use of Rule 26(g), because the rule is comparable to a motion for 
leave to amend, and a complaint may be amended if it is in the interest of justice to do 
so.249  Here, Kay specifically told the opposing party that he may need to withdraw his 
election to use Rule 26(g), and he immediately informed them of his intent to do so once 
he found out that the damages would likely exceed $100,000.250  Additionally, RE/MAX 
was explicitly designated as the property manager and was specifically mentioned in the 
rental agreement as the party which would undertake certain managerial duties.251  As a 
result, there was enough evidence that a jury could reasonably find that RE/MAX had a 
duty to warn Kay about the hazard which eventually caused his injury.252  The supreme 
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the trial holding that a plaintiff who 
elects to limit his damage claims under Rule 26(g) may subsequently withdraw his 
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request for the expedited procedure provided by the rule and that where there is at least 
minimally sufficient evidence that a Realtor assumed a responsibility to protect a tenant, 
it is a question for the jury whether or not that assumed duty was breached.253 
 
 
City of Kenai v. Friends of the Recreation Center, Inc.   
In City of Kenai v. Friends of the Recreation Center, Inc.,254 the supreme court 
held that full attorneys’ fees should be awarded to public interest litigants even though 
the case was ultimately dismissed as moot.255  Friends of the Recreation Center, Inc. 
(“Friends”) sued the city for entering into a contract for private management of the city’s 
recreation center without competitive bidding, as required by city ordinance.256  The 
superior court issued a preliminary injunction to stop the city from honoring its 
contract.257  The city council then amended the ordinance to exclude recreation center 
managers from the competitive bidding requirement, and the case was dismissed as 
moot.258  Friends was awarded full attorneys’ fees, and the city appealed.259  The supreme 
court held that the attorneys’ fees award was not an abuse of discretion because if a 
prevailing party is a public interest litigant, it is normally entitled to the full amount of 
reasonable attorneys’ fees.260  The court found that Friends had demonstrated probable 
success on the merits, making it the prevailing party despite the case being dismissed for 
mootness.261  The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that 
full attorneys’ fees should be awarded to public interest litigants even though their case 
was dismissed as moot.262  
 
 
Lee v. State  
In Lee v. State,263 the supreme court held that facts alleged in a complaint were 
properly deemed admitted when an individual willfully failed to follow court orders in 
responding to discovery.264  The State filed a complaint against Lee under Alaska’s 
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, alleging that he engaged in 
consumer fraud in his advertisements and demonstrations for “free electricity.”265  Lee 
did not adequately respond to discovery requests, despite repeated orders to do so from 
the court.266  In response, the trial court ordered the facts alleged in the complaint to be 
deemed admitted.267  The supreme court held that the complaint was properly deemed 
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admitted, because Lee’s decision not to answer discovery was willful and prejudicial to 
the State’s case.268  Also, there did not appear to be any effective alternatives that would 
correct the prejudice to the State’s case, other than deeming the facts to be admitted.269  
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the trial judge, holding that the facts in the 
complaint were properly deemed admitted when an individual willfully and prejudicially 
failed to follow court orders in responding to discovery.270      
 
 
McLaughlin v. Lougee 
In McLaughlin v. Lougee,271 the supreme court held that the repeal of statutory 
contribution in Alaska did not preclude a common-law contribution action against 
defendants who were not parties to the original action.272  The McLaughlins lost title to a 
property due to malpractice by their attorney Robson.273  The McLaughlins allege that 
Robson’s law firm conspired with Robson in order to deprive the McLaughlins of their 
legal rights to sue Robson for malpractice.274  Because Robson’s liability insurance was 
exhausted, the McLaughlins sought contribution for the remainder of their damages from 
Robson’s alleged co-conspirator, the law firm.275  The superior court ruled that because 
the Uniform Contribution Act was repealed in 1989 by voter initiative, the McLaughlins 
could not seek contribution from Hughes Thorsness, a non-party to the original action.276  
The supreme court first stated that the ruling on this case applied only to cases between 
the 1989 voter initiative and the new contribution law enacted in 1997.277  The supreme 
court held that common-law contribution is available against non-parties to the original 
action because fairly allocating damages according to the relative fault of all parties, or 
non-parties, furthers the objective of Alaska’s comparative-fault-several-liability rule.278  
Because Alaska does not reduce damages in an original action for the fault of non-parties, 
disallowing contribution in a subsequent action would be unfair to the parties deemed at 
fault in the original action.279  The supreme court reversed the superior court’s decision 
and remanded the case, holding that the repeal of statutory contribution in Alaska did not 
preclude a common-law contribution action against defendants who were not parties to 
the original action.280 
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State, Department of Transportation and Public Facilities v. Miller   
In State, Department of Transportation and Public Facilities v. Miller,281 the 
supreme court held that the superior court did not err: (1) in denying the State a 
continuance where new information came to light two and a half months before trial; (2) 
in instructing the jury on negligence; (3) in permitting the jury to consider the lost 
earning capacity of the plaintiff; or (4) in failing to grant the State’s motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict.282  Miller was injured in a plane crash at an unmanned 
airport in Kipnuk owned and maintained by the State of Alaska.283  He sued the State for 
negligence on the grounds that the State failed to maintain functioning windsocks on the 
runway and was awarded damages.284  The State appealed.285  The supreme court held 
that the superior court’s denial of a continuance for further discovery did not prevent the 
State from presenting evidence on four issues which affected the overall trial, because the 
State had enough time to present its core case and alert the jury as to the existence of the 
four new issues286 and thus was not deprived of a “substantial right.”287  Further, 
considering the condition of the airport as a whole, the jury was correctly instructed on 
the south windsock’s relevance.288  Also, the superior court did not err in instructing the 
jury to consider lost earning capacity when Miller stipulated he was not seeking damages 
in relation to his decision to leave his job, because the issue of lost earning capacity was 
distinct from the issue of actual lost earnings, and on the facts a reasonable jury could 
have found that Miller was entitled to damages for lost earning capacity.289  Finally, the 
State was not entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because a reasonable 
person could find that the State, having installed but not maintained the windsock, was 
aware it had created a dangerous condition and failed to adequately warn about or remedy 
the condition.290  The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding 
that the superior court did not err: (1) in denying the State a continuance where new 
information came to light before trial; (2) in instructing the jury on negligence; (3) in 
permitting the jury to consider the lost earning capacity of the plaintiff; or (4) in failing to 
grant the State’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.291 
 
 
 
Milos v. Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc.   
In Milos v. Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc.,292 the supreme court held that the 
evidence in a wrongful death suit permitted the inference that an employee killed at his 
worksite was off-shift at the time of the accident and that this fact was material to a 
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determination of whether Alaska’s workers’ compensation statute would apply as an 
exclusive remedy.293  Milos was killed after riding, without authorization, an ATV 
belonging to his employer, Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc. (“Quality”), up a large pile of 
gravel and accidentally contacting an overhead power line.294  Milos’s estate sued Quality 
for negligence, and Quality moved for summary judgment, arguing that, under Alaska 
law, workers’ compensation was the estate’s sole remedy.295  The superior court granted 
summary judgment to Quality, holding that Milos’s injuries arose out of and in the course 
of his employment.296  The supreme court held that the estate had submitted enough 
evidence to create a genuine issue of fact about whether Milos was on the clock at the 
time of the accident.297  Further, this issue was material because if Milos’s off-clock 
status were proven, it might exclude him from workers’ compensation coverage.298  
There was not a sufficient relationship between Milos’s actions and his employment to 
allow summary judgment based on the applicability of the workers’ compensation 
statute.299  The supreme court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case, 
holding that the evidence permitted the inference that Milos was off-shift at the time of 
the accident and that this fact was material to a determination of whether Alaska’s 
workers’ compensation statute would apply.300 
 
 
Morgan v. Morgan 
In Morgan v. Morgan,301 the supreme court held that a former wife failed to move 
for modification of her marriage dissolution decree within a reasonable time after 
discovering her former husband’s pension.302  The parties’ 1974 divorce decree dividing 
their marital property did not include the husband’s then-unvested pension.303  The 
former wife, having learned of the pension’s existence in 2000, moved to modify the 
dissolution decree in June, 2003, and the superior court granted the motion.304  The 
former husband appealed, claiming the former wife’s motion was not filed within a 
reasonable time.305  The supreme court agreed, holding that the former wife’s generalized 
fear of the former husband’s anger problem should not have precluded her from seeking 
relief sooner.306  The supreme court reversed and remanded the decision of the superior 
court, holding that the former wife failed to move within a reasonable time to modify her 
marriage dissolution decree after learning of her former husband’s pension.307  
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Murray v. Ledbetter 
In Murray v. Ledbetter,308 the supreme court held that an attorney’s alleged 
misrepresentation in court was not sufficiently egregious to qualify as fraud directed at a 
court of law but at most was a wrong committed between the individual parties.309  
Rodney and Katherine Ledbetter, while married, came to a debt settlement agreement 
with Murray.310  The following year, they filed for divorce, and the decree of divorce 
ordered Rodney to assume most of the marriage debt liabilities.311  After moving to 
Anchorage, Katherine received notice that Murray was filing suit against Katherine and 
Rodney for defaulting on their settlement agreement.312  Katherine responded with a 
letter stating that Rodney had assumed all marital debts and eventually dropped off 
several legal documents, including the original summons and complaint, at the office of 
Rodney’s attorney, Crist.313  Without any consultation with Katherine, Crist represented 
her in an Idaho court and agreed on a new settlement with Murray’s attorney.314  The 
superior court judge held that the Idaho judgment could not be enforced in Alaska 
because it had been obtained fraudulently in the Idaho court.315  The supreme court held 
that the degree of misconduct by Crist was not sufficient to find that he had acted 
recklessly in representing Katherine in an Idaho court,316 that Katherine failed to prove 
that the Idaho court’s determination on her being required to pay back the debt would 
have been different had she been represented by her own attorney,317 that as a result of 
the misrepresentation one party was not able to take advantage of the other,318 that it 
would be inequitable to place the consequences of the superior court’s decision on 
Murray, the lender,319 and that Katherine was partly at fault for completely ignoring the 
case after depositing documents at Crist’s office.320  If there was a wrong, it was between 
Katherine and Crist, not between Crist and the Idaho court.321  The supreme court 
reversed the superior court’s ruling, holding that an attorney’s alleged misrepresentation 
in court was not sufficiently egregious to qualify as fraud directed at a court of law, but at 
most was a wrong committed between the individual parties.322 
 
 
Perkins v. Doyon Universal Services, LLC  
In Perkins v. Doyon Universal Services, LLC,323 the supreme court held that an 
employer does not discriminate on the basis of race so long as it is able to provide 
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legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for hiring a non-minority rather than a minority 
individual.324  Perkins, who identified himself as black, applied for a job at Doyon 
Universal Services, LLC (“Doyon”), but the job was given to another individual who was 
not a minority.325  As a result, Perkins filed a discrimination suit as a pro se plaintiff.326  
The superior court granted summary judgment dismissal to Doyon.327  The supreme court 
held that when a plaintiff establishes that he is a member of a recognized class protected 
by statute and that he was denied a position for which he was qualified, he establishes a 
prima facie case of discrimination, shifting the burden to the defendant.328  Although the 
burden shifted, however, Doyon had legitimate reasons for hiring the non-minority 
candidate over Perkins.329  The hired individual had worked for eight years in a kennel, 
whereas Perkins had only worked in a research lab, which has a more tenuous 
relationship to the desired job.330  The supreme court affirmed the dismissal, finding that 
an employer does not discriminate on the basis of race so long as it is able to provide 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for hiring a non-minority rather than a minority 
individual.331 
 
 
Price v. Eastham 
In Price v. Eastham,332 the supreme court held that the superior court must 
include sufficient findings in its decision for meaningful appellate review333 and that even 
a pro se litigant must preserve claims for appeal by raising them at the trial level.334  Price 
posted “no trespassing” signs on his property to prohibit snowmachiners from crossing 
the land.335  A group of snowmachiners sued Price to have the trail declared right-of-way 
or, alternatively, a prescriptive easement.336  The superior court found that a right-of-way, 
or alternatively a prescriptive easement, existed.337  After the supreme court affirmed and 
remanded,338 the superior court issued a single sentence order describing the length and 
width of the easement, and Price appealed.339  The supreme court held that the superior 
court failed to make findings sufficient to clearly and explicitly specify the scope of the 
easement, and therefore to allow for meaningful appellate review. 340  Additionally, the 
supreme court refused to consider a new argument Price raised on appeal, because he did 
not raise that issue at the trial level, even though pro se litigants should be held to less 
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rigorous standards than attorneys.341  The supreme court remanded the case, holding that 
the superior court’s one sentence order describing the prescriptive easement did not 
provide enough specificity for meaningful appellate review and that, though a pro se 
litigant’s brief should be read generously, the court would not consider on appeal an issue 
he or she did not preserve at the trial level.342 
 
 
Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc.  
In Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc.,343 the supreme court held that, while the doctrine of 
res judicata bars an action when the claims in that action were previously dismissed with 
prejudice,344 a new claim in the subsequent action is not barred when it does not stem 
from the same transaction.345  Mr. Smith sued his former employer, CSK Auto, for 
injuries Smith allegedly received while working at CSK.346  After CSK had the case 
removed to federal court based on diversity of citizenship, and shortly after the court 
dismissed Smith’s claims with prejudice, he filed the current action in superior court, 
stating claims similar to those of the federal case, in addition to a new wrongful 
termination claim.347  The superior court dismissed this second complaint on grounds that 
it was barred by either res judicata or collateral estoppel, and Smith appealed.348  After 
quickly dispensing with the claims that were identical to those of the previously 
dismissed complaint,349 the supreme court held that the wrongful termination claim, 
which was new to this action, was not a new legal theory arising from the same facts, but 
was rather a claim arising from a different transaction.350  Since the wrongful termination 
claim arose from a different harm, and caused a different injury, the claim was not 
precluded.351  The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court in part and 
reversed in part, holding that the claims that were based on the same injury as the 
previously dismissed complaint were barred by res judicata, while the new claim of 
wrongful termination was not barred since it did not stem from the same transaction.352 
 
 
Solomon v. Interior Regional Housing Authority 
In Solomon v. Interior Regional Housing Authority,353 the supreme court held that 
equitable tolling is available in overcoming the statute of limitations in a state law claim 
when a litigant is pursuing the claim in federal court in a timely manner.354  Solomon 
sued Interior Regional Housing Authority (“IRHA”) in federal court for violating the 
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Indian employment preference laws, and claimed that he was not hired in retaliation for 
his worker’s compensation claims.355  Solomon’s federal claims were dismissed, and 
afterward he filed in state court under Alaska state law.356  The IRHA argued that his 
claim was barred by the statute of limitations.357  Solomon argued that, because he was 
pursuing those claims in federal court, his state claim should be eligible for equitable 
tolling to allow him to file his claim in state court.358  The supreme court, applying a 
three-part test, held that his claim was eligible for equitable tolling under state law, 
because: (1) the IRHA had notice about the alternative remedy; (2) there was no 
prejudice to the IRHA; and (3) Solomon acted reasonably and in good faith.359  The 
supreme court reversed the decision of the superior court, holding that, because Solomon 
was pursuing his claim in federal court, his state court claim was eligible for equitable 
tolling of the statute of limitations.360 
 
 
Stuart v. Whaler’s Cove, Inc. 
In Stuart v. Whaler’s Cove, Inc.,361 the supreme court held that the superior court 
did not abuse its discretion when refusing to hold a party in contempt after it had made 
significant efforts to comply with the court’s prior order.362  The superior court 
previously ordered Whaler’s Cove, Inc. (“Whaler’s Cove”) to remove buildings that 
obstructed the right-of-way shared by Stuart.363  A majority of the encroaching buildings 
were removed, but not all of them.364  Stuart filed a motion requesting that Whaler’s 
Cove be held in contempt.365  The superior court found that significant effort had been 
exerted and denied the motion.366  The supreme court held that, under a clear error 
standard of review and according considerable deference,367 the record documented 
significant efforts by Whaler’s Cove, including using heavy equipment, draining the 
reservoir, and reinforcing the embankment.368  Furthermore, these efforts improved the 
flow through the right-of-way.369  The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s 
decision, holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion when refusing to hold 
Whaler’s Cove in contempt after it had made significant efforts to comply with the 
court’s prior order.370 
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Valley Hospital Ass’n v. Brauneis  
In Valley Hospital Ass’n v. Brauneis,371 the supreme court held that a motion for 
entry of a default judgment could not be denied on grounds that an averment lacks proof 
without first providing a plaintiff with notice and opportunity to submit evidence of the 
truth of the averment.372  Valley Hospital Association, Inc. (“Valley Hospital”) obtained a 
default judgment against Brauneis, but appealed the superior court’s refusal to award 
attorneys’ fees and grant the hospital the right to enforce a health care provider lien.373  
The supreme court held that a motion for entry of a default judgment could not be denied 
on grounds that an averment lacks proof without first providing a plaintiff with notice and 
opportunity to submit evidence of the truth of the averment, thus Valley Hospital should 
have been given notice and an opportunity to provide evidence that it recorded the lien, 
since it was questioned.374  In addition, the supreme court held that the denial of 
attorneys’ fees was not an abuse of discretion since Valley Hospital failed to document its 
fees and had waived its right to fees when it failed to move for reconsideration.375  The 
supreme court remanded the case, holding that a motion for entry of a default judgment 
could not be denied on grounds that an averment lacks proof without first providing a 
plaintiff with notice and opportunity to submit evidence of the truth of the averment.376  
 
 
Vazquez v. Campbell  
In Vazquez v. Campbell,377 the supreme court held that a losing party who 
engages in bad-faith conduct or brings frivolous claims and defenses can be forced to pay 
all reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the prevailing party instead of just a partial 
payment.378  Campbell sought to enforce a child custody order entered by a court in 
Oregon, and the Vazquezes unsuccessfully opposed this order at the superior court 
level.379  The superior court ruled that the Vazquezes litigated in bad-faith and thus 
awarded full attorneys’ fees and costs to Campbell.380  The supreme court held that 
Alaska Civil Rule 82,381 which gives partial attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party as a 
standard, allows a court to award full attorneys’ fees if the losing party acted in bad-faith 
or pursued frivolous claims or asserted frivolous defenses.382  Furthermore, the supreme 
court held that Campbell was entitled to attorneys’ fees despite that fact that she used a 
free legal aid service.383  The supreme court affirmed the ruling of the superior court, 
holding that a losing party who engages in bad-faith conduct or brings frivolous claims 
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and defenses can be forced to pay all reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the 
prevailing party instead of just a partial payment.384 
 
 
Williams v. Williams 
 In Williams v. Williams,385 the supreme court held that neither the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel nor Alaska’s statutory fraud tolling provision applied in a suit by an 
heir against two of her siblings for fraudulently removing stock from their father’s 
estate.386  Pete Williams began a transfer of stock in a family business to two of his four 
children, Mike and Connie, who completed the transfer after Pete’s death, removing the 
stock from his estate, which was probated nine years later.387  Another child, Christine, 
sued Mike and Connie for fraud in connection with the stock transfer eight years after the 
probate.388  The superior court dismissed her complaint as untimely.389  Christine 
appealed, arguing that the statute of limitations was tolled under the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel because Mike and Connie concealed the existence of an earlier will and the 
stock transfer and misrepresented that she would receive a share in the business.390  She 
also argued that her suit was timely under an Alaska statute that tolls the statute of 
limitations on claims of fraud in probate proceedings until discovery of the fraud.391  The 
supreme court held that, to show equitable estoppel, a plaintiff must show fraudulent 
conduct, justifiable reliance, and damage and must exercise due diligence in uncovering 
concealed facts, and that neither equitable estoppel nor the statutory fraud tolling 
provision applied to Christine’s suit because Mike and Connie did not commit the 
fraudulent acts she alleged.392  Even if they did, Christine’s suit would still be untimely 
because, with due diligence, she should have discovered the concealed facts at the time of 
the probate, ending the toll.393  The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior 
court, holding that neither the doctrine of equitable estoppel nor Alaska’s statutory fraud 
tolling provision applied to Christine’s claims against Mike and Connie for fraudulently 
removing stock from their father’s estate.394 
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V.  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
Alaska Right to Life Committee v. Miles  
In Alaska Right to Life Committee v. Miles,395 the Ninth Circuit held that certain 
challenged provisions of Alaskan campaign finance law did not violate the First 
Amendment.396  The Alaska Right to Life Committee (“AKRTL”), a pro-life nonprofit 
corporation, sued the director and members of the Alaska Public Offices Commission 
(collectively “APOC”) in their official capacities after APOC notified AKRTL that a 
proposed AKRTL telemarketing campaign shortly before the 2002 gubernatorial race 
would subject AKRTL to selected financial disclosure requirements under state campaign 
finance law.397  AKRTL alleged multiple violations of the First Amendment.398  The 
district court granted summary judgment to APOC, and AKRTL appealed.399  The Ninth 
Circuit held that the challenged provisions did not violate the First Amendment, because: 
(1) the definition of “electioneering communication” was neither unconstitutionally 
vague nor overbroad on its face or as applied;400 and (2) the three forms of challenged 
reporting requirements survived strict scrutiny.401  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
decision of the district court, holding that the selected provisions of Alaskan campaign 
finance law challenged by AKRTL did not violate the First Amendment.402  
 
 
Frederick v. Morse 
 In Frederick v. Morse,403 the Ninth Circuit held that a school principal cannot 
restrict political speech contrary to the school’s mission if the speech did not disrupt 
school activities404 and was neither plainly offensive nor school-sponsored.405  Joseph 
Frederick displayed a banner that read “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” as the Olympic Torch passed 
by his school.406  The students had been released from class for the event, and Frederick 
was standing off school property as he held the banner.407  The school principal took the 
banner, stating that it was offensive material contrary to the school’s drug policy, and 
suspended Frederick from school for ten days.408  Frederick sought a declaratory 
judgment that his First Amendment rights had been violated, which the district court 
refused on summary judgment.409  The Ninth Circuit held that a school may restrict 
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speech that is neither plainly offensive nor school-sanctioned only if it reasonably will 
disrupt school activities410 and, because it was undisputed that Frederick’s speech was not 
likely to disrupt school activities, the school violated Frederick’s constitutional rights.411  
Additionally, Morse, the school principal, was not entitled to qualified immunity because 
she violated Frederick’s established constitutional rights in a way that would clearly be a 
violation to a reasonable principal.412  Thus, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s 
dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, holding that a school principal cannot 
restrict disfavored political speech that did not disrupt school activities and was neither 
plainly offensive nor school-sponsored.413 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. State, Department of Environmental Conservation 
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. State, Department of Environmental 
Conservation,414 the supreme court held that a state entity could bill an appealing permit 
holder for the administrative costs of an appeal without violating due process.415  The 
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (“Department”) issued several air 
quality permits to Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. (“Alyeska”), and Alyeska appealed based 
on several aspects of the permits.416  The Department billed Alyeska approximately 
$8,000 for the administration costs of their appeal.417  Alyeska claims that this was 
improper under Alaska Statute section 46.14.240, or alternatively that the statute is a 
violation of their due process.418  The supreme court held that the plain language of 
section 46.14.240 allows the Department to recover such costs from Alyeska and that 
Alyeska failed to meet its burden of showing that the plain language should not 
control.419  The supreme court also held that the Department’s interpretation of the statute 
did not impede Alyeska’s access to justice because Alyeska failed to identify any specific 
harm done to it as a result of the imposition of the fees.420  Also, Alyeska’s argument that 
it did not receive proper notice was rejected because it continued to pursue its claim for 
almost a year after it received the initial invoice.421  Because Alyeska was unable to 
provide evidence that the plain language of the statute was not controlling, and because 
there was no evidence of a due process violation, they could be required to pay for the 
administrative costs of their own appeal.422  The supreme court affirmed the superior 
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court, holding that a state entity could bill an appealing permit holder for the 
administrative costs of such an appeal.423 
 
 
Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform v. Municipality of Anchorage 
In Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform v. Municipality of Anchorage,424 the 
supreme court held that a voter initiative requiring the granting of taxi licenses to all 
eligible persons did not violate the Alaska constitutional prohibition of voter initiated 
appropriation.425  In 2002, Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform (“Citizens”) submitted a 
petition for a voter initiative requiring that all eligible persons wishing to obtain a taxi 
license must be granted one by Anchorage, but the municipal clerk rejected the 
submission.426  The supreme court held that the initiative, if approved, would not 
appropriate assets of Anchorage.427  The taxi permits are not public assets, since fares 
paid by customers go to the cab drivers, not the state.428  The supreme court demanded 
that the initiative be placed on the ballot at the next municipal election.429  The supreme 
court reversed the judgment of the superior court, holding that a voter initiative requiring 
the granting of taxi licenses to all eligible persons did not violate the constitutional 
prohibition of voter initiated appropriation.430 
 
 
Crawford v. Kemp  
In Crawford v. Kemp,431 the supreme court held that an arrestee raised a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether the facts and circumstances known to an arresting 
officer supported a reasonable belief that the arrestee’s words created a hazardous 
condition constituting disorderly conduct.432  Kemp, a state trooper, asked Crawford his 
name while in search of a suspect in a courthouse clerk’s office.433  Crawford repeatedly 
refused and, after a further exchange of words, was arrested and searched.434  Crawford 
filed a complaint alleging violation of his right to free speech and unreasonable search 
and seizure, but the superior court found that Kemp had sufficient probable cause to 
arrest Crawford for disorderly conduct and was immune under state and federal law; 
Crawford appealed.435  The supreme court held that the arrestee raised a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the facts and circumstances known to the officer supported a 
reasonable belief that the arrestee’s words were unreasonably loud or created a hazardous 
condition constituting disorderly conduct.436  The supreme court also held that, because it 
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was not clear that Kemp arrested Crawford out of a good faith belief that Crawford was 
violating the law, Kemp was not immune from the state law tort suit.437  The supreme 
court reversed the superior court’s decision, holding that the arrestee raised a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether the facts and circumstances known to the officer 
supported a reasonable belief that the arrestee’s words created a hazardous condition 
constituting disorderly conduct.438 
 
 
Green Party of Alaska v. State, Division of Elections   
In Green Party of Alaska v. State, Division of Elections,439 the supreme court held 
that a statute restricting recognition of political parties by the Alaska Division of 
Elections (“Division”) was constitutional because it served the State’s compelling interest 
in regulating ballot access in a way that did not overburden the Green Party’s voters or 
candidates.440  An Alaska statute441 defined a political party as an organized group whose 
number of registered voters was equal to, or whose candidate for governor had received, 
at least three percent of the popular vote in the previous gubernatorial election.442  The 
Division withdrew official recognition from the Green Party of Alaska, whose registered 
voters were equal to only about two percent of the votes cast in the previous 
gubernatorial election, and whose candidate received only about one percent of the 
popular vote.443  The Green Party challenged the constitutionality of the statute, alleging 
that it violated the party’s rights to equal protection, free speech, free political 
association, and ballot access.444  The supreme court held that the Green Party had 
asserted a constitutionally protected right,445 but that it had overstated the injury to its 
rights, because it could still register voters before the next election or add its candidate to 
the ballot by petition.446  The State had a compelling interest in preventing confusion, 
deception and frustration of the democratic process at the polls, and therefore could 
require parties to demonstrate some specific degree of voter support.447  Also, its means 
of accomplishing this goal, tying party recognition to the gubernatorial election, was 
narrowly tailored, because the gubernatorial election is the only statewide election which 
is sufficiently likely to result in a competitive race.448  Finally, the State had satisfied its 
burden of determining the existence of less restrictive alternatives by establishing that its 
three-percent requirement was well within the mainstream of ballot access laws of other 
states.449  The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that a 
statute restricting recognition of political parties by the Division was constitutional 
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because it served the State’s compelling interest in regulating ballot access in a way that 
did not overburden the Green Party’s voters or candidates.450 
 
 
Kohlhaas v. State 
In Kohlhaas v. State,451 the supreme court held that secession is unconstitutional 
and an improper subject for a ballot initiative.452   Kohlhaas submitted a ballot initiative 
with one hundred qualifying signatures calling for Alaska’s secession from the United 
States.453  The Lieutenant Governor refused to certify the initiative petition for 
circulation.454  The superior court affirmed this refusal, and Kohlhaas appealed.455  The 
supreme court held that the petition was correctly rejected because the power of the 
people to enact laws through initiative cannot extend beyond the legislature’s power 
under the Constitution.456   Although review of an initiative’s constitutionality typically 
cannot occur until after its enactment, an initiative petition can be rejected if it is clearly 
unconstitutional.457  Secession is clearly unconstitutional under several post-civil war 
Supreme Court decisions and is not a power reserved by the states under the Tenth 
Amendment.458  The supreme court affirmed the rejection of the initiative, holding that 
secession is unconstitutional and an improper subject for a ballot initiative.459  
 
 
Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute  
In Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute,460 the supreme court held that in non-
emergencies, a non-consenting mental patient cannot be forced by the State to take 
psychotropic drugs, unless the court finds that it is in the patient’s best interest and that 
the use of such drugs is the least intrusive method of treatment.461  Myers was an 
involuntary patient at the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (“API”), and API petitioned the 
superior court to authorize the use of psychotropic drugs without her consent.462  The 
court found that under Alaska statute, it was not authorized to make an independent 
determination of Myers’ best interests, and thus deferred to API’s judgment.463  Myers 
appealed, arguing that a court must determine what is in her best interest, that the right to 
refuse consent to medication is fundamental, and that API must show both that the State 
has a compelling interest and that the medication was the least intrusive method.464  The 
supreme court held that because Alaska’s constitution provides a broader right to privacy 
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than the U.S. Constitution, Myers’ right to refuse medical care is fundamental.465  
Further, when a substantial burden is placed on such privacy, the State must show that 
there is a compelling interest and that there are no means less restrictive.466  Although 
API has a compelling interest in keeping Myers safe,467 a court, rather than API, must 
determine whether or not Myers’ constitutional right to privacy has been violated.468  The 
supreme court vacated the involuntary treatment order, holding that in non-emergencies, 
a non-consenting mental patient cannot be forced by the State to take psychotropic drugs, 
unless the court finds that it is in the patient’s best interest and that the use of such drugs 
is the least intrusive method of treatment.469 
 
 
Sengupta v. University of Alaska  
In Sengupta v. University of Alaska,470 the supreme court held that a former 
tenured state university professor failed to establish a prima facie case of First 
Amendment retaliation.471  The University of Alaska Fairbanks (“UAF”) terminated 
Sengupta for cause.472  The professor sought reemployment with UAF, but when UAF 
refused to rehire him as a matter of policy, Sengupta filed suit, alleging violation of the 
First Amendment.473  The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of UAF, 
and Sengupta appealed.474  The supreme court held that Sengupta failed to make a prima 
facie First Amendment retaliation case because he adduced no evidence that permitted a 
reasonable inference that UAF’s refusal to rehire him was motivated by anything other 
than its no-rehire policy.475  The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior 
court, holding that Sengupta did not establish a prima facie case of First Amendment 
retaliation.476        
 
 
Simpson v. Murkowski  
In Simpson v. Murkowski,477 the supreme court held that senior Alaskans were not 
entitled to longevity bonuses under the doctrine of promissory estoppel or the Contracts 
Clause.478  In 1972 the Alaska legislature approved a program giving Alaskans over the 
age of sixty-five a monetary bonus as an incentive for them to remain in Alaska.479  In 
2003, the Governor used his veto power to eliminate appropriations for the longevity 
bonus program, despite the existence of a phase-out program which indicated that seniors 
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already receiving benefits would continue to receive them.480  In response to the 
Governor’s veto, a group of senior citizens sued the State, and the superior court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the State.481  The supreme court held that the senior 
citizens were not entitled to longevity bonuses under the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel.482  In order to show promissory estoppel, a party must show: (1) the action 
induced a change of position, (2) the promisor should have foreseen the reliance, (3) there 
was an actual promise, and (4) justice calls for enforcement.483  The senior citizens failed 
to establish (3), because the prior Governor’s letter suggesting the gradual phase-out of 
the program was a proposal, not an enforceable promise.484  Also, the discontinuation of 
the longevity bonus program did not violate the Contract Clause of the Alaska 
Constitution, since the language of the statute did not clearly show that the legislature 
intended to create a contract with the citizens when the statute was enacted.485  Further, 
the Governor was well within his authority to veto the appropriations under his power 
granted by the Alaska Constitution.486  The supreme court affirmed the ruling of the 
superior court, holding plaintiff senior citizens could not claim promissory estoppel or a 
Contracts Clause violation when the Governor vetoed appropriations for a longevity 
bonus that had been given to senior citizens in order to encourage them to remain in 
Alaska.487 
 
 
City of Skagway v. Robertson   
In City of Skagway v. Robertson,488 the supreme court held that a city ordinance 
restricting speech was not overbroad, and therefore was constitutional, because it was 
properly construed to apply only to commercial speech which did nothing more than 
propose a transaction.489  The City of Skagway (“City”), in order to discourage 
aggressive sales tactics aimed at pedestrians, passed an ordinance confining person-to-
person sales within its historic district to enclosed structures or areas containing at least 
200 square feet of retail space.490  Appellant Robertson sold tours by approaching 
pedestrians on the street; appellant Lee sold tours from various retail locations.491  The 
City appealed the superior court’s finding that the ordinance’s restriction on speech was 
not narrowly tailored because it amounted to a non-specific ban on sales in public, no 
matter what was being sold.492  Applying the Central Hudson493 test for commercial 
speech, the supreme court held that the ordinance did not restrict “business” as a whole 
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but merely a subcategory of business, “Off Premises Canvassing.”494  Further, the 
language of the ordinance stating that it addressed speech “solely intended” to attract 
pedestrians did not impermissibly focus on the intent of the speaker; rather, the word 
“solely” was a proper use of limiting language, focusing the application of the ordinance 
to commercial speech only.495  The supreme court reversed the superior court, holding 
that the Skagway city ordinance restricting speech was not overbroad, and therefore was 
constitutional, because it was properly construed to apply only to commercial speech 
which did nothing more than propose a transaction.496   
 
 
Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage 
In Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage,497 the supreme court held that 
allowing initiative petitions to force the sale of public utilities would deprive the 
assembly of its discretionary authority in violation of the Alaska Constitution.498  
Staudenmaier submitted two initiative petitions that the Anchorage municipal clerk 
refused to certify.499  The first called for the municipality to sell the Anchorage Municipal 
Light and Power Utility at fair market value, and the second called for the sale of the 
Anchorage Municipal Refuse Collection Utility to the highest bidder.500  The superior 
court affirmed rejection of the petitions, and Staudenmaier appealed.501  The supreme 
court held that the petitions were properly rejected because article XI, section 7 of the 
Alaska Constitution502 prohibits the making of appropriations by voter initiative.503  The 
supreme court reasoned that this prohibition applies to initiatives that designate the use of 
state assets, such as Staudenmaier’s.504  The Anchorage Municipal Charter section that 
allowed the sale of municipal utilities by voter initiative violated the Alaska Constitution 
when it was written, and was therefore void.505  The supreme court affirmed the decision 
of the superior court, holding that allowing initiative petitions to force the sale of public 
utilities would deprive the assembly of its discretionary authority in violation of the 
Alaska Constitution.506 
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Alaska Court of Appeals  
 
Bessette v. State  
In Bessette v. State,507 the court of appeals held that a police officer had probable 
cause to stop a person operating a snowmachine on a sidewalk.508  Trooper Loop 
approached Bessette after noticing him trying to start a snowmachine on the sidewalk.509  
Bessette showed signs of drunkenness and admitted he had driven the snowmachine.510  
Bessette’s breath alcohol content registered above the legal limit, and Trooper Loop 
arrested him for driving under the influence.511  Bessette filed a motion to suppress all 
evidence from the stop, claiming Trooper Loop did not have probable cause to stop him 
for operating the snowmachine on the sidewalk because the sidewalk was covered with 
snow.512  The superior court found that Officer Loop did have probable cause to make the 
stop and convicted Bessette.513  Bessette appealed the denial of his suppression motion.514  
The court of appeals held that probable cause existed because having a snowmachine on 
the sidewalk is a traffic infraction regardless of whether the sidewalk is under a snow 
berm.515  The court of appeals affirmed Bessette’s conviction, holding that a police 
officer had probable cause to stop a person operating a snowmachine on a sidewalk.516 
 
 
Case v. Municipality of Anchorage  
In Case v. Municipality of Anchorage,517 the court of appeals held that the 
presumption of constitutionality of the meritorious defense requirement for setting aside a 
default judgment was not rebutted.518  Case demanded a trial to contest a speeding ticket 
but failed to appear on the specified trial date and received a negative default 
judgment.519  The magistrate denied his motion to set aside the default judgment on 
grounds that he failed to assert a meritorious defense, which would show that the trial 
result could be different if retried.520  Case appealed, arguing that the meritorious defense 
requirement violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.521  The court of appeals 
held that the evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption of constitutionality 
of the meritorious defense requirement, because no case law prohibited the requirement 
and Case had failed to cite any authority supporting his argument.522  However, the court 
of appeals declined to resolve the constitutional issue completely, holding only that to the 
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extent the meritorious defense rule required merely a general defense theory, it did not 
violate the Fifth Amendment.523  The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
magistrate, holding that the presumption of constitutionality of the meritorious defense 
requirement for setting aside a default judgment was not rebutted.524 
 
 
State v. Herrmann 
In State v. Herrmann,525 the court of appeals held that a superior court ruling that 
Alaska’s pre-2005 presumptive sentencing law was unconstitutional amounted to an 
impermissible advisory opinion when an individual failed to show that he had been 
prejudiced by such a sentencing.526  Herrmann was convicted of vehicle theft, driving 
under the influence, and refusing to submit to a breath test.527  The State sought to use 
Herrmann’s prior convictions as proof of aggravating factors, but the superior court ruled 
that Alaska’s pre-2005 presumptive sentencing law was unconstitutional under Blakely528 
and had to be thrown out in its entirety.529  The State petitioned for a review of the 
ruling.530  The court of appeals held that the superior court’s ruling was an advisory 
opinion on an issue not raised by Herrmann’s case, because Hermann did not dispute the 
existence of the prior convictions or show that his Sixth Amendment rights had been 
violated.531  In a series of other cases, the court of appeals determined that there is no 
Blakely problem when the State limits its proof of aggravators to the defendant’s prior 
convictions, and the defendant does not dispute the existence of those convictions.532  
The court of appeals vacated the decision of the superior court, holding that in the 
absence of a showing that Herrmann had been prejudiced by being sentenced under the 
pre-2005 scheme, the ruling that the State’s sentencing law was unconstitutional 
amounted to an impermissible advisory opinion.533 
 
 
Hotrum v. State 
In Hotrum v. State,534 the court of appeals held that a warrantless entry was 
justified under the emergency aid doctrine and that criminalizing possession of more than 
twenty-five marijuana plants did not violate the Alaska Constitution.535  Police went to 
Hotrum’s house following a 911 call concerning gun shots and loud noises and entered 
the house when no one responded to their presence.536  Hotrum entered a no contest plea 
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and was convicted of misconduct involving a controlled substance.537  He appealed, 
arguing that police made an unlawful warrantless entry and that criminalizing the 
possession of more than twenty-five marijuana plants, regardless of their size, violates the 
privacy provision of the Alaska Constitution.538   The court of appeals held that the 
warrantless entry met all three requirements under the emergency aid doctrine, which are 
that: (1) the police had reasonable grounds to believe there was an emergency and an 
immediate need for their assistance; (2) the search was not primarily motivated by intent 
to arrest or seize evidence; and (3) there was some reasonable basis to associate the 
emergency with the place searched.539  The court of appeals also held that criminalization 
of possession of more than twenty-five marijuana plants did not violate the privacy 
provision of the Alaska Constitution because the legislature has the power to set 
reasonable limits on personal marijuana possession.540  The court of appeals affirmed the 
decision of the superior court, holding that the warrantless entry was justified under the 
emergency aid doctrine and that criminalizing possession of more than twenty-five 
marijuana plants did not violate the Alaska Constitution.541 
 
 
Morgan v. State  
In Morgan v. State,542 the court of appeals held that due process entitles an 
individual to a new trial, rather than a mere reassessment of the facts by a new judge, 
when the testimony of witnesses is essential to the verdict.543  Morgan was convicted of 
second-degree sexual assault.544  He appealed, and the case was remanded to the superior 
court, but a new judge was assigned to the case.545  The original trial judge did not allow 
evidence that T.F., the alleged victim, had previously made false accusations of rape 
against another man.546  On remand, the new judge allowed this evidence, but Morgan 
was convicted again.547  Morgan appealed, arguing that he should have been given a new 
trial, rather than allowing the new judge to rely on the transcript from the old trial.548  The 
court of appeals held that, because the verdict depends in large part on the credibility of 
T.F. and because her credibility cannot be determined from a cold read of the record, it 
would violate Morgan’s due process rights to allow the new judge to decide the case 
without a new trial.549  The court of appeals reversed the decision of the superior court, 
holding that due process entitles an individual to a new trial, rather than a reassessment of 
the facts by a new judge, when the testimony of witnesses is essential to the verdict.550   
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Stevens v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough 
In Stevens v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough,551 the court of appeals held that a local 
noise ordinance did not violate the First Amendment, nor was it unconstitutionally 
vague.552  Stevens was cited seven times for violating the local noise ordinance by 
playing loud music at his restaurant.553  The district court found that Stevens violated the 
noise ordinance, and he appealed, arguing that the ordinance was vague, overbroad, and 
would have the effect of chilling free speech.554  The court of appeals held that three 
factors governed whether the First Amendment is violated: (1) whether the regulation is 
justified without reference to the content of the speech; (2) whether the regulation is 
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest”; and (3) whether the 
regulation leaves open ample alternative channels of communication.555  Here, because 
Stevens offered no evidence that the ordinance reached substantially more conduct than 
was necessary to achieve the Borough’s goals, the ordinance did not violate the First 
Amendment.556  Furthermore, the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague because it 
outlined geographic and time restrictions on noise, thus providing adequate notice of 
what conduct was prohibited.557  The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district 
court, holding that the local noise ordinance did not violate the First Amendment, nor was 
it unconstitutionally vague.558 
 
 
Williams v. State  
In Williams v. State,559 the court of appeals held that Alaska Statute section 
12.30.027(b), which prohibits anyone charged with domestic violence from returning to 
the alleged victim’s residence while on pre-trial release, violates the equal protection 
clause of the Alaska Constitution.560  Williams was charged with assaulting his wife in 
2004 after he was seen with his hand around her neck.561  As a condition of his pre-trial 
release, and in accordance with section 12.30.027(b), Williams was prohibited from 
returning to his wife’s residence, despite no objection from the alleged victim or the 
State.562  Williams argued this statute violated equal protection and infringed on his 
fundamental right to maintain his marital relationship.563  The district court held the 
statute did not violate equal protection, and Williams appealed.564  The court of appeals 
held that the statute was unconstitutional because it infringed on an important right 
without proof that it advanced a state interest.565  Infringement on Williams’ right to live 
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with his wife required careful scrutiny.566  The statute was overinclusive because many 
crimes that do not evidence a threat of future violence in the home are included under 
domestic violence offenses.567  This allows the statute to create significant hardship 
without advancing the State’s interest in reducing domestic violence.568  Thus, the statute 
is unconstitutional.569  The court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court, 
holding that the Alaska statute prohibiting anyone charged with domestic violence from 
returning to the alleged victim’s residence while on pre-trial release violates the equal 
protection clause of the Alaska Constitution.570    
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VI.  CONTRACT LAW 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Adams v. Adams  
In Adams v. Adams,571 the supreme court held that specific performance of an 
option-to-purchase provision in a lease was justified by the lessor’s actual knowledge of 
the option and that reformation of the lease was supported by clear and convincing 
evidence.572  Michael Adams leased property to the lessee, Don Adams, with a signed 
extension that gave the lessee an option to purchase.573  The lessee sought to exercise the 
option to purchase and Michael refused, claiming he was unaware of the option.574  The 
lessee sued for specific performance.575  The supreme court held that actual knowledge 
may be inferred from circumstances and that here, there was enough circumstantial 
evidence to support the superior court’s finding that Michael had actual knowledge of the 
option-to-purchase provision.576  The supreme court also held that there was no clear 
error in the superior court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence that reformation of 
the lease was justified by a mutual mistake of fact.577  The supreme court also held that 
the lessor should have been awarded interest, and that the lessee should have been 
awarded attorneys’ fees, under the contract.578  The supreme court thus affirmed the 
specific performance order and the reformation of the lease and remanded for adjustment 
of interest to the lessor. 579 
 
 
Cleary v. Smith 
In Cleary v. Smith,580 the supreme court held that a settlement agreement between 
the Alaska federal prison systems and Alaska prisoners resolving a suit regarding prison 
conditions did not create a contract right for a certain class of prisoners to remain in 
Alaska prisons.581  A group of prisoners filed a class action lawsuit in 1981 challenging 
the conditions of prisons operated by the State of Alaska or the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
(“FBOP”).582  After being divided into classes, the prisoners confined in the FBOP 
prisons came to a settlement agreement that allowed all Alaska prisoners housed in the 
FBOP system to be transferred to Alaska state prisons.583  One member of that class, 
Donald Stumpf, filed a motion for an injunction when he was informed that he would be 
transferred to an Arizona detention center, arguing that the settlement agreement gave 
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him a property interest in his Alaska confinement.584  The supreme court affirmed the 
superior court’s denial of the injunction, holding that the settlement agreement did not 
create a contract right in allowing all members of the FBOP class from the 1981 suit to 
remain in Alaska and avoid transfer to a non-FBOP facility.585 
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VII.  CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
C.J. v. State 
In C.J. v. State,586 the supreme court held that (1) the State owed a duty of care to 
a parolee’s victim; (2) capping non-economic damages did not violate equal protection 
under the Alaska Constitution; and (3) each sexual penetration, in one continuous assault, 
was a separate incident.587  Luke Carter was released on mandatory parole after serving 
ten years of his fifteen-year sentence for violent rape. 588  Shortly thereafter, Carter 
violated terms of his parole, and the parole officer issued an arrest warrant but did not 
take any further action to locate or arrest Carter.589  Two weeks later, Carter raped C.J. 
and was later charged and convicted by a jury for three counts of first-degree sexual 
assault.590  C.J. filed an action against the State for negligence, and the State filed a 
motion for summary judgment.591  The superior court denied the State’s motion for 
summary judgment, treated C.J.’s injuries as a single injury, and limited non-economic 
damages to a cap of $400,000.592  The supreme court held that the State had a duty to 
exercise due care in supervising parolees.593  The supreme court also held that the cap on 
non-economic damages did not violate equal protection under the Alaska Constitution.594  
Under the “sliding scale approach” for equal protection claims, the damages cap, which 
imposed only economic burdens and was substantially related to the legitimate interest of 
reducing insurance premiums, satisfied the minimum scrutiny “means-end fit 
requirement”  and is therefore constitutional.595  However, the damages were not limited 
to a single cap since each sexual penetration, though committed in rapid succession, was 
a distinct act and a separate assault under criminal law.596  The supreme court vacated the 
denial of summary judgment and remanded for discretionary function immunity, holding 
that the cap on non-economic damages for each incident was constitutional.597 
 
 
State, Department of Corrections v. Cowles 
In State, Department of Corrections v. Cowles,598 the supreme court held that a 
parole board cannot be held liable for its selection of parole conditions599 and that, under 
certain circumstances, the State must exercise due care in supervising parolees.600  A 
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parolee murdered his girlfriend and then committed suicide.601  He had been incorrectly 
assigned a “medium” supervision level, although his actions warranted a “maximum” 
supervision level.602  The personal representative of the girlfriend’s estate sued the 
Department of Corrections, alleging that it negligently administered the parole plan.603  
The superior court denied the State’s motion for summary judgment, and the State 
appealed.604  Emphasizing the policy considerations inherent in the parole process as well 
as the separation-of-powers doctrine, the supreme court expressly overruled State, 
Division of Corrections v. Neakok,605 holding discretionary-function immunity 
immunized the State from negligence liability arising from a parole board’s decision of 
parole conditions or parole revocation.606  The supreme court also narrowed Neakok, 
holding that the State must exercise due care in supervising parolees only when it knows, 
or reasonably should know, that they pose a threat to a particular individual or group.607  
The supreme court vacated the superior court’s order denying the State’s motion for 
summary judgment, holding that a parole board’s selection of parole conditions is entitled 
to discretionary function immunity and that the State has a duty to exercise due care to 
supervise parolees only in certain circumstances.608 
 
 
State v. Parker 
 In State v. Parker,609 the supreme court held that a victim’s age and the intention 
to use child pornography pictures only for private use did not mandate inclusion among 
the least serious conduct of the offenses charged.610  Parker pled no contest to possession 
of child pornography, attempted misconduct involving a controlled substance, and 
exploitation of a minor after taking approximately 100 photographs and three videos of a 
sixteen-year-old girl whom he had given drugs to on numerous occasions.611  At 
sentencing, Parker presented mitigating factors.612  He argued that his conduct was 
among the least serious for the offense because the girl was over the age of consent 
(sixteen) and the images were intended for private rather than commercial use.613  The 
trial court denied Parker’s claim, but the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the 
conduct was the least serious for the offenses charged.614  The supreme court held that 
Parker’s intention for only private use, rather than commercial use, made the conduct less 
serious, but not necessarily the least serious, especially since production of child 
pornography is a separate crime.615  The presumptive sentence is intended to encompass 
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most of the convictions, with the least serious mitigator only applying to a few;616 that the 
child was over the age of consent does not automatically put his conviction in the least 
serious category, especially considering that he likely could have been convicted of more 
charges than those to which he pled no contest.617  The supreme court reversed the court 
of appeals and remanded the case, holding that the victim’s age and the intention to use 
child pornography pictures only for private use did not mandate inclusion among the least 
serious conduct for the offenses charged.618 
 
 
Surrells v. State  
In Surrells v. State,619 the court of appeals held that revocation of a first felony 
offender’s probation and imposition of his remaining suspended sentence does not 
constitute an increase in his maximum sentence and therefore does not implicate the 
Blakely
620 right to trial by jury.621  Surrells was convicted of a class B felony and was 
sentenced by a judge to six years imprisonment with four years suspended.622  As a first 
felony offender, his unsuspended term of imprisonment could not exceed the four-year 
presumptive term for a second felony offender convicted of the same offense in the 
absence of aggravating factors or extraordinary circumstances.623  After Surrells served 
two years in prison and was released, his probation was revoked and he served two 
additional years.624  Subsequently, the State petitioned to revoke his probation and 
Surrells moved to correct his sentence, arguing that any additional revocation of his 
probation would require a showing of aggravating factors in a trial by jury.625  The court 
of appeals held that a sentencing court has authority to revoke a defendant’s probation 
and impose previously suspended jail time as a result of the defendant’s post-sentencing 
conduct; because the original maximum sentence never changed, the sentence was never 
“increased,” and the Blakely right to trial by jury did not apply.626  Furthermore, a first 
felony offender’s probation can be revoked, resulting in an unsuspended sentence that 
exceeds the presumptive term for a typical second felony offender of the same offense, 
when it is justified by the totality of the circumstances, such as poor performance on 
probation.627  As a benchmark rule, this sentencing guideline does not implicate the 
Blakely right to trial by jury.628  The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s 
decision, holding that revocation of a first felony offender’s probation and imposition of a 
remaining suspended sentence does not constitute an increase in his maximum sentence 
and therefore the Blakely right to trial by jury does not apply.629 
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Alaska Court of Appeals  
 
Alex v. State  
In Alex v. State,630 the court of appeals held that jury instructions defining 
“constructive possession” as having “the power to exercise dominion or control” were 
problematic, but in the case at hand, the instructions were harmless error.631  The 
defendant was convicted of a weapons charge when a gun was found under his seat, the 
passenger seat of a car.632  At trial, he argued that he had no knowledge of the gun, 
despite his earlier confession to the police.633  The court of appeals held that the jury 
instructions, defining constructive possession as “the power to exercise dominion or 
control over a thing,” were problematic, as there was no mention of any intent to 
possess.634  However, the instructions were harmless since the defense in this case had 
not contested any knowledge of the gun, thus intent to possess it was not an issue.635  The 
jury instruction would have only made a difference had the defendant conceded 
knowledge of the gun under his seat.636 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
superior court, holding that although jury instructions defining “constructive possession” 
as having the power to exercise dominion or control” were problematic, they were 
harmless in the case at hand.637     
 
 
Anderson v. State 
In Anderson v. State,638 the court of appeals held that hindering prosecution in the 
first degree can be committed by rendering assistance to felony probationers who have 
committed misdemeanor or non-criminal violations of their probation and that it is not 
necessary to have a separate search warrant when executing an arrest warrant for parts of 
the house which do not belong to the person being arrested.639  Lars and Lana Anderson 
were convicted of first-degree hindering prosecution when they allowed their twenty 
year-old son, Daniel, to hide in their bedroom while police officers looked for him in 
response to a parole violation he committed.640  The Andersons argued that because 
drinking alcohol during probation did not qualify as a crime “punishable as a felony,” 
they could not be held for first degree hindering prosecution641 and that by finding Daniel 
hidden in their bedroom, the police violated the Fourth Amendment, because the arrest 
warrant was for Daniel, and their bedroom was private.642  The court of appeals held that 
the Andersons can be guilty of first degree hindering prosecution despite the fact that 
drinking alcohol while on probation is not in and of itself a felony, because it is the 
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punishment for the original offense which is altered by violating parole.643  Also, there 
was no additional warrant needed to enter the residence, even though it was shared with 
Lars and Lana, as long as the officers had probable cause to believe that Daniel was 
inside the home.644  The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s judgment, holding 
that it is not necessary for a probation violator to have committed a felony for someone to 
be guilty of first degree hindering prosecution and that a separate search warrant for 
different parts of a shared home is not necessary if the arrestee could be hiding there.645 
 
 
Cooper v. District Court 
In Cooper v. District Court,646 the court of appeals held that neither the victim of 
a crime nor the State Office of Victims’ Rights (“Office”) has standing to challenge the 
sentence imposed upon the perpetrator of a crime.647   Cynthia Cooper and the Office 
independently challenged her husband’s sentence which was imposed for his assault 
against her.648  Cynthia also moved to have a portion of the proceedings sealed from 
public access because it violated psychotherapist-patient privilege.649  Daniel Cooper 
arranged a plea bargain with the Municipality of Anchorage to complete a year of 
counseling.650  The District Court agreed to allow Daniel to satisfy this condition of his 
probation by continuing in a program he had already begun.651   Cynthia objected, 
claiming that Daniel must complete a domestic violence intervention program approved 
by the Department of Corrections,652 but the District Court judge declared that Daniel’s 
current program was sufficient, and Cynthia applied for relief.653  The court of appeals 
held that though the victim may provide input before decisions such as sentencing are 
made,654 victims do not have the right to appeal those decisions because ultimately 
criminal prosecutions are conducted on behalf of the entire community, and victims are 
not parties to criminal proceedings.655  Also, the Office only has the authority to advocate 
on behalf of clients and to assist crime victims in protecting their legal rights and, thus, 
has no authority to file a suit except on behalf of a client who has standing.656  Finally, 
the records that Cynthia moved to seal did not contain information protected by the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege and, furthermore, that Cynthia waived any privilege she 
otherwise would have had by failing to make a timely objection.657  The court of appeals 
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denied the application of relief, holding that neither the victim of a crime nor the Office 
has standing to challenge the sentence imposed upon the perpetrator of a crime.658 
 
 
Douglas v. State 
In Douglas v. State,659 the court of appeals held that there was no reversible error 
in the superior court judge’s evidentiary rulings, that the prosecutor’s final argument 
mentioning presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent was not so prejudicial 
as to warrant a reversal, but that sentencing was conducted in violation of Blakely v. 
Washington
660.661  Douglas was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual assault and 
two counts of fourth-degree sexual assault.662  Douglas appealed, arguing that (1) 
evidence of sexual phone calls between the victim and another man and of noise 
complaints should have been admitted, (2) the prosecutor’s final argument incorrectly 
described the presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent, and (3) the 
superior court failed to weigh the probative value in admitting evidence of his prior 
assault conviction.663  The court of appeals held that the superior court appropriately 
weighed the probative value of evidence regarding sexual phone calls and noise 
complaints against the prejudicial value when limiting the admissibility of the 
evidence.664  Second, although the prosecutor’s comments regarding the presumption of 
innocence were incorrect, the limiting instructions given by the judge meant that the 
comments were not prejudicial enough to warrant reversal.665  Furthermore, the 
prosecutor’s comments that Douglas argues attacked his decision to remain silent were 
fair comments on the evidence.666  Ultimately, however, the court remanded the case to 
determine whether the aggravating factors during sentencing were Blakely-compliant.667  
The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and remanded the case for further 
proceedings regarding the aggravating factors, holding that there was no reversible error 
in the superior court judge’s evidentiary rulings, that the prosecutor’s final argument 
mentioning presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent was not so prejudicial 
as to warrant a reversal, but that sentencing was conducted in violation of Blakely.668 
 
 
Garhart v. State  
In Garhart v. State,669 the court of appeals held that Crocker670 restrictions on 
search warrants did not apply retroactively to a pre-Crocker conviction for marijuana 
possession, and that appellant’s commercial cultivation of marijuana was not 
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constitutionally protected.671  Garhart was convicted of controlled substance misconduct 
after warranted searches of his house and vehicle revealed evidence of commercial 
cultivation of marijuana.672  After Garhart’s conviction but prior to sentencing, Crocker 
was decided, holding that a warrant to search a home for marijuana must be based upon 
probable cause to believe that the marijuana possession falls outside the scope of 
protected personal use.673  Garhart’s motion for a new trial was denied by the superior 
court and he appealed, citing Crocker.674  The court of appeals held that, even though 
Crocker established a new rule of state constitutional law, here it did not satisfy the three-
prong Alaska test for retroactivity because: (1) the policy behind Crocker of protecting 
the privacy of the home was not at issue, (2) the law enforcement officers reasonably 
relied on the pre-Crocker law in applying for and issuing the search warrants, and (3) full 
retroactive application would have a substantial negative impact on the administration of 
justice because many cases would be reopened.675  Also, Garhart’s commercial 
cultivation of marijuana was not protected by the Alaska Constitution because the 
legislature may properly limit the amount of marijuana a person may possess even if for 
personal use in his or her home, and Garhart exceeded that amount.676  The court of 
appeals affirmed the superior court judgment, holding that Crocker restrictions on search 
warrants did not apply retroactively to a pre-Crocker conviction, and that the appellant’s 
commercial cultivation of marijuana was not constitutionally protected.677 
 
 
Hall v. State  
In Hall v. State,678 the court of appeals held that a five year composite sentence 
with two and a half years suspended was appropriate for a man who pled no contest to 
writing bad checks while he was awaiting trial for writing other bad checks.679  While 
awaiting trial for writing $8,000 in bad checks, Hall was accused of writing more bad 
checks in the amount of nearly $65,000.680  Hall pled no contest to these charges, and the 
trial judge sentenced him to four years, two suspended, for a scheme to defraud and one 
year, six months suspended, for the misdemeanor of violating conditions of his release.681  
Hall appealed the sentences, arguing that because this was his first felony and the crime 
was a nonviolent property crime, precedent required the judge to give him probation, not 
imprisonment.682  The court of appeals held that imprisonment can be a useful deterrent 
and, because Hall had a history of writing bad checks, the trial judge was correct in ruling 
that probation would not deter Hall from continuing to write bad checks.683  Additionally, 
when a defendant has committed a Class B felony, as Hall did here, a first offender 
                                                 
671 Garhart, 147 P.3d at 750–51. 
672 Id. at 747. 
673 Id. 
674 Id. 
675 Id. at 749–50. 
676 Id. at 750. 
677 Id. at 750–51, 754. 
678 No. A-9437, 2006 Alas. App. LEXIS 168 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2006). 
679 Id. at *12–13. 
680 Id. at *1.  
681 Id. at *5. 
682 Id. at *5–6. 
683 Id. at *7–8. 
 53 
should receive more than probation unless there are mitigating circumstances.684  The 
court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the superior court, holding that a five-year 
composite sentence, with two and a half years suspended, was appropriate for a man who 
pled no contest for writing bad checks while he was awaiting trial for writing other bad 
checks.685 
 
 
Jackson v. State  
In Jackson v. State,686 the court of appeals held that a district court did not violate 
the doctrine of separation of powers by requiring a minor to return to court on a bi-
weekly basis to report the progress of her probation.687  Jackson pled no contest to two 
counts of underage alcoholic beverage consumption.688  Jackson received a sentence of 
probation, a condition of which required her to meet with her sentencing judge on 
alternate weeks to discuss her progress.689  Jackson appealed, arguing that the Department 
of Corrections had the exclusive authority to monitor probationers.690  The court of 
appeals held that the sentencing judge did not violate the doctrine of separation of 
powers,691 because the state supreme court had recognized that the probation process was 
shared between the judicial and executive branches and that the legislature intended the 
judiciary to supervise minors convicted of consuming alcoholic beverages.692  The court 
of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that the district court did not 
violate the doctrine of separation of powers when it required Jackson to report the 
progress of her probation to her sentencing judge.693     
 
 
Lampkin v. State  
In Lampkin v. State,694 the court of appeals held that convictions for one act that 
violated separate statutes did not constitute double jeopardy when each statue served a 
separate societal interest and that one offense was not a lesser included offense of the 
other.695  Lampkin was serving a jail sentence when he was convicted of fourth and fifth 
degree controlled substance misconduct and promoting contraband in the first degree for 
possessing the two controlled substances.696  Lampkin appealed the convictions, arguing 
that conviction for both drug possession and promoting contraband violated double 
jeopardy. 697   Lampkin argued, alternatively, that drug possession is a lesser included 
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offense of the promoting contraband charge.698  The court of appeals held that the 
defendant was not in double jeopardy, because the two statutes serve the distinct societal 
interests of preventing possession of controlled substances and preventing introduction of 
contraband materials into the prison. 699  Additionally, possession of drugs is not a lesser 
included offense of the promoting contraband charge, because when the jury found the 
defendant guilty of promoting contraband, it did not logically follow that they must also 
find him guilty of possession. 700  The court of appeals affirmed Lampkin’s conviction, 
holding that his conviction under two separate statutes for one act did not constitute 
double jeopardy and that one charge was not a lesser included offense of the other. 701 
 
 
Miller v. State  
In Miller v. State,702 the court of appeals held that an investigative traffic stop of a 
driver who had been involved in a verbal domestic dispute was not supported by a 
reasonable suspicion that the argument would lead to a crime.703  A 911 caller reported an 
argument in a parking lot and gave a general description of the vehicle and individuals 
involved.704  The responding officer stopped a vehicle matching the description and 
ultimately arrested the driver, Miller, for driving while under the influence and refusing 
to submit to a chemical test.705  Miller moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, but 
his motion was denied.706  The court of appeals held that a report of a verbal domestic 
disturbance alone did not provide the officer with an objective basis for believing that a 
crime had been or was about to be committed.707  No violence or threat of violence had 
been reported, and there was no reason to believe that the verbal argument, though 
heated, would end in domestic violence.708  The court of appeals reversed the district 
court’s conviction, holding that an investigative traffic stop of a driver involved in a 
verbal domestic dispute was not supported by a reasonable suspicion that the argument 
would lead to a crime.709 
 
 
State v. Moreno  
In State v. Moreno,710 the court of appeals held that Alaska’s pre-2005 
presumptive sentencing law was valid, provided that there is a jury trial when Blakely-
compliant aggravating factors are involved.711  Moreno was convicted of first degree 
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sexual abuse of a minor in 2004.712  The State proposed no aggravating factors, and 
Moreno faced an eight year presumptive sentence under Alaska’s pre-2005 presumptive 
sentencing law.713  The superior court found the presumptive sentencing law 
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment and announced its intention to apply 
indeterminate sentencing to Moreno.714  The court of appeals held that Alaska’s pre-2005 
presumptive sentencing law was not unconstitutional because its constitutional flaws 
could be remedied by providing a jury trial when certain aggravating factors were 
involved.715   The court recognized that the law did violate the Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial under Blakely v. Washington,716 but determined that the court could sever the 
unconstitutional portions of the law from the presumptive sentencing scheme as a 
whole.717  The court of appeals reversed the decision of the superior court, holding that 
Alaska’s pre-2005 presumptive sentencing law was valid, provided that there is a jury 
trial when Blakely-compliant aggravating factors are involved.718  
 
 
Porterfield v. State 
 In Porterfield v. State,719 the court of appeals held that a co-conspirator’s 
statement against penal interest to an unknown police informant was not testimonial in 
nature and, therefore, did not implicate the confrontation clause of the Sixth 
Amendment720 as described in Crawford v. Washington.721  Porterfield was convicted of 
first-degree murder and first-degree arson.722  The government presented the testimony of 
Porterfield’s wife admitting each spouse’s involvement to a friend who was covertly 
acting as a police informant.723  Previously, the court of appeals held that these statements 
were properly admitted under the “statement against penal interest” hearsay exception 
and that Porterfield’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.724  Granting this appeal 
to reconsider in light of the Crawford decision, the court of appeals followed circuit and 
state precedent to hold that Porterfield’s wife’s statements did not implicate the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment because they were not testimonial in 
nature.725  These statements were not testimonial because Porterfield’s wife had no 
knowledge that her statements could be used against Porterfield,726 and she made the 
statements to a friend, not to a government official.727  The court of appeals affirmed the 
superior court, holding that Porterfield’s wife’s statement against penal interest to an 
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unknown police informant was not testimonial in nature and, therefore, did not implicate 
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment as described in Crawford.728 
 
 
Smart v. State  
In Smart v. State,729 the court of appeals held that the Blakely v. Washington730 
right to jury trial and requirement of reasonable doubt for aggravating factors should be 
applied retroactively to all defendants.731  Two men received enhanced sentences based 
on the State’s proof of aggravating factors.732  After their convictions were final, Blakely 
was decided, giving criminal defendants the right to a jury trial on any issue of fact that 
would potentially increase the defendants’ maximum penalty.733  The court of appeals 
held that the correct test for retroactive application of Blakely was the test stated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker734 and later adopted by the Alaska 
supreme court in State v. Semancik735.736  The court distinguished the retroactivity test 
stated in Teague v. Lane,737 which limits the authority of federal courts to overturn state 
criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings, because Teague did not 
address the authority of state courts.738  Under Semancik, the court looks at the purpose of 
the new rule, the extent of reliance on the old rule, and the effect of retroactive 
application on the administration of justice.739  The new rule, Blakely, consisted of the 
defendant’s right to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to have a jury 
decide issues of fact that might raise a defendant’s maximum penalty.740  The purpose of 
the Blakely requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to prevent unconstitutional 
punishment, was sufficient to merit full retroactivity under Semancik.741  Also, although 
reliance on the earlier standard was substantial, the administration of justice would not be 
severely impacted by retroactive application of Blakely.742  The purpose of the Blakely 
right to jury trial on issues of fact, to guarantee the citizenry’s liberties, also favored 
retroactivity.743  The court of appeals reversed and vacated the superior court’s ruling for 
one of the convicts and affirmed the ruling for the other convict on grounds of harmless 
error, holding that the Blakely right to jury trial and requirement of reasonable doubt for 
aggravating factors should be applied retroactively to all defendants.744 
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State v. Stafford  
In State v. Stafford,745 the court of appeals held that when determining the 
mandatory minimum sentences for individuals convicted of driving under the influence 
(“DUI”), the date of sentencing was the pertinent date for applying a new, more lenient 
law.746  In 2004, the Alaska legislature repealed a lifetime look-back period for prior DUI 
convictions and enacted an amendment which required sentencing courts to count only an 
offender’s DUI convictions within the previous fifteen years for the purpose of 
determining mandatory minimum sentences.747  Stafford and Castrey were arrested for 
DUI; both had DUI convictions that were more than fifteen years old.748  The district 
court applied the new law because Stafford and Castrey were awaiting sentencing when 
the amendment went into effect.749  The State appealed, arguing that the date the offense 
was committed should be the pertinent date for applying the new law.750  The court of 
appeals held that the date of sentencing was the pertinent date for applying the new law, 
because the legislative history of the statute suggested that the legislature wanted the new 
law to be applied as soon and broadly as possible, and there was no language suggesting 
its application should be limited to those offenses committed on or after the effective 
date.751  The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that the 
date of sentencing was the pertinent date for applying the new law when determining the 
mandatory minimum sentences for individuals convicted of DUI.752  
 
 
Stevens v. State 
In Stevens v. State,753 the court of appeals held that Alaska Statute section 
28.15.021(5),754 which allows off-highway vehicles to be operated without a license, did 
not exempt a driver whose license had been revoked from Alaska Statute section 
28.15.291(a),755 which prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle on the highway without 
a license,756 and that Alaska Statute section 28.15.291(a) did not violate due process or 
equal protection.757  Police found Stevens operating a four-wheel vehicle on a highway 
with a revoked license and charged him under section 28.15.291(a).758  Stevens pled no 
contest and then appealed, arguing that, under section 28.15.021(5), he was not required 
to have a license to operate an off-highway vehicle on the highway and, in the alternative, 
that section 28.15.291(a) violated due process and equal protection.759  The court of 
appeals held that the legislative purpose of section 28.15.021(5) was not to exempt 
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unlicensed on-road operation of off-highway vehicles from the prohibition in section 
28.15.291(a) but merely to permit unlicensed operation of off-highway vehicles only 
when they are operated off the highway.760  Further, Stevens’ due process was not 
violated because, when viewed together, section 28.15.291(a) and section 28.15.021(5) 
are not incompatible.761  Also, section 28.15.291(a) did not fail for vagueness, because it 
was not ambiguous or confused after legal analysis.762  Section 28.15.291(a) also did not 
violate equal protection, because the legislature was not irrational in distinguishing on-
road and off-road operation of motor vehicles.763  The court of appeals affirmed the guilty 
plea,764 holding that section 28.15.021(5) did not exempt a driver whose license had been 
revoked from section 28.15.291(a),765 and that section 28.15.291(a) did not violate due 
process or equal protection.766 
 
 
Walsh v. State  
In Walsh v. State,767 the court of appeals held that a trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion when he did not inquire into or attempt to resolve an apparent breakdown in an 
attorney-client relationship in an indigent’s criminal trial.768  Walsh told the judge at his 
plea hearing that he and his attorney were having difficulty reaching an agreement on the 
pleadings.769  Walsh later stated that there was a conflict of interest with his attorney and 
asked for new counsel, but did not specify any particular conflict.770  The judge asked for 
particulars of ethical violations, but did not hear anything further about it.771  After the 
trial had commenced, Walsh again objected to his attorney and was told by the judge that 
such complaints would be addressed elsewhere.772  Walsh appealed his conviction.773  
The court of appeals held that judges should be hesitant to inject themselves in the 
attorney-client relationship and that here, the breakdown in attorney-client relationship 
never appeared so severe as to prevent communication between the attorney and Walsh, 
thus the judge acted properly.774  The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding 
that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he did not inquire into or attempt to 
resolve an apparent breakdown in an attorney-client relationship in an indigent’s criminal 
trial.775 
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Y.J. v. State  
In Y.J. v. State,776 the court of appeals held that a minor’s act of concealing a 
holster under a bed was evidence tampering.777  Y.J. ran from a police officer who 
approached him and suspected him of concealing a weapon.778  Y.J. ran into an apartment 
after tossing the gun, but a few minutes later he came out and was taken into custody.779  
Upon searching the apartment, police found a holster underneath the bed.780  Y.J. was 
convicted of possessing a concealed weapon and evidence tampering.781  After his trial, 
Y.J. filed a motion for a partial judgment of acquittal for the evidence tampering 
charge.782  The superior court denied this motion, and Y.J. appealed.783  The court of 
appeals held that concealing a holster under the bed was evidence tampering, because 
substantial evidence existed to show that Y.J.’s intent was to hide the holster from police, 
impairing the availability of evidence in a criminal investigation.784  It was irrelevant that 
under the law, the holster was not actually “concealed” because it was found quickly by 
the police.785  The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding 
that a minor’s act of concealing a holster under a bed was evidence tampering.786   
 
 
Zemljich v. Municipality of Anchorage 
 In Zemljich v. Municipality of Anchorage,787 the court of appeals held that the 
government satisfies its duty to offer an independent test of blood alcohol when a driver 
understands this right, is given a reasonable opportunity to exercise this right, but is 
unwilling to make an affirmative decision to exercise or waive the right.788  Police officer 
Daily stopped Zemljich’s car after observing Zemljich stopped beside a young girl crying 
in the fetal position in an alley.789  Daily observed that Zemljich appeared drunk and 
arrested him for driving under the influence after Zemljich showed a .227 alcohol level 
on a breath test.790  Daily offered Zemljich an independent chemical test, but Zemljich 
could not decide whether an independent test would help him and left it undecided 
whether he would assert his right for that test.791  The court of appeals held, in addition to 
finding a reasonable suspicion to authorize the stop,792 that Zemljich impliedly waived 
his right to an independent chemical test.793  The trial court correctly found waiver of the 
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right to the independent test because Zemljich understood his right to an independent 
test794 and was given reasonable opportunity to assert that right.795  The court of appeals 
affirmed the conviction, holding that the government satisfies its duty to offer an 
independent test of blood alcohol when a driver understands this right, is given a 
reasonable opportunity to exercise it, but is unwilling to make an affirmative decision to 
exercise or waive the right.796 
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VIII.  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Crawford v. State  
In Crawford v. State,797 the supreme court held that the warrantless search of the 
unlocked center console of an automobile was a reasonable search incident to arrest.798  
Crawford was arrested for reckless driving, and the arresting officer found crack cocaine 
in the vehicle’s center console while conducting a search for weapons.799  After his 
suppression motion was denied, Crawford pleaded no contest to fourth degree 
misconduct involving a controlled substance.800  The court of appeals upheld the search 
because the officer had an articulable reason to believe that the console contained a 
weapon, and the supreme court granted a petition for hearing.801  The supreme court held 
that the warrantless search was a reasonable search incident to arrest because the 
vehicle’s console was within Crawford’s immediate control and was unlocked, making it 
immediately associated with Crawford’s person.802  Additionally, the search was 
reasonably contemporaneous with Crawford’s arrest because there was only a short delay 
between the arrest and the search.803  The supreme court affirmed the decision of the 
court of appeals, holding that the warrantless search of a car’s center console was a 
reasonable search incident to an arrest for reckless driving.804 
 
 
Hora v. Cooper   
In Hora v. Cooper,805 the supreme court held that a person subject to a domestic 
violence protective order does not violate that order simply by being in the same public 
place as the person protected by the order,806 and that the fact that two parties both 
expressed concerns for their safety was insufficient basis for subjecting both parties to a 
mutual restraining order.807  Cooper was placed under a protective order after he pled no 
contest to a charge of family violence after allegedly assaulting his then-wife, Hora.808  
Hora later petitioned for a long-term restraining order, arguing that Cooper had violated 
the terms of the initial order, most notably by making eye contact with her at a local 
shopping mall and attending a conference that she also attended.809  In separate 
proceedings, the superior court denied the petition for a long-term restraining order and 
granted Cooper’s separate motion for a mutual restraining order stemming from the 
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couple’s divorce proceedings.810  The supreme court held that Cooper’s conduct did not 
amount to “stalking” or “contacting,” the relevant elements of the crime of violating a 
protective order.811  The crime of stalking requires the victim to reasonably perceive the 
threat of injury, and Hora’s evidence did not support such a finding.812  Furthermore, a 
person subject to a domestic violence protective order does not commit the crime of 
violating that order simply by being in the same public place as the person protected by 
the order.813  However, the superior court abused its discretion in issuing the mutual 
restraining order, as there was insufficient factual support for Cooper’s concern that he 
would be subject to harassment or contact by Hora.814  The supreme court affirmed the 
superior court’s denial of a long-term restraining order and overturned its imposition of a 
mutual restraining order, holding that a person subject to a domestic violence protective 
order does not violate that order simply by being in the same public place as the person 
protected by the order, and that the fact that both parties expressed concerns for their 
safety is insufficient basis for subjecting both parties to a mutual restraining order.815  
 
 
Vaska v. State 
In Vaska v. State,816 the supreme court held that it was error to apply the prior 
inconsistent statement provision for the first time on appeal, where defendant’s decision 
not to cross examine a young witness was influenced by the State’s reliance on the 
catchall exception to the hearsay rule and its failure to lay an adequate foundation to 
admit the witness’ statements as prior inconsistent statements.817  Vaska was convicted of 
first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, T.E.818  At trial, the court permitted T.E.’s mother to 
testify about T.E.’s out of court statements since T.E. could not remember them while on 
the stand.819  Vaska appealed, arguing that admission of the mother’s hearsay statements 
under the catchall exception to the hearsay rule was unconstitutional.820  On appeal, the 
State, for the first time, argued that the statements were admissible as prior inconsistent 
statements.821  The court of appeals adopted this new theory, and Vaska appealed.822  The 
supreme court held that a party offering a statement under the prior inconsistent statement 
rule must satisfy two foundational conditions.823  First, the offering party must show that 
the prior statement is, in fact, inconsistent with the witnesses’ testimony.824  Second, the 
witness who made the prior statement is to be given an opportunity to explain or deny 
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it.825  Both should be met while the witness is still on the stand and before the prior 
statement is admitted.826  Here, the State abandoned its examination of T.E. and asked for 
her to be excused without complying with either of the foundational conditions.827  The 
State’s decision to apply the catchall theory at trial led Vaska to decide not to cross-
examine T.E., potentially seriously prejudicing his case.828  The supreme court reversed 
the evidentiary ruling of the court of appeals and remanded the case, holding that it was 
error to apply the prior inconsistent statement provision for the first time on appeal.829 
 
 
Alaska Court of Appeals  
 
State v. Avery 
In State v. Avery,830 the court of appeals held that, under Blakely v. Washington,831 
prior convictions need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt when used as 
aggravating factors to increase a sentence.832  After three prior felony convictions, Avery 
was convicted a fourth time for possessing cocaine.833  The superior court added three 
years to Avery’s sentence based on his criminal history.834  Subsequent to the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Blakely that all non-prior conviction aggravating factors that increase a 
defendant’s prison sentence beyond the established maximum must be proven to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt,835 Avery filed a motion to modify his sentence, arguing that 
the aggravating factors should have been proven to a jury.836  The superior court ordered 
a new sentencing hearing to decide if the Blakely decision should affect Avery’s 
sentence.837  The State appealed, arguing that Blakely did not make Avery’s sentence 
illegal and that the superior court did not have the authority to change Avery’s 
sentence.838  The court of appeals held that because all of the aggravating factors were 
based on Avery’s prior convictions, his sentence was not illegal under Blakely.839  
Furthermore, because Avery’s motion for relief was untimely, the superior court did not 
have the authority to alter his sentence.840  The court of appeals thus reversed the superior 
court’s order of a new sentencing hearing, holding that prior convictions need not be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt when used as aggravating factors to increase a 
sentence.841 
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Billum v. State  
In Billum v. State,842 the court of appeals held that although the sentencing court’s 
use of aggravating factors to compound defendant’s sentence was technically 
unconstitutional, it was harmless error since the same sentence could have been imposed 
without use of any aggravating factors.843  Billum was convicted of three counts of first-
degree assault for causing a car accident and injuring four people.844  Because he was 
intoxicated while driving, the judge used this aggravating factor to impose an additional 
five years of suspended sentence.845  The court of appeals held that such use of an 
aggravating factor without benefit of a jury trial was unconstitutional under Blakely v. 
Washington
846.847  However, because the judge had the authority to impose the same 
sentence by imposing consecutive sentences for each of the charges against the 
defendant, it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the use of the aggravating factor was 
harmless error.848  The court of appeals affirmed the sentencing court’s decision, holding 
that even though the use of aggravating factors in extending the sentence without a jury 
determination was unconstitutional, it was harmless error and the sentence should 
stand.849 
 
 
Blank v. State  
 In Blank v. State,850 the court of appeals held that a breath test conducted by an 
officer prior to arrest was not a preliminary breath test and therefore could be used as 
evidence at trial.851  Blank hit and killed a pedestrian, then drove away from the scene.852  
A police officer later questioned her at her home, and administered a breath test, which 
showed that she was intoxicated.853  Blank challenged the use of this test at trial, arguing 
that it was a preliminary breath test because it was given with a portable device and 
therefore could only be used in establishing probable cause.854  The court of appeals held 
that whether or not a breath test is preliminary is determined by the point in time that the 
test is given, not the kind of device used, and therefore the breath test in question was not 
proven to be preliminary.855  The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s decision, 
holding that the evidence of a breath test was admissible because the test had not been 
shown to be preliminary.856 
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Brown v. State  
In Brown v. State,857 the court of appeals held that a probation officer authorized 
to conduct suspicionless searches of the probationer can also temporarily detain the 
probationer and enlist the assistance of the police to conduct the stop.858  Probation 
Officer Davies mistakenly believed that one of his probationers who may have been 
violating parole got into a cab, so he requested that the police stop the cab.859  When the 
police stopped the cab, Davies recognized him as Brown, another of his probationers.860  
Brown ran and left behind drugs.861  On appeal, Brown argued that Davies did not have 
the authority to seize and detain Brown for the purpose of conducting a search and that, 
even if the stop was lawful if conducted by Davies alone, the stop became unlawful when 
Davies enlisted the help of the police.862  The court of appeals held that a probation 
officer’s authority to search a probationer carries the power to temporarily detain the 
probationer for the purpose of conducting the search, as long as the search is conducted in 
a reasonable time and manner and is not conducted for the purpose of harassment.863  The 
court of appeals also held the police assistance did not make the search unlawful, since 
probation officers should not choose between endangering themselves by searching alone 
or foregoing a search altogether.864  The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the 
superior court, holding that a probation officer has the authority to temporarily seize and 
detain a probationer in order to conduct a search subject to the conditions of parole and to 
enlist the assistance of the police to conduct the stop.865 
 
 
Bryant v. State 
In Bryant v. State,866 the court of appeals held that a defense counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to call a witness who may have given favorable testimony and 
failing to offer evidence that could have been used to rehabilitate credibility.867  Bryant 
was convicted after standing trial for sexual abuse of a minor.868  He moved for a new 
trial based on ineffective counsel, arguing that his trial attorney neglected to call a 
witness to the stand who would have given testimony in his favor, and that his counsel 
failed to offer into evidence a certificate that Bryant hoped to use during his closing 
argument to rehabilitate his credibility.869  The court of appeals held that Bryant did not 
meet his burden of proof to show that the trial attorney knew, or should have known, 
what the witness was going to say and what help that witness could have provided.870  
The court of appeals also held that the rehabilitation evidence was unnecessary because 
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the prosecution did not address the issue in its closing argument and because the evidence 
would not have rehabilitated his credibility.871  The court of appeals affirmed the ruling 
of the superior court, holding that a defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to call 
a witness who may have given favorable testimony and failing to offer evidence that 
could have been used to rehabilitate credibility.872 
 
 
Carlson v. State 
In Carlson v. State,873 the court of appeals held that a judge may deviate from the 
judicially declared benchmark range for individuals convicted of second-degree murder 
without violating the Sixth Amendment.874  Carlson was convicted of second-degree 
murder and was sentenced to fifty years imprisonment with ten years suspended.875  The 
judge determined that Carlson’s sentence should exceed the benchmark range because of 
his prior history of delinquency and repeated perjury.876  Carlson appealed, claiming that 
his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the judge imposed a sentence above the 
benchmark range without the aid of a jury.877  The court of appeals held that a judge 
could deviate from the judicially declared benchmark range without violating the Sixth 
Amendment, because the legislature retained an indeterminate sentencing structure, 
allowing a sentencing judge to impose a sentence above the benchmark for any sound 
reason.878  Defendants convicted of second-degree murder do not have a Sixth 
Amendment right to have a jury decide whether their sentences should exceed the 
benchmark range, because a finding of guilt subjects the defendant to the statutory 
penalty of ten to ninety-nine years in prison.879  Within the statutory range, sentencing is 
indeterminate, and judges are permitted to impose a sentence above the thirty-year 
benchmark ceiling as long as they have a sound reason for doing so.880  The court of 
appeals affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that it is not a violation of 
the Sixth Amendment for judges to deviate from the judicially declared benchmark range 
for second-degree murder.881 
 
 
Cleveland v. State  
In Cleveland v. State,882 the court of appeals held that a presumptive term of 
imprisonment may be properly increased when at least one Blakely883-compliant 
aggravating factor has been proven, even if other aggravating factors relied on by the 
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sentencing judge have not been proven to a jury.884  Cleveland was convicted of three 
felonies relating to the forcible sexual penetration of his female cousin and was sentenced 
to nineteen years imprisonment.885  On appeal, he argued that the sentencing judge 
improperly increased the presumptive maximum term of imprisonment, since the 
aggravating factors were not presented to a jury, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.886  The court of appeals held that Cleveland’s sentence did not violate the 
Constitution, since five of the seven aggravating factors were in fact proven to the jury, 
and any one of the five was sufficient to allow the sentencing judge to increase the 
maximum presumptive term of imprisonment.887  The court of appeals affirmed the 
superior court’s denial of Cleveland’s motion for a correction of sentence, holding that 
the presumptive maximum term was properly exceeded.888 
 
 
Collier v. Municipality of Anchorage  
In Collier v. Municipality of Anchorage,889 the court of appeals held that a police 
officer did not violate a driver’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel when the officer 
required the driver to produce his driver’s license during a routine traffic stop.890  Collier 
was convicted of speeding and appealed, arguing that the officer improperly obtained his 
identification after he had invoked his Fifth Amendment right.891  The court of appeals 
held that a routine traffic stop was not a custodial interrogation, and as such, the right to 
counsel did not arise when the officer requested Collier’s driver’s license.892  The court of 
appeals affirmed the conviction for speeding, holding that the driver’s Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel was not triggered when a police officer required him to produce his 
driver’s license when he was stopped for speeding.893  
 
 
State v. Dague 
In State v. Dague,894 the court of appeals held that where a criminal defendant is 
entitled to a trial by jury on an aggravating factor, the defendant is not further guaranteed 
a grand jury indictment on that factor.895  Dague was prosecuted for second-degree 
murder for the death of a ten-month-old infant in her care; she was ultimately convicted 
of manslaughter.896  The State asked the judge to hold a jury trial to consider the presence 
of an aggravating factor.897  The trial court discharged the jury and barred the State from 
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raising the issue with a subsequent jury.898  The court of appeals held that because 
aggravating factors are not “elements” of the crime but rather are factors related to 
sentencing, they need not be alleged in the indictment, and the sentencing judge has a 
duty to take account of aggravating factors even if not raised by the State.899  
Furthermore, the Blakely900 line of cases did not prohibit state courts from using the 
element/sentencing factor dichotomy for purposes outside of the Sixth Amendment right 
to jury trial, such as the grand jury indictment concerned here.901  The court of appeals 
reversed the superior court’s decision, holding that, even where a defendant is guaranteed 
a jury trial on an aggravating factor, that factor is not an element of the crime for 
purposes of the grand jury clause of the Alaska Constitution.902 
 
 
Davis v. State  
In Davis v. State,903 the court of appeals held that the speedy trial calculation 
under Alaska Criminal Rule 45904 restarted when the defendant failed to change his plea 
at a change-of-plea hearing he requested, that the Rule 45 clock did not begin running 
until the trial judge ruled on the defendant’s suppression motion, and that hearsay 
testimony was improperly admitted under the present-sense-impression-exception.905   On 
July 26, 2000, Davis was charged with criminal offenses related to an automobile 
collision; the passenger in the other vehicle involved allegedly told the police officer 
statements regarding Davis.906  Davis’ trial began on February 4, 2002 which could have 
violated his statutory right to a speedy trial.907  However, since Davis scheduled a 
change-of-plea hearing at which he did not change his plea, the superior court ruled that 
the speedy trial calculation restarted.908  The jury subsequently found Davis guilty on all 
counts.909  The court of appeals held that the speedy trial calculation restarted when the 
defendant announced that he would not change his plea at a change-of-plea hearing he 
requested and that the Rule 45 clock did not begin running until the trial judge ruled on 
defendant’s suppression motion.910  The court of appeals also held that the present-sense-
impression hearsay exception is defined by its spontaneity or substantial contemporaneity 
and that hearsay testimony was improperly admitted under this exception here,911 since 
there was time for the passenger to reflect before the police officer asked him questions 
about the event. 912  The court of appeals reversed the conviction and granted a new trial, 
holding that the speedy trial calculation under Alaska Criminal Rule 45 restarted when 
                                                 
898 Id. at 992–93. 
899 Id. at 994–97. 
900 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
901 Dague, 143 P.3d at 1002. 
902 Id. at 1014. 
903 133 P.3d 719 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). 
904 ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 45 (2006). 
905 Davis, 133 P.3d at 722–23, 730. 
906 Id. at 722. 
907 Id. 
908 Id. 
909 Id. 
910 Id. 
911 Id. at 727. 
912 Id. at 729. 
 69 
the defendant failed to change his plea at a change-of-plea hearing he requested, that the 
Rule 45 clock did not begin running until the trial judge ruled on defendant’s suppression 
motion, and that hearsay testimony was improperly admitted under the present sense 
impression exception. 913 
 
 
Erickson v. State  
In Erickson v. State,914 the court of appeals held that a pat-down search of a 
passenger in a minor traffic violation stop, who the officer suspected of giving a false 
name, was an illegal search.915  Erickson was a passenger in a car pulled over for not 
having a front license plate.916  The police officer could not find the name that Erickson 
gave him in the Alaska Public Safety Information Network (“APSIN”) and concluded 
that the name given was false.917  The officer ordered Erickson out of the car and 
conducted a pat-down search, where he found an identification card.918  The officer 
arrested Erickson for giving false information and then continued the pat-down search, 
finding illegal drugs.919  Erickson was convicted of possession of illegal drugs and 
appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of the search.920  The court of 
appeals held that the search was illegal because the officer did not have probable cause to 
arrest Erickson and had no reason to believe Erickson was armed and dangerous.921  The 
fact that the officer could not find the name in APSIN is not enough to justify an arrest, 
so the pat-down search could not be performed incident to that arrest.922  The court of 
appeals reversed and remanded the decision of the superior court, holding that a pat-down 
search of the passenger in a minor traffic violation stop, who the officer suspected of 
giving a false name, was an illegal search.923 
 
 
State v. Garrison  
In State v. Garrison,924 the court of appeals held that an individual’s statements to 
the police are admissible when made outside the presence of counsel before the start of 
adversary proceedings and when any alleged police threats occur after the individual’s 
incriminating statements are made.925  Garrison was interviewed at his home without 
counsel present as part of an ongoing murder investigation.926  He had refused earlier 
attempts at questioning outside his attorney’s presence.927  However, at this time, 
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Garrison answered the police officer’s questions and admitted he had a connection to the 
murder weapon.928  The trial court held that this evidence was inadmissible, and the State 
appealed.929  The court of appeals held that the evidence was admissible, because there 
was no violation of attorney-client privilege when Garrison was not in custody and when 
formal proceedings had not yet been brought against him.930  Additionally, the court of 
appeals held that the testimony was given voluntarily, as the statements made by the 
police were minimally coercive, if at all, and were made after Garrison had already 
admitted his connection to the weapon.931  The court of appeals reversed the decision of 
the superior court, holding that an individual’s statements to the police are admissible 
when made outside the presence of counsel before the start of adversary proceedings and 
when alleged police threats occur after the individual’s incriminating statements are 
made.932     
 
 
State v. Gottschalk 
In State v. Gottschalk,933 the court of appeals held that giving an individual a copy 
of the indictment when he was in court for another proceeding did not constitute service 
for purposes of starting the speedy trial period under Alaska Criminal Rule 45.934  While 
in a court proceeding on a petition to revoke his probation, Gottschalk was given a copy 
of an indictment for felony DUI in a pending case.935  The superior court found that 
providing Gottschalk with the copy during the probation proceeding constituted service 
for Criminal Rule 45 purposes, even though he was not formally served until three 
months later.936  The court of appeals held that the speedy trial period under Rule 45 must 
have a clear, exact start date, and that Gottschalk’s proposed start date, when he received 
a copy of the indictment, would open the door for confusion as to when the Rule 45 clock 
started on each individual case.937  Therefore, the court determined that to start the speedy 
trial period, a defendant must be formally served under Rules 4 and 9 or formally 
arraigned on the charge under Rule 10.938  The court of appeals reversed the superior 
court’s order dismissing the case, holding that the defendant was not “served” for 
purposes of Rule 45 when the State gave him a copy of the indictment while he was in 
court for another proceeding, but instead was served when he was formally served with 
the charge several months later.939 
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Joseph v. State 
In Joseph v. State,940 the court of appeals held that a police officer’s reasonable 
suspicion of public use of marijuana does not justify conducting an investigative stop and 
that any evidence obtained as a result of an attempt to conduct an unjustified investigative 
stop must be suppressed.941  Joseph was convicted of third-degree controlled substance 
misconduct.942  The primary evidence against Joseph was a bag of cocaine that he threw 
away while being pursued by an officer who was investigating a report of public use of 
marijuana.943  Joseph appealed, arguing that the cocaine evidence should have been 
suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful seizure.944  The court of appeals held that the 
seizure was unlawful because Alaska case law limits investigative stops to situations in 
which the suspected criminal activity poses imminent public danger or recently caused 
serious harm, and the public use of marijuana did not satisfy this requirement.945  The 
court of appeals also held that the cocaine evidence should have been suppressed because 
the exclusionary rule applies to situations in which evidence is obtained while police are 
attempting to conduct an unlawful investigative stop.946  The court of appeals rejected the 
rule in the United States Supreme Court’s decision of California v. Hodari D.947 on state 
law grounds, finding that the Hodari D. rule fails to safeguard citizens’ rights to privacy 
under the Alaska Constitution.948  The court of appeals reversed the ruling of the superior 
court, holding that the exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained during an attempt to 
conduct an unjustified investigative stop and that reasonable suspicion of public use of 
marijuana does not justify conducting an investigative stop.949 
 
 
Knox v. State 
 In Knox v. State,950 the court of appeals held that a defense attorney’s failure to 
inform a defendant before his guilty plea that he would be subject to mandatory parole 
should he be released early because of good-time credit constituted a prima facie case for 
ineffective assistance of counsel.951  Knox was charged with selling crack cocaine, a class 
B felony, and faced a presumptive six-year sentence as a third-felony offender.952  Knox 
argued that his attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel in handling his 
suppression motion and in advising him about his plea.953  The court of appeals held that 
Knox did not overcome the strong presumption that his attorney represented him 
effectively with respect to the suppression hearing, because he did not show that the 
                                                 
940 No. A-8939, 2006 Alas. App. LEXIS 167 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2006). 
941 Id. at *3. 
942 Id. at *1. 
943 Id. 
944 Id. at *1–2. 
945 Id. at *10. 
946 Id. at *21. 
947 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 
948 Joseph, 2006 Alas. App. LEXIS 167 at *34. 
949 Id. at *36. 
950 130 P.3d 971 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). 
951 Id. at 973. 
952 Id. at 971–72. 
953 Id. at 972. 
 72 
decisions were not tactical.954  However, there was a prima facie case of ineffective 
assistance of counsel with respect to his plea decision, because the attorney admitted that 
she did not know that he would receive mandatory parole after his early release because 
of good-time credit, and she claimed that she believed this fact may have swayed Knox’s 
decision to plead.955  The court of appeals reversed the dismissal of Knox’s application 
for post-conviction relief and remanded, holding that the defense attorney’s erroneous 
and influential advice to the defendant that he would not be subject to mandatory parole 
after his early release constituted a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of 
counsel.956 
 
 
Marunich v. State 
In Marunich v. State,957 the court of appeals held that a trial court’s addition of 
general conditions of probation after sentencing did not violate a probationer’s double 
jeopardy rights but did violate his due process rights.958  Marunich was sentenced to six 
years in prison and four years on probation for two separate robberies.959  The superior 
court issued its written judgment a week later, which contained twelve conditions of 
probation that had not been mentioned by the sentencing judge.960  Marunich appealed, 
arguing that the added conditions of probation illegally increased the severity of his 
sentence.961  The court of appeals held that the addition of conditions which are inherent 
aspects of being on probation did not violate Marunich’s double jeopardy rights, because 
probation officers have a certain authority to supervise and control the conduct of 
probationers.962  The post-sentencing addition of the general conditions violated 
Marunich’s due process rights, however, because he was not given notice or the 
opportunity to seek judicial review of the conditions.963  The court of appeals directed the 
superior court to give Marunich an opportunity to object to the conditions, holding that 
the post-sentencing addition of general conditions of probation violated Marunich’s due 
process rights, though not his double jeopardy rights.964 
 
 
McQuade v. State  
In McQuade v. State,965 the court of appeals held that a traffic stop which led to 
the arrest of two people in connection with a robbery was based on reasonable suspicion, 
and therefore, it was proper that the evidence gained during the traffic stop was not 
suppressed.  A robbery occurred at an Anchorage gas station.966  After choosing to follow 
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a suspicious vehicle, occupied by McQuade and Johnston, and observing continued 
suspicious behavior including the commission of a traffic violation, a police sergeant 
pulled over McQuade and Johnston.967  In searching the car, officers found clothing that 
fit the robber’s description and cash that fit the description of the stolen money.968  
McQuade and Johnston moved to suppress this evidence, arguing that the sergeant lacked 
reasonable suspicion to stop them as robbery suspects.969  The superior court denied the 
motion.970  The court of appeals held that in order to satisfy the reasonable suspicion 
standard, an officer must not rely on just a hunch, but have an objective justification for 
making a stop and be able to point to “specific and articulable facts.”971  Because of the 
time at which the officer saw the car, the reactions of the men to the police car, the abrupt 
driving maneuvers, and the unusual behavior of the men while the sergeant followed, the 
sergeant could point to “specific and articulable facts” and had an objective justification 
for stopping the car.972  The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the superior court, 
holding that a traffic stop which led to the arrest of two people in connection with a 
robbery was based on reasonable suspicion, and therefore, it was proper that the evidence 
gained during the stop was not suppressed.973 
 
 
Myers v. Municipality of Anchorage  
In Myers v. Municipality of Anchorage,974 the court of appeals held that two 
Anchorage ordinances punishing the sale or possession of drug paraphernalia were 
invalid, one because it was unconstitutionally vague, the other because it made possible a 
conviction without proof of mens rea.975  Myers, a “head shop” owner,976 challenged the 
constitutionality of Sections 08.35.020 and 08.35.025 of the Anchorage Municipal 
Code,977 the first prohibiting the sale of drug paraphernalia or possession of drug 
paraphernalia with intent to sell, the second prohibiting the possession of drug 
paraphernalia in public.978  Interpretation of the ordinances required examination of the 
definition of “drug paraphernalia” found in Section 08.35.010.979  The court of appeals 
held that Section 08.35.010, which outlawed all items intended either to help introduce 
controlled substances into the human body, or to facilitate violations of Alaska's drug 
laws,980 impermissibly encompassed both legal and illegal uses of controlled 
substances.981  The court of appeals also held that this Section’s definition of “drug 
paraphernalia” as items that circumstances may reasonably indicate a subjective intent to 
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use or sell for consumption of controlled substances offered the possibility that the 
possessor could be convicted of a violation based on a third party’s view of the 
circumstances, rather than the possessor's actual intent.982  This would violate Alaska’s 
due process requirement of actual awareness of wrongdoing.983  The court of appeals thus 
held that Sections 08.35.020 and 08.35.025 of the Anchorage Municipal Code were 
invalid; Section 08.35.020 because it was unconstitutionally vague, Section 08.35.025 
because it made possible a conviction without proof of mens rea.984  
 
 
Netling v. State 
In Netling v. State,985 the court of appeals held that manufacturing 
methamphetamine is a sufficiently serious crime to justify substantial imprisonment even 
in the absence of injury, but that the superior court failed to support its determination that 
manufacturing methamphetamine on a small scale could not qualify for mitigation as 
among the least serious conduct within the definition of the offense.986  Netling pleaded 
guilty to second-degree controlled substance misconduct for manufacturing 
methamphetamine and was sentenced to the five-year presumptive term after the court 
rejected the mitigating factors that he proposed.987  Netling appealed, arguing that his 
sentence should be eligible for mitigation because: (1) the harm caused by his conduct 
was consistently minor and inconsistent with a substantial term of imprisonment, and (2) 
his conduct of manufacturing methamphetamine on a small scale was among the least 
serious within the definition of the offense.988  The court of appeals held that 
manufacturing methamphetamine was a sufficiently serious crime to justify substantial 
imprisonment even in the absence of injury, because the legislature viewed 
methamphetamine as a particularly dangerous drug and enacted provisions to severely 
punish its manufacture.989  However, the superior court failed to provide support for its 
determination that Netling’s small-scale operation could not qualify as among the least 
serious conduct within the range of methamphetamine manufacturing.990  The court of 
appeals vacated the superior court’s ruling in part, holding that while manufacturing 
methamphetamine is a sufficiently serious crime to justify substantial imprisonment, the 
superior court failed to support its determination that manufacturing methamphetamine 
on a small scale could not qualify for mitigation as among the least serious conduct 
within the definition of the offense.991 
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Noyakuk v. State 
In Noyakuk v. State,992 the court of appeals held that statements made by a suspect 
during his first post-arrest interview with state officers were inadmissible because he was 
not properly advised of his Miranda rights,993 but that this Miranda violation did not taint 
subsequent admissible statements994 and that state officers honored his right to an 
attorney.995  While Noyakuk was in custody for other criminal offenses, state troopers 
interviewed him regarding the murder of his girlfriend.996  During this interview Noyakuk 
was repeatedly told he could have an attorney present and could stop the interview at any 
time but was never given a full Miranda warning.997  Noyakuk confessed to the murder of 
his girlfriend.998  Each subsequent interview or conversation was preceded with a full 
Miranda warning.999  Noyakuk’s motion at trial to suppress these statements was granted 
regarding the first interview, but denied regarding all others.1000  The court of appeals 
held that, although the first interview was conducted the day after he was arrested, 
Noyakuk, who was being held incommunicado in a holding cell, was just as susceptible at 
that time to coercion as a new arrestee.1001  The court of appeals also held that there was 
sufficient time between the first and second interview to eliminate any threat of 
coercion.1002  Furthermore, Noyakuk was appointed an attorney, was properly Mirandized 
in subsequent interviews, and understood those warnings.1003  Finally, Noyakuk, who had 
enough prior experience with the criminal justice system to understand his rights, 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.1004  The court of appeals affirmed 
the decision of the superior court, holding that statements a suspect made during his first 
interview were appropriately suppressed because he was not properly advised of his 
Miranda rights,1005 but that subsequent statements were not tainted and were 
admissible1006 and that state troopers honored his right to an attorney.1007  
 
 
State v. One 
In State v. One,1008 the court of appeals held that where an indigent petitioner files 
for post-conviction relief, his or her attorney who submits a "no arguable claims" 
certificate on grounds that the post-conviction petition is time-barred must explain why 
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there is no arguable exception to the statute of limitations.1009  One entered a plea of no 
contest to an assault charge.1010  After sentencing, he filed a pro se petition for post-
conviction relief.1011  His court-appointed attorney, Zorea, concluded that One’s claim 
was time-barred and filed a no arguable claims certificate stating that he believed One 
had no arguable claim for post-conviction relief.1012  The superior court accepted the 
certificate, and One appealed, arguing that the certificate did not explain in detail why he 
had no grounds for relief.1013  The court of appeals held that a no arguable claims 
certificate must fully explain all of the claims the attorney considered and why the 
attorney concluded these claims were frivolous.1014  Zorea was obligated, but failed to 
provide, a full explanation of how he reached the conclusion that the claim was time-
barred.1015  The court of appeals reversed the decision of the superior court, holding that 
where an indigent petitioner files for post-conviction relief, his or her attorney who 
submits a "no arguable claims" certificate on grounds that the post-conviction petition is 
time-barred must explain why there is no arguable exception to the statute of 
limitations.1016  
 
 
Parrish v. State 
In Parrish v. State,1017 the court of appeals held that, without a complete record 
that allows for meaningful review, the superior court’s ruling cannot be reversed.1018  
Parrish was charged in 2005 with driving under the influence (“DUI”) and felony breath-
test refusal and agreed to a plea bargain with the State, whereby he would plead guilty to 
a prior 2004 DUI and the 2005 felony breath-test refusal in exchange for the dismissal of 
the 2005 DUI.1019  Parrish appealed his sentence, arguing that it should have been 
reduced on account of two mitigating factors.1020  The court of appeals rejected the first 
mitigating factor, that Parrish’s history of minor violations was inconsistent with the 
imposition of substantial imprisonment, because Parrish was not appealing the 2004 DUI 
charge, and the court would not review a composite sentence unless all of the underlying 
cases were appealed.1021  The second mitigating factor, that his conduct was among the 
least serious within the definition of the statute, was also rejected because Parrish had 
never before raised this argument in his defense, and thus the court had no record to 
establish whether that claim was true.1022  The court of appeals upheld the judgment of 
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the superior court, holding that the record was inadequate to allow the court to perform a 
meaningful review.1023 
 
 
Peterson v. State  
In Peterson v. State,1024 the court of appeals held that a defendant's Cooksey1025 
plea was valid where the issue preserved for appeal was dispositive of all charges and 
that an investigative stop did not amount to a seizure where the individual obviously did 
not feel compelled to reply to the officer’s questions.1026  Officer Turnage noticed 
unusual movement coming from Peterson’s car,1027 stepped out of his car to investigate, 
and observed a possible sexual assault.1028  Turnage knocked on the glass, to which 
Peterson replied with expletives, asking what the officer wanted.1029  Peterson then gave a 
fake name and an obviously fake birth date.1030  Drugs were subsequently discovered and 
Peterson was arrested.1031  Peterson entered a Cooksey plea, reserving the right to appeal 
the issue of suppression, for three felony charges and a normal no contest plea for four 
misdemeanors.1032  He did not appeal the misdemeanor charges.1033  The court of appeals 
held that a Cooksey plea is only valid if the issue being appealed is dispositive,1034 and 
Peterson’s Cooksey plea was valid because the State failed to prove that the suppression 
issue here is not dispositive of the felony charges against Peterson.1035  On the merits of 
the suppression motion, Turnage’s actions did not constitute an illegal seizure,1036 
because when Turnage approached Peterson, Peterson clearly did not feel compelled to 
answer the officer’s questions.1037  Further, Peterson’s fake name and birth date gave 
Turnage probable cause for arrest.1038  The supreme court affirmed the denial of 
Peterson’s suppression motion,1039 holding that a defendant’s Cooksey plea is valid where 
the issue preserved for appeal is dispositive of all the charges and that a police officer’s 
questioning of an individual did not amount to a seizure where the individual obviously 
did not feel compelled to reply to the officer’s questions.1040 
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State v. Rivers 
In State v. Rivers,1041 the court of appeals held that a person’s statements made to 
an investigator of the Employment Security Division of the Department of Labor 
(“Division”) at an interview are admissible in court when the person does not 
affirmatively exercise his or her right against self-incrimination during the interview.1042  
Rivers moved to suppress incriminating statements he had given during an interview with 
an investigator of the Division regarding his unemployment insurance.1043  The 
investigator encouraged interviewees to participate and informed them that failure to do 
so could result in a loss of future benefits.1044  The superior court judge suppressed the 
statements because he found that Rivers had been coerced into giving them.1045 The court 
of appeals held that the statements were admissible because at the time they were made, 
Rivers was not in custody, was not coerced, and most importantly did not exercise his 
right to avoid self-incrimination.1046 Alaska Statute section 23.20.070, which governs 
immunity from prosecution when making statements before the Division, falls within a 
category of statutes requiring individuals to affirmatively assert their right against self-
incrimination in order to gain immunity from prosecution.1047  The court of appeals relied 
heavily on the reasoning from Minnesota v. Murphy1048 in finding that Rivers’ situation 
did not fall under the two possible exceptions to the affirmative assertion requirement, 
because he was neither in custody nor compelled to give the incriminating testimony.1049  
The court of appeals reversed the superior court’s decision, holding that a person’s 
statements made to a Division investigator at an interview are admissible in court when 
the person does not affirmatively exercise his or her right against self-incrimination 
during the interview.1050 
 
 
Serradell v. State 
In Serradell v. State,1051 the court of appeals held that the superior court could not 
deny a criminal offender’s pro se application for post-conviction relief without adequate 
notice to the petitioner.1052  Upon his counsel’s advice, Serradell pleaded no contest to 
one count of second-degree murder.1053  Serradell then sought to withdraw his plea by 
claiming that he was tricked into agreeing to the plea bargain by his attorneys.1054  The 
State filed an “Answer and Opposition” asserting that Serradell had failed to rebut the 
presumption that his counsel was competent, and the superior court denied Serradell’s 
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application.1055  Serradell argued that the superior court erred because he was never given 
notice of its intent to dismiss his application, thus preventing him from supplementing his 
pleading.1056  The court of appeals held that the State’s “Answer and Opposition” was not 
the functional equivalent of a motion for summary disposition, as claimed by the State, 
and thus Serradell had no notice of the possible dismissal of his petition, in violation of 
current Alaska rules of criminal procedure.1057  The court of appeals reversed the 
judgment of the superior court, holding that a petitioner must receive adequate notice that 
his application for post-conviction relief will be denied.1058 
 
 
Slwooko v. State 
 In Slwooko v. State,1059 the court of appeals held that a reasonable person who 
initiated contact with the police herself would not believe she was in custody when she 
was interviewed in a polite, non-accusatory manner, even though it occurred in a police 
office,1060 and that the interview did not become custodial when she refused to answer 
questions because officers assured her that she was not under arrest and remained non-
accusatory.1061  Although another person had already confessed to a murder, police went 
to question Slwooko after the confessor made suspicious statements and another person 
tipped police that Slwooko admitted involvement in the murder.1062  Upon seeing the 
police, Slwooko told them that she needed to talk to them, prompting the police to take 
Slwooko to a closed interview room at the police station.1063  There, the police read 
Slwooko her Miranda1064 rights, but she said that she did not want to answer 
questions.1065  The officers emphasized that Slwooko was not under arrest and continued 
to question her in a polite manner, after which she confessed to her involvement in the 
murder.1066  The trial court ruled that Slwooko was not in custody when the interview 
started, but that the interview became custodial when the officers continued to ask her 
questions after she refused.1067  The court of appeals held that Slwooko was not in 
custody when the interview began, since a reasonable person would not have believed 
that she had no choice to end the questioning.1068  Furthermore, the interview did not 
become custodial when officers continued to ask her questions after she initially refused, 
because the tone remained polite and non-accusatory and the officers emphasized that she 
was not under arrest immediately afterwards.1069  The court of appeals affirmed 
                                                 
1055 Id.   
1056 Id. at 463.   
1057 Id. at 463–64.  
1058 Id. at 464.   
1059 139 P.3d 593 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).  
1060 Id. at 598–600. 
1061 Id. at 604. 
1062 Id. at 595. 
1063 Id. at 595–96. 
1064 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
1065 Slwooko, 139 P.3d at 596. 
1066 Id. 
1067 Id. at 597. 
1068 Id. at 598–600. 
1069 Id. at 600–01. 
 80 
Slwooko’s conviction, holding that her confession was admissible because it was made 
during a non-custodial interview with the police.1070 
 
 
Stickman-Sam v. State  
In Stickman-Sam v. State,1071 the court of appeals held that a criminal defendant is 
entitled to a change of venue if an approved trial-site location is geographically closer to 
the site of the alleged crime than the original court.1072  Stickman-Sam was charged with 
manslaughter, which allegedly occurred in Galena.1073  Under the Alaska criminal rules, a 
criminal defendant may move for a change of venue to an approved trial site if that site is 
the closest one to the location of the alleged crime.1074  Stickman-Sam, whose trial was 
originally located in Fairbanks, moved to change venue to Nenana.1075  The trial judge 
denied his motion because, though Nenana is geographically closer to Galena than 
Fairbanks, the expense of travel and logistical convenience makes Fairbanks practically 
easier to access than Nenana.1076  The court of appeals held that the underlying purpose of 
the criminal rule is to ensure that a defendant has access to a jury pool drawn from the 
community in which the crime occurred, particularly when the crime occurs in a rural 
community.1077  The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial judge, holding that 
the criminal rules allow a defendant to change his trial to the venue geographically 
closest to the site of the alleged crime.1078 
 
 
Tritt v. State  
In Tritt v. State,1079 the court of appeals held that an appeal of a trial court’s denial 
of a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy should be decided on the merits of the 
double jeopardy claim even if no final judgment has been entered for the underlying 
criminal charges, unless the double jeopardy claim is patently without merit.1080  Tritt 
was charged with felony driving under the influence, and the trial court declared a 
mistrial without his consent.1081  When Tritt was brought to court a second time to face 
trial, he filed a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds, but the superior 
court denied the motion.1082  In an unpublished order, the supreme court had decided a 
similar case.1083  The court of appeals, realizing that attorneys and trial court judges may 
not be aware of the unpublished order, published this opinion following the order’s 
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precedent.1084  The court of appeals granted Tritt’s motion for review, holding that an 
appeal of a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy should be 
decided on the merits of the double jeopardy claim even if no final judgment has been 
entered for the underlying criminal charges, unless the double jeopardy claim is patently 
without merit.1085 
 
 
Tyler v. State 
In Tyler v. State,1086 the court of appeals held that when evidence establishing an 
aggravating factor is uncontested, and there is no reasonable possibility that a jury would 
find in the defendant’s favor with regard to that factor, any potential error in failing to 
submit an issue to a jury is harmless and therefore not plain error.1087  David Tyler was 
charged with felony driving while intoxicated and driving with a suspended license.1088  
Tyler pleaded no contest to the charges.1089  Tyler conceded two aggravating factors, both 
of which were based on his prior convictions.1090  He was sentenced to five years’ 
imprisonment.1091  Tyler appealed the decision, arguing that, under Blakely v. 
Washington,1092 the superior court did not have the authority to issue a sentence longer 
than the presumptive three years because the aggravating factors were not found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.1093  The court of appeals held that though under Blakely, the 
defendant has the right to demand that all aggravating factors of a criminal sentence be 
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, an exception exists for aggravating factors 
based on prior convictions.1094  Because the State relied only upon Tyler’s six prior 
convictions for driving under the influence in increasing his sentence,1095 Tyler’s case fell 
into the Blakely exception.1096  The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the superior 
court, holding that when evidence establishing an aggravating factor is uncontested, and 
there is no reasonable possibility that a jury would find in the defendant’s favor with 
regard to the aggravating factor, any potential Blakely error in failing to submit an issue 
to a jury is harmless and therefore not plain error.1097   
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Williams v. State 
 In Williams v. State,1098 the court of appeals ruled that reasonable suspicion to 
conduct an investigative stop can be based on an anonymous tip from an informant when 
the informant provides intimate detailed information that can be corroborated by 
police.1099  An anonymous informant told the police that Antonio Williams and two other 
men had rented a light green Mercury Mountaineer under an alias and were transporting 
drugs that day from Anchorage to Fairbanks.1100  After corroborating that such an SUV 
had been rented under the same alias, the police set up surveillance and made an 
investigative stop when it found the vehicle in question.1101  The court of appeals held 
that the reasonable suspicion required for an investigative stop existed because the 
informant provided detailed information that was corroborated by police.1102  Thus, the 
court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s denial of the suppression motion, holding 
that an anonymous tip from an informant can be enough for reasonable suspicion when 
information given can be corroborated.1103 
 
 
Winterrowd v. Municipality of Anchorage  
In Winterrowd v. Municipality of Anchorage,1104 the court of appeals held that 
traffic stops do not constitute “custody” for Miranda purposes and that motorists have no 
Fifth Amendment right to refuse to produce vehicle registration and proof of 
insurance.1105  On two occasions when he was stopped for speeding, Winterrowd failed to 
produce his vehicle registration or proof of insurance, invoking his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel.1106  He was later convicted of 
failing to carry motor vehicle insurance and failing to produce proof of insurance.1107  
Winterrowd appealed, arguing that because he was “seized” under the Fourth 
Amendment and had invoked his Fifth Amendment privileges, he could not be punished 
for failing to produce registration and proof of insurance.1108  The court of appeals held 
that although a traffic stop is a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment, traffic stops do 
not constitute “custody” for Miranda purposes because some seizures of short duration, 
such as traffic stops, do not trigger the Fifth Amendment rights recognized in 
Miranda.1109  Moreover, motorists have no Fifth Amendment rights to refuse to produce 
vehicle registration or proof of insurance.1110  The court of appeals affirmed the judgment 
of the district court, holding that during traffic stops, motorists are not in “custody” for 
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Miranda purposes and have no Fifth Amendment right to refuse to produce vehicle 
registration or proof of insurance.1111 
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IX.  ELECTION LAW 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana v. Municipality of Anchorage  
In Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana v. Municipality of 
Anchorage,1112 the supreme court held that a ballot proposition that was confusing and 
misleading was legally insufficient to be certified and placed on the ballot.1113  Citizens 
for Implementing Medical Marijuana (“Citizens”) submitted to the Anchorage municipal 
clerk a petition advocating the legalization of marijuana paraphernalia when used in a 
private and/or medicinal context.1114  The Municipality refused to certify the petition for 
the ballot, and Citizens sued.1115  The superior court dismissed the suit on summary 
judgment, and Citizens appealed.1116  The supreme court held that a ballot proposition 
petition must be truthful and comprehensible,1117 and Citizens’ petition failed to meet this 
requirement because its title was confusing, it was misleading as to the conduct it sought 
to protect, and it failed to explain whether it abolished or created rights.1118  The supreme 
court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that the ballot proposition was 
confusing and misleading and thus legally insufficient to be certified and placed on the 
ballot.1119    
 
 
North West Cruise Ship Ass’n of Alaska v. State, Office of Lieutenant Governor 
In North West Cruise Ship Ass’n of Alaska v. State, Office of Lieutenant 
Governor,1120 the supreme court held that, despite technical deficiencies in the process of 
obtaining signatures for an initiative petition, the Division of Elections (“Division”) 
construed its own regulations in a manner consistent with both the rule of liberal 
construction with regard to statutory initiative procedures and the regulations ensuring 
voters are well-informed when signing such a petition.1121  A ballot initiative, which 
would have led to increased regulation of the cruise ship industry, was opposed by that 
industry on the grounds that the procedures followed in collecting signatures violated 
Alaska law.1122  North West Cruise Ship Ass’n of Alaska argued that the signatures on 
the initiative petitions were invalid for four reasons.1123  The supreme court held that, 
despite these technical deficiencies, the signatures on the initiative were valid because the 
deficiencies did not impede the purpose of the statutory initiative process.1124  The 
supreme court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the Division, holding that, 
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despite technical deficiencies in the process of obtaining signatures for an initiative 
petition, the Division of Elections construed its own regulations in a manner consistent 
with both the rule of liberal construction with regard to statutory initiative procedures and 
the regulations ensuring voters are well-informed when signing petitions.1125 
 
                                                 
1125 Id. at 578–59. 
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X.  EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Board of Trustees v. Municipality of Anchorage  
In Board of Trustees v. Municipality of Anchorage,1126 the supreme court held that 
it was not unconstitutional for a retirement system to absorb the costs of a grievance 
settlement with a municipality, and the municipality is not required to absorb the impact 
of the settlement.1127  Anchorage maintains a retirement program for former city police 
officers and firemen called the Anchorage Police and Fire Retirement System 
(“System”).1128  After a grievance action victory by a former police officer against the 
city resulted in increased liability for the System, a superior court judge ruled that the 
increased liability was inherent to the System, and Anchorage did not have to compensate 
the System for the increased liability.1129  In a separate action, another grievance against 
Anchorage led to more increases in liability for the system, but this time a different judge 
ruled that forcing the System to absorb the costs without help from the city was an 
unconstitutional violation of the State’s accrued benefits clause.1130  The supreme court 
held that forcing the System to bear the increased costs was not unconstitutional and the 
municipality did not have to pay.1131  Increased liability was inherent to the System and a 
settlement by the municipality was not an unconstitutional change to the plan.1132  The 
supreme court affirmed the ruling of one superior court and reversed the ruling of another 
superior court, holding that it was not unconstitutional for a retirement system to absorb 
the costs of a grievance settlement with a municipality, and the municipality is not 
required to absorb the impact of the settlement.1133 
 
 
Circle De Lumber Co. v. Humphrey 
In Circle De Lumber Co. v. Humphrey,1134 the supreme court held that disability 
payments to an injured employee were properly calculated by the Workers’ 
Compensation Board using the employee’s overall wage earnings rather than his wage 
earnings from the two years prior to the injury.1135  Otto Humphrey was seriously injured 
in 1993 while employed by Circle De Lumber Company and, as a result of his injury, was 
first awarded Temporary Total Disability (“TTD”) benefits and then, after it was 
determined in 1999 that his injuries were permanent, awarded Permanent Total Disability 
(“PTD”) benefits.1136  The Compensation Board (“Board”) calculated Humphrey’s TTD 
benefits based on the salary he was earning at the time of the accident, but calculated his 
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PTD benefits based on the salary for the position that Humphrey estimated he would have 
been holding in 1998.1137  Circle De argued that the Compensation Board took too broad 
a view of Humphrey’s employment history when determining the PTD compensation and 
should have only considered his salary from the two years before the accident when 
determining his average wage, as required by statute.1138  The supreme court held that 
Humphrey’s earnings in the two years prior to the accident were not an accurate predictor 
of wage losses, and thus the Board’s alternative method of calculation was 
appropriate.1139  Because Humphrey’s salary from the two previous years was lower than 
the average of his entire career, and because substantial evidence showed his earning 
patterns were stabilizing and improving, it was reasonable to use his overall earnings 
history in the calculation.1140  The supreme court upheld the Board’s decision to calculate 
permanent disability payments for a permanently injured employee based on the 
employee’s overall earning patterns rather than his earnings from the two years prior to 
his accident.1141 
 
 
Leigh v. Seekins Ford 
In Leigh v. Seekins Ford,1142 the supreme court held that the Alaska Workers’ 
Compensation Board  (“Board”) failed to make sufficient findings addressing an 
employee’s evidence that he was incapacitated by pain and pain medication and that his 
employer failed to provide substantial evidence that work within his capabilities was 
regularly and continuously available.1143  Leigh injured his back while working for 
Seekins Ford.1144  Leigh applied to the Board for permanent total disability (“PTD”) 
benefits, but the Board found that Seekins Ford rebutted Leigh’s presumption of 
compensability and that Leigh failed to prove his PTD status, therefore denying his 
claim.1145 The superior court upheld the Board’s conclusions, and Leigh appealed, 
arguing that Seekins Ford did not rebut the presumption of compensability.1146  The 
supreme court held that the Board failed to make adequate findings to support its 
conclusion that Leigh was not totally and permanently disabled, and failed to sufficiently 
address Leigh’s contentions about the effect of his pain and pain medication on his 
employment.1147  Also, Seekins Ford did not present substantial evidence that work that 
Leigh could undertake was regularly, continuously available.1148  The supreme court 
vacated the superior court’s decision and remanded to the Board for further proceedings, 
holding that the Board’s findings were insufficient regarding an employee’s evidence that 
he was incapacitated by pain and pain medications and that his employer failed to provide 
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substantial evidence that work within his capabilities was regularly and continuously 
available.1149 
 
 
Mahan v. Arctic Catering, Inc.  
In Mahan v. Arctic Catering, Inc.,1150 the supreme court held that an employee 
alleging wrongful termination did not present sufficiently strong circumstantial evidence 
that she was fired for retaliatory reasons.1151  Bonita Mahan worked for Arctic Catering 
Inc. on two separate occasions and alleged that (1) during her first period of employment 
she was subject to sexual harassment and (2) her second period of employment was 
wrongfully terminated for retaliation associated with the sexual harassment that had 
occurred previously.1152  The supreme court affirmed dismissal of her first claim on 
statute-of-limitations grounds.1153  The supreme court held that with regard to the 
wrongful termination claim, Mahan did not offer enough circumstantial evidence that she 
was fired for retaliatory rather than legitimate reasons, thus failing to meet her burden 
under either the pretextual discharge framework test or the mixed-motives discharge 
framework test of wrongful termination, because she offered no evidence beyond her 
own personal feelings that she had been treated unfairly.1154  The supreme court affirmed 
the superior court’s order, holding that an employee alleging wrongful termination failed 
to present sufficiently strong circumstantial evidence that she was fired for retaliatory 
reasons.1155   
 
 
McMullen v. Bell  
In McMullen v. Bell,1156 the supreme court held that a state employee had no legal 
or practical right to include substantial cashed-in leave in the calculation of his retirement 
benefits.1157  Upon retiring from state service, McMullen sought to include substantial 
cashed-in leave in the calculation of his retirement benefits.1158  The Public Employee’s 
Retirement Board (“Board”) excluded the cashed-in leave from the calculation of 
McMullen’s benefits, and the superior court affirmed the Board’s decision.1159  
McMullen appealed, arguing that the law in effect when he was hired entitled him to 
include leave in the calculation of benefits.1160  The supreme court held that neither the 
law nor practice entitled McMullen to include his cashed-in leave when calculating his 
retirement benefits, because even though the statute in effect when he was hired did not 
expressly exclude cashed-in leave from the definition of compensation, McMullen failed 
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to show that he was actually entitled to retirement benefits including the cashed-in leave 
under the original law.1161  Also, McMullen was not a party to collective bargaining 
agreements that permitted the inclusion of cashed-in leave in retirement benefits, and he 
acknowledged that he did not actually expect that he would be able to include the leave in 
his retirement benefits.1162  The supreme court affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that 
the state employee was not entitled by law or practice to include his cashed-in leave to 
calculate his retirement benefits.1163 
 
 
Olson v. Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc.   
In Olson v. Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc.,1164 the supreme court held that an 
employee’s claim of wrongful termination was properly dismissed because the employee 
could not allege any facts to support that claim.1165  Olson had a history of absences from 
work, was put on probation by his employer, Teck Cominco, and warned that continued 
absences beyond his allotment could result in termination.1166  Olson claimed lead 
poisoning and filed a workers’ compensation suit, missing days beyond his permitted 
“unplanned absence” time, and after the workers’ compensation claim was found to be 
invalid, was terminated from Teck Cominco for excessive absences.1167  Olson filed a 
wrongful termination suit, claiming that he was fired, not because of the absences, but in 
retaliation for the workers’ compensation claim he filed against the company.1168  The 
supreme court found that there was no factual support alleged for this claim, and so there 
was no genuine issue of material fact to be tried.1169  The supreme court upheld the trial 
court’s granting of summary judgment against Olson, holding that he could allege no 
facts to support his claim of wrongful termination.1170 
 
 
Schmitz v. Yukon-Koyukuk School District 
In Schmitz v. Yukon-Koyukuk School District,1171 the supreme court held that a 
teacher, whose tenure contract incorporated the grievance provisions of the school 
district’s collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the teachers’ union, was required 
to exhaust all remedies under the grievance provisions before instigating litigation against 
the district.1172  Schmitz, a teacher, signed a tenure contract with the Yukon-Koyukuk 
School District that incorporated the teachers’ union’s CBA terms regarding grievance 
procedures.1173  When the district eliminated Schmitz’s position and transferred him to a 
distant school, Schmitz complied with the first two steps of the grievance process and 
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then sued the district for breach of contract.1174  Schmitz argued that he was not required 
to fulfill the grievance process steps because the school allegedly had breached his 
contract and not the CBA itself.1175  Rejecting this argument, the superior court granted 
the school district’s motion for summary judgment.1176  The supreme court held that the 
contract fully incorporated the terms of the CBA and that Schmitz was required to 
exhaust all remedies under the CBA before pursuing litigation.1177  The supreme court 
affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that a teacher whose tenure contract 
incorporated the grievance provisions of the school district’s CBA with the teacher’s 
union was required to exhaust all remedies under those provisions before suing the 
district.1178 
 
 
Alaska Court of Appeals 
 
Ornelas v. State 
 In Ornelas v. State,1179 the court of appeals held that The Alaska Employment 
Security Act (“AESA”)1180 does not preclude prosecuting individuals for theft who 
fraudulently obtain unemployment benefits.1181  In order to receive unemployment 
benefits, Ornelas falsely reported that he had not worked and had not received 
earnings.1182 Ornelas confessed and was convicted of twenty-three counts of making false 
statements in order to obtain unemployment benefits pursuant to AESA, as well as 
second degree theft.1183  Ornelas appealed his conviction for theft, arguing that AESA 
provided exclusive remedies for those who fraudulently obtain unemployment 
benefits.1184  The court of appeals held that, although AESA includes a remedy for 
general AESA violations, the legislature did not intend this to be the sole remedy for theft 
under AESA; it is merely the remedy for violations not covered elsewhere in AESA or by 
“another applicable statute,” which in this case would be the statute criminalizing 
theft.1185  The court further reasoned that it is unlikely that the legislature did not intend 
to criminalize the fraudulent receipt of benefits.1186  The court of appeals affirmed the 
conviction for theft, holding that AESA does not preclude the prosecution of individuals 
for theft who fraudulently obtain unemployment benefits.1187 
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XI.  ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Kempthorne 
In Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Kempthorne,1188 the Ninth Circuit 
held that the Final Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”) issued by the government 
when land in the Northwest Planning Area (“NWPA”) is leased does not have to include 
site-specific analysis for particular locations, until actual leasing and exploration has 
occurred.1189  The Northern Alaska Environmental Center (“NAEC”) alleged that the 
government violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) when it failed to 
analyze the environmental impact of oil drilling on specific parcels for lease, and that the 
government’s analysis, which looked at the entire region, was insufficient.1190  The 
government argued that once the parcels were leased and explored, the lessees would still 
have to apply for permits for drilling at those sites, and then site-specific analysis of the 
environmental effects would be possible.1191  The Ninth Circuit held that a site-specific 
FEIS is not necessary during initial leasing authorization, before actual leasing and 
exploration, because uncertainty is inherent in multi-stage projects, and oil exploration in 
the WNPA is a multi-stage project.1192  Thus, it is not unreasonable for a general analysis 
of the region at that early point in the project.1193  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision 
of the district court, holding that a site-specific FEIS was not necessary during initial 
leasing authorization under the NEPA.1194 
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XII.  ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
In re Ford 
In In re Ford,1195 the supreme court issued a ninety-day suspension to an attorney 
who knowingly violated a superior court order.1196  Attorney Ford refused to follow a 
superior court’s order to transfer a damage payment to opposing counsel.1197  The Alaska 
Bar Association’s hearing committee ruled on summary judgment that Ford knowingly 
disobeyed an order of the court in violation of Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 
3.4(c).1198  The committee issued a thirty-day suspension, which was raised by the 
disciplinary board to ninety days, and Ford appealed.1199  The supreme court held that 
Ford knowingly violated Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(c) and independently 
issued a ninety-day suspension to deter further misconduct.1200  The supreme court 
further found that a summary judgment ruling did not violate Ford’s due process rights, 
given that there was no genuine issue of material fact.1201  As for sanctions, the supreme 
court found that Ford’s misconduct warranted a ninety-day suspension because there was 
no question that there was a knowledgeable breach of duty that harmed the reputation of 
lawyers and impeded efficiency.1202  Although the recommended sanction was six-
months,1203 the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh the mitigating circumstances, 
and a ninety-day suspension was the typical length assessed in earlier cases.1204  The 
supreme court thus suspended an attorney who knowingly violated a court’s order for 
ninety days.1205   
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XIII.  FAMILY LAW 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
In re Adoption of Missy H. and Cameron H. 
 In In re Adoption of Missy H. and Cameron H.,1206 the supreme court held that a 
two-part test governs whether the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) reasonably 
withheld its consent to an adoption, consisting of  (1) whether the statutorily required 
consents had been obtained or excused and (2) whether adoption is in the best interests of 
the child.1207  The Donnes had been foster parents for about thirty children.1208  Due to 
child abuse allegations, their foster care license was revoked until a mental-health 
evaluation was completed on the mother and until the Donnes completed a plan of 
correction.1209  The Donnes then tried to adopt two of their former foster children, Missy 
and Cameron.1210  OCS withheld its consent, but the superior court found that OCS did so 
unreasonably because adoption was in the best interest of the children.1211  The supreme 
court held that the correct test for determining the reasonableness of OCS’s decision to 
withhold consent to adoption is a two-part inquiry, consisting of (1) whether the 
statutorily required consents had been obtained or excused and (2) whether adoption is in 
the best interests of the child, and that the superior court had improperly focused only on 
the best interest prong.1212  The supreme court also held that OCS’s withholding of 
consent was reasonable because it was properly following its rules for ensuring safety of 
the children in its custody.1213  The supreme court remanded the case, holding that the 
correct test for whether OCS reasonably withheld its consent to an adoption is (1) 
whether the statutorily required consents had been obtained or excused and (2) whether 
adoption is in the best interests of the child.1214 
 
 
Brotherton v. Brotherton  
In Brotherton v. Brotherton,1215 the supreme court held that allowing a writ of 
execution on a judgment five years after the order in a divorce was proper because the 
wife chose not to execute until the appeals process was complete.1216  In 1995, Douglas 
and Tahni Brotherton divorced.1217  There were several court orders and appeals,1218 at 
the end of which Tahni was awarded half of the equity in a property, and Douglas also 
was ordered to pay her accrued interest at 10.5 percent.1219  Douglas appealed the order, 
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arguing that Tahni had relinquished her right to execution since more than five years had 
passed since the judgment.1220  The supreme court held that a court has the discretion in 
allowing executions on orders more than five years old if there are “just and sufficient 
reasons” for the delay.1221  Here, Tahni did have “just and sufficient reasons” for delay 
because (1) there was a great deal of animosity in the case, and, more importantly, (2) 
Tahni was waiting for the appeals process to end before seeking an execution.1222  The 
supreme court affirmed the ruling of the superior court, holding that allowing a writ of 
execution on a judgment five years after the order in a divorce was proper because the 
wife chose not to execute until the appeals process was complete.1223 
 
 
Byers v. Ovitt 
In Byers v. Ovitt,1224 the supreme court held that, in altering a child support order, 
the trial court correctly permitted discovery of a father’s tax returns, declined to call for a 
third hearing sua sponte, and imputed income to the father based on his expenses,1225 but 
that the trial court incorrectly calculated the father’s adjusted gross income by not 
deducting federal income tax payments and voluntary retirement contributions.1226  In 
2002, a court ordered Byers to pay Ovitt child support.1227  Subsequently, Ovitt 
discovered evidence indicating that Byers’ income was higher than initially reported and 
brought a suit to modify the child support order.1228  The superior court master ordered 
discovery of Byers’ tax returns to verify the claim.1229  Byers was uncooperative.1230  The 
superior court master thus imputed Byers’ adjusted gross income based on his 
expenditures and ordered an increase in child support payments.1231  Byers failed to 
request a third hearing, and the superior court affirmed.1232  Byers appealed, arguing that 
the superior court impermissibly (1) ordered discovery of his tax returns; (2) failed to call 
a third hearing sua sponte; (3) imputed adjusted gross income; and (4) calculated adjusted 
gross income.1233   The supreme court held that (1) it was within the superior court’s 
broad discretion in discovery decisions to order Byers to turn over his tax returns; (2) the 
superior court was not obligated to initiate a third hearing sua sponte because it gave 
Byers clear notice that it was his obligation to request a hearing; (3) the superior court has 
the discretion to impute adjusted gross income where, as here, the defendant is 
uncooperative and the record is incomplete;1234 but that (4) the superior court should have 
deducted Byers’ retirement contributions and federal income tax in calculating adjusted 
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gross income.1235   The supreme court thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded the case, holding that the trial court correctly permitted discovery of a father’s 
tax returns, declined to call for a third hearing sua sponte, and imputed income to the 
father based on his expenses in altering a child support order;1236 but that it incorrectly 
calculated the father’s adjusted gross income by not deducting federal income tax 
payments and voluntary retirement contributions.1237  
 
 
Debbie G. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services  
In Debbie G. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,1238 the supreme 
court held that designating a relative to raise a minor child did not remedy the risk of 
harm posed in the home and that termination of parental rights was therefore 
appropriate.1239  Debbie G. and Charles F., the birth parents of John G., both had a history 
of substance abuse, mental illness, and criminal activity, and acknowledged that they 
were either unwilling or unable to take care of John G.1240  The Office of Children’s 
Services began proceedings to terminate parental rights and determined that John should 
be placed with the same family that had adopted John’s half-brother.1241  The superior 
court ruled to terminate parental rights, and both parents appealed, arguing that they had 
remedied their conduct by designating a relative to care for John.1242  The supreme court 
held that parents who place a child at risk of harm do not remedy the situation by 
designating a relative to step into their parental role, because the designation would not 
ensure permanent placement for the child, nor would it prevent the parents from trying to 
regain physical custody.1243  The supreme court affirmed the holding of the superior court 
terminating Debbie G. and Charles F.’s parental rights, holding that the designation of a 
relative to raise a minor did not remedy the conduct that placed the child at risk.1244 
 
 
Dunlap v. Dunlap  
In Dunlap v. Dunlap,1245 the supreme court held that a divorced father’s appeal 
ten years after an initial ruling did not meet the “exceptional circumstances” and “clear 
error constituting manifest injustice” standard for timeliness,1246 and that a contract 
between divorced parents requiring one party to contribute to an educational fund was 
enforceable despite failing to identify the exact procedure for administering such a 
fund.1247  According to James and Ann Dunlap’s divorce settlement, James was to put a 
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percentage of his retirement buyout into educational accounts for their children.1248  
James created such accounts, but subsequently closed them.1249  The supreme court held 
James’ claim that a prior judgment requiring him to contribute a portion of his retirement 
payout to both the educational fund and to child support was improper was barred, 
because James waited ten years to appeal the order and failed to show the requisite 
“exceptional circumstances” and “manifest injustice.”1250  The supreme court also held 
that the clause of the divorce settlement requiring James to establish an educational fund 
for the children was enforceable, even though the clause did not specify the exact 
procedure for administering the educational fund, because the essential terms of the 
provision were clear, and thus fairness and justice required it to be upheld.1251  The 
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s judgment, holding that a divorced father’s 
appeal ten years after an initial ruling did not meet the “exceptional circumstances” and 
“clear error constituting manifest injustice” standard for timeliness, and that a divorce 
agreement requiring contribution to an educational fund was enforceable despite its 
failure to identify the exact procedure for administering the fund.1252   
 
 
Elliott v. Elliott 
In Elliott v. Elliott,1253 the supreme court held that the superior court erred in not 
holding an evidentiary hearing or making factual findings before modifying a child 
custody arrangement.1254  After their divorce, Darlis and Nathan Elliot amicably agreed to 
set a visitation schedule for their two children.1255  However, Darlis Elliott eventually 
moved for a modification of child custody and support, which Nathan Elliott opposed.1256  
The superior court denied the motion and ordered the visitation schedule proposed by 
Nathan Elliott without holding a hearing or making any factual findings.1257  The supreme 
court held that, while not specifically required in the state child custody statute, 
procedural due process and the court’s ability to make an “informed and principled 
determination” required a hearing.1258  A hearing is not required only when the 
modifications are sufficiently minor.1259  Furthermore, this case required that factual 
findings regarding the best interests of the child and the changed circumstances 
accompany modifications in the arrangements.1260  The supreme court vacated and 
remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the superior court’s modification 
of a child custody arrangement without holding a hearing and without making any factual 
findings was reversible error.1261 
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Fortson v. Fortson 
In Fortson v. Fortson,
1262
 the supreme court held that a 60-40 division of marital 
assets in a divorce proceeding was not an abuse of discretion because the court had 
properly considered outside factors, such as the health of the parties, in making its 
decision.1263  Blanton Fortson challenged the court’s allocation of property in divorce 
proceedings between himself and his wife Jayne, a dermatologist and paraplegic with 
significant ongoing medical expenses.1264  Blanton argued that there was a discrepancy 
between his and Jayne’s earning power, because Jayne’s earning capacity was ten times 
that of Blanton.1265  The supreme court held that the superior court did not abuse its 
discretion in dividing the Fortsons’ marital assets unequally, giving sixty percent to Jayne 
and forty percent to Blanton, despite the initial presumption that an equal division of 
property is most equitable.1266  Stating that the statutory factors under consideration 
include the age and health of the parties, the supreme court noted that Blanton had a 
reasonable earning capacity, whereas Jayne’s health care costs were already substantial 
and likely to increase if her health declined further, which would also substantially reduce 
her high earning capacity.1267  The supreme court also reviewed several other questions 
pertaining to the division of assets, addressing issues such as capital gains taxes, 
repayment of loans, and property valuations.1268  The supreme court affirmed the superior 
court’s judgment in all of its holdings save one, holding that an unequal division of assets 
in favor of the higher-earning party is not an abuse of discretion when other factors 
reasonably prompt the court to divide it in this manner.1269 
 
 
Gilbert M. v. State 
 In Gilbert M. v. State,1270 the supreme court held that a grandfather did not have 
standing to appeal the revocation of his daughter’s parental rights.1271  After his daughter 
Jan’s parental rights over his granddaughter, Belinda, were terminated and Belinda was 
adopted, Gilbert attempted to appeal the termination of his daughter’s parental rights.1272  
Jan chose not to appeal the termination herself.1273  The supreme court held that Gilbert 
could not appeal the termination of parental rights because he and Jan did not have a 
“special relationship,” such as that between a parent and their minor child, thus Gilbert 
did not have the third party standing required to appeal the termination of parental rights 
on Jan’s behalf.1274  The supreme court also held that Gilbert had no right to appeal as 
Belinda’s Indian custodian, because he was never found do be her Indian custodian by a 
court and because he would “almost certainly” be in prison for the remainder of Belinda’s 
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minority.1275  The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that 
a grandparent who did not have a “special relationship” with his daughter and who was 
not an Indian custodian of his granddaughter lacked standing to appeal his daughter’s loss 
of parental rights.1276 
 
 
Ginn-Williams v. Williams 
 In Ginn-Williams v. Williams,1277 the supreme court held that a divorce settlement 
agreement need not be modified because no evidence was presented that affected the 
children’s best interests, that a non-custodial father could claim his son as a dependent, 
and that a second mortgage and a car debt were marital property.1278  Melanie Ginn-
Williams and Channing Williams divorced after five years of marriage and executed a 
voluntary agreement for joint legal custody of their children.1279  Five days after the 
agreement, Ginn-Williams filed a motion to amend the agreement,1280 claiming for the 
first time that Williams had a history of domestic abuse.1281  The superior court denied 
Ginn-Williams’ motion, concluding that the agreement was entered into voluntarily in the 
best interests of the children.1282  Additionally, the court denied Ginn-Williams’ motions 
to bar Williams from claiming their son as a dependent and held that a second mortgage 
and car debt were marital property.1283  The supreme court held that there were no 
changed circumstances justifying the modification of the divorce settlement agreement, 
that Williams could claim his son as a dependent, and that the second mortgage and car 
debt were marital property.1284  Ginn-Williams’ proposed revision of the settlement 
agreement was motivated by previously expressed concerns that Williams was unreliable 
rather than any fear for the safety of the children.1285  As for the dependency claim, since 
their son was a “qualifying child” under the federal tax laws, Williams could claim him 
as a dependent.1286  Finally, the car debt was marital property because it was acquired 
during the marriage;1287 the mortgage was marital property because even though 
Williams’ acquired it before the marriage, Ginn-Williams evidenced the intent to accept 
the property upon marriage.1288  The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior 
court, holding that a divorce settlement need not be modified because no evidence was 
presented that affected the children’s best interests, that a non-custodial father could 
claim his son as a dependent, and that a second mortgage and a car debt were marital 
property.1289   
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King v. Carey 
In King v. Carey,1290 the supreme court held that a non-custodial parent failed to 
demonstrate a change in circumstances and thus was not entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing for modification of custody.1291  King moved for modification of custody of her 
son because of changed circumstances,1292 but her only evidence of changed 
circumstances was an affidavit signed by her son stating that he now preferred to live 
with both parents.1293  Carey, the boy’s father, opposed the motion, alleging that King 
manipulated the son into signing the affidavit.1294  King replied, alleging for the first time 
that the boy had begun using alcohol and drugs and felt threatened by his step-brother 
while living with his father.1295  The supreme court held that the only evidence King 
properly raised was the affidavit, which was not enough to meet her burden of 
demonstrating a significant change in circumstances, and thus did not warrant an 
evidentiary hearing for custody change.1296  The supreme court affirmed the superior 
court, holding that the non-custodial parent failed to produce sufficient evidence to 
indicate a change of circumstances and was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing or 
modification of her son’s custody.1297 
 
 
Krize v. Krize 
In Krize v. Krize,1298 the supreme court held that, where a husband regularly 
deposited lease income into a joint bank account, the transmutation doctrine did not apply 
to future lease income.1299  In dividing Robert and Judy Krize’s property during their 
divorce proceeding, the superior court ruled that although the real property was Robert’s 
separate property, future lease income from a long-term lease on the property was marital 
property.1300  Robert appealed, claiming that the deposits of lease income into the joint 
account constituted individual gifts, not a transmutation of the income into marital 
property.1301  The supreme court held that the depositing of funds into the joint account 
was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the lease proceeds were marital 
property, because transmutation requires intent to change separate property into marital 
property, and there was no evidence that Robert intended for the future lease income to 
be marital property.1302  The title to the property was in Robert’s name only, and Judy did 
not help manage the property or the lease, nor did she use her credit to help improve the 
property.1303  Additionally, Robert had retained the right to stop depositing the lease 
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income into the account.1304  On a separate question, the supreme court held that it was 
proper to take the likelihood of future inheritance into account in property divisions, even 
if speculative, since property divisions are not subject to later revision.1305  The supreme 
court reversed the ruling of the superior court, holding that placing funds earned from 
separate property into a joint account was insufficient evidence to justify the application 
of the transmutation doctrine to future lease income.1306 
 
 
Mattfield v. Mattfield  
In Mattfield v. Mattfield,1307 the supreme court held that a husband’s appeal of a 
superior court decision to disburse to the IRS funds from a dissolved family business was 
premature and that his appeal of a decision to reconsider a child support order was not 
supported by a showing of reversible error.1308  Six years after Rodney and Tamara 
Mattfield’s divorce, the IRS filed a levy against, and after trial recovered, funds from the 
Mattfield’s dissolved marital business.1309  At roughly the same time, the superior court 
referred the issue of child support to the Child Support Enforcement Division, which 
calculated Rodney’s support obligation based on estimated instead of actual earnings.1310  
Though this order was contrary to the superior court’s mandate, the court signed it, 
apparently by oversight.1311  Tamara moved to reconsider and vacate the IRS and child 
support orders, the superior court agreed, and Rodney appealed.1312  The supreme court 
held that Rodney’s appeal of the disbursement of IRS funds was premature because the 
order was not a final judgment subject to appeal, and that the appeal of the decision to 
reconsider the child support order was unsupported by the record, because 
reconsideration of the order was consistent with the court’s previous orders to calculate 
child support using actual income.1313  Rodney was given opportunity but failed to 
respond to Tamara’s motion to reconsider, and the lower court sufficiently explained its 
child support order.1314  The supreme court dismissed appeal regarding disbursement and 
affirmed the superior court’s reconsideration of the child support order, holding that a 
husband’s appeal of the superior court’s decision to disburse to the IRS funds from a 
dissolved family business was premature, and his appeal of the decision to reconsider a 
child support order was not supported by a showing of reversible error.1315 
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Melendrez v. Melendrez 
In Melendrez v. Melendrez,1316 the supreme court held that the superior court did 
not give undue weight to the value of keeping siblings together in granting a father 
primary custody of four children.1317  During their divorce proceedings, Valerie and 
Michael Melendrez, Sr., established a custody agreement whereby their four children 
would reside with Valerie in California during the school year.1318  A year later, the two 
oldest children requested to relocate to Alaska to be with their father, Michael, which 
Valerie did not oppose.1319  Michael then proposed a modification of custody for the two 
youngest children as well, which would grant him primary custody of all four 
children.1320  The superior court granted Michael custody, and Valerie appealed, claiming 
that the court gave undue weight to the benefit of keeping all four children together, and 
undervalued the importance of maintaining stability and continuity in the lives of the 
youngest children, by keeping them with her.1321  The supreme court held that Valerie did 
not present clear evidence that the relationship between the older and younger children 
was overvalued, and thus did not demonstrate that the superior court’s factual findings 
were clearly erroneous.1322  In addition, sibling relationships can be heavily weighed in 
considering custody placements, and so the superior court did not abuse its discretion in 
their custody assignment.1323  The supreme court affirmed the custody modification, 
holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion or clearly err in its decision to 
grant primary custody to the father for all four children in question.1324 
 
 
Odom v. Odom  
In Odom v. Odom,1325 the supreme court held that the superior court’s award of 
primary physical custody of the children and award of the family home to the wife in a 
divorce proceeding was not an abuse of discretion, and that the husband’s interests in his 
family business were separate property that could be invaded only if an equitable division 
could not be achieved through an unequal division of marital property.1326  In Bill and 
Carey Odom’s divorce proceeding, the superior court awarded Carey the family home 
and primary physical custody of both children.1327  The superior court found that Bill’s 
interests in Odom Enterprises were separate property but demanded that it be invaded in 
order to achieve an equitable distribution.1328  Bill appealed the award of custody and the 
family home and the invasion of his separate property.1329  Carey appealed the ruling that 
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Bill’s interests were separate property and the amount of invasion.1330  The supreme court 
held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in awarding primary physical 
custody of the children to Carey, because the superior court properly considered that 
Carey had been the primary caregiver on a full-time basis and was an excellent 
mother.1331  Similarly, the award of the family home was not an abuse of discretion 
because the superior court properly linked the award of the home to the award of primary 
physical custody of the children.1332  Moreover, Bill’s interests in Odom Enterprises were 
separate property because Bill had made active efforts to keep the property separate 
(thereby eliminating the possibility of transmutation), no marital contributions had been 
made to the property, and Carey failed to prove that the property had appreciated as a 
result of the marriage.1333  Separate property should not be invaded unless equitable 
division of the marital property is impossible,1334 and Bill’s separate property should only 
have been invaded if all of the marital assets would not be enough to meet Carey’s 
reasonable needs.1335  The supreme court affirmed the awards of primary physical 
custody and the home to Carey and affirmed the finding that Bill’s interests in Odom 
Enterprises were separate property but vacated and remanded the invasion of the separate 
property to determine if unequal division of marital property would properly balance the 
equities.1336  
 
 
Peter A. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
 In Peter A. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,1337 the supreme 
court held that a father could not appeal an adjudication order finding his children to be in 
need of aid, because the issue was moot.1338  Peter A.’s two children were found, in an 
adjudication order by the superior court, to be in need of aid because of their mother’s 
alcohol abuse problem.1339  Though the case was dismissed and the children remained 
with their father, Peter A. appealed the entry of the order, arguing that the superior court 
could not adjudicate children to be in need of aid based only on one parent’s actions 
where there is a second, fit parent willing and able to care for the child.1340  The supreme 
court held that the issue on appeal was moot, because the adjudication order was a dead 
letter and there was no actual controversy.1341  However, equity required vacatur of the 
adjudication order.1342  The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine did not 
apply because the primary legal issue in the case was not likely to be “repeatedly 
circumvented” in future litigation.1343  The supreme court vacated the superior court’s 
                                                 
1330 Id. 
1331 Id. at 331. 
1332 Id. at 331–32. 
1333 Id. at 332–39. 
1334 Id. at 340. 
1335 Id. at 341. 
1336 Id. at 342. 
1337 146 P.3d 991 (Alaska 2006). 
1338  Id. at 992.  
1339 Id. 
1340  Id. at 993. 
1341 Id. at 994. 
1342 Id. at 996. 
1343 Id. at 997. 
 103 
adjudication order, but dismissed Peter A.’s appeal as moot, holding that he could not 
appeal an adjudication order finding his children to be in need of aid because the issue 
was moot.1344   
 
 
Rodvik v. Rodvik  
In Rodvik v. Rodvik,1345 the supreme court held that unsupervised visits by a father 
were appropriate, that adequate supporting evidence must be shown to award marital 
property unequally, that federal income taxes should be subtracted from income for child 
support purposes, that bad faith and vexatious conduct warrant attorneys’ fees award, and 
that a judge does not need to recuse himself solely because a party has criticized one of 
his previous decisions.1346  Karsten and Maureen Rodvik obtained a divorce in superior 
court, where Maureen was awarded sole custody of the children and Karsten was allowed 
supervised visits.1347  Four protective orders were issued against Karsten, and he did not 
cooperate with many of the superior court’s instructions.1348  Maureen was awarded over 
half the marital property and legal fees.1349  The superior court judge declined to recuse 
himself after Karsten noted that the judge had cited Karsten for his opposing viewpoint in 
a previous controversial case.1350  Karsten appealed.1351  The supreme court held that the 
unsupervised visits were appropriate pending a psychological evaluation because of 
evidence that Karsten’s behavior had an adverse effect on the children.1352  The court 
remanded the marital property issue because further supporting evidence was needed to 
show why Maureen needed over half the marital property, in addition to child support, to 
meet the children’s needs.1353  The court also held that Karsten’s income should be 
recalculated because federal income taxes were not subtracted before child support 
payments were calculated.1354  The court held that the legal fees award was appropriate, 
despite the spouses’ roughly equal economic positions, because Karsten’s behavior made 
litigation significantly more expensive for Maureen.1355  The court also held that the 
judge did not need to recuse himself when a party had publicly disagreed with his 
previous decision because judicial decisions often spark public comment and such 
comments do not prevent a judge from rendering an unbiased verdict.1356  The supreme 
court affirmed in part, and remanded in part, the decision of the superior court, holding 
that unsupervised visits were appropriate, that adequate support is needed to award 
marital property unequally, that federal income taxes should be deducted from child 
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support income, that the legal fees award was appropriate, and that the judge did not need 
to recuse himself.1357 
 
 
Rowland v. Monsen  
In Rowland v. Monsen,1358 the supreme court held that a father in a custody 
dispute was entitled to attorneys’ fees against the mother because the mother did not 
prove that the order of fees was void or that extraordinary circumstances warranted relief, 
and her own motion for relief and appeal of the underlying order for attorneys’ fees were 
untimely.1359  Several years after separating, Rowland petitioned for a protective order on 
behalf of her children against their father, Monsen, who had custody.1360  Rowland failed 
to prove her allegations, and Monsen retained custody and moved for attorneys’ fees.1361  
Rowland served her opposition but did not file the pleading with the court, which 
subsequently ordered Rowland to pay the full amount.1362  Rowland filed for relief, 
arguing that the court’s order was void and that extraordinary circumstances warranted 
relief, but her motion was denied as untimely.1363  The supreme court held that Monsen 
was entitled to attorneys’ fees against Rowland.1364  Rowland’s argument that the order 
was void was without merit because neither the untimeliness nor the inadequacy of 
findings of Monsen’s motion for attorneys’ fees were fundamental flaws.1365  Also, 
Rowland’s motion for relief based on extraordinary circumstances and appeal of the 
underlying order for attorneys’ fees were not brought within a reasonable time since she 
did not explain the nearly four-year delay.1366  The supreme court affirmed the superior 
court’s judgment that a father in a custody dispute was entitled to attorneys’ fees against 
the mother because the mother did not prove that the order of fees was void or that 
extraordinary circumstances warranted relief, and her own motion for relief and appeal of 
the underlying order for attorneys’ fees were untimely.1367 
 
 
Van Sickle v. McGraw 
In Van Sickle v. McGraw,1368 the supreme court held that amendments to the child 
custody statute, Alaska Statute section 25.24.150,1369 do not apply to a case in which the 
evidence closed after the amendments’ effective date and that the superior court did not 
abuse its discretion by awarding custody to the father in a custody dispute.1370  Joshua 
McGraw and Jennifer Van Sickle parented a child out of wedlock, separated within 
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months of the child’s birth, and now live in separate states.1371  Van Sickle appealed the 
superior court’s decision to grant primary custody to McGraw, claiming that the court 
erred by not applying the amended version of the child custody statute and that the court 
abused its discretion by misapplying various sections of the previous statute.1372  The 
supreme court held that the amended statute did not apply here because the evidence 
closed before the effective date of the amendments.1373  Also, trial courts are vested with 
broad discretion when determining child custody,1374 and the superior court did not abuse 
its discretion in finding that McGraw was better at achieving an open and loving 
relationship between the child and the other parent,1375 in finding that Sitka is a better 
home for the child,1376 or by failing to make specific findings regarding the geographic 
distance between the two parents.1377  The supreme court affirmed the decision of the 
superior court, holding that the amendments to the child custody statute do not apply to 
this case because the evidence closed before the amendments’ effective date and that the 
superior court did not abuse its discretion by awarding custody to McGraw.1378 
 
 
Watega v. Watega  
In Watega v. Watega,1379 the supreme court held that the superior court abused its 
discretion in granting a man's motion to compel the sale of the family house during 
divorce proceedings over his wife's objections, because no exceptional circumstances 
existed.1380  Craig Watega filed for divorce from his wife, Lesley, in 2002.1381  A court 
gave Craig custody of the couple's house for the duration of the divorce proceedings, but 
he failed to make payments on the deed of trust.1382  Fearful of foreclosure, Craig 
petitioned the court to allow the property to be sold.1383  Without granting a hearing, the 
court agreed to the sale.1384  Lesley fought the sale, but the superior court found the 
buyers had a valid and enforceable interest in the house.1385  Lesley appealed.1386  The 
supreme court held that the superior court abused its discretion in granting Craig's motion 
to compel the sale of the house, because though the relevant statute did authorize the 
superior court to permit the sale of property pending a divorce in exceptional 
circumstances,1387 the Wategas’ case did not qualify as exceptional circumstances, since 
the house was not in imminent danger of foreclosure and the sale did nothing to increase 
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or preserve the value of the marital estate, and because protecting Lesley's credit was not 
a valid reason for the sale given her own objections to the sale.1388  Because Lesley’s 
opposition to the sale was stated in the file, the buyers had at least constructive 
knowledge that she might challenge an ownership claim and, therefore, could not have 
been bona fide purchasers for value.1389  The supreme court reversed and remanded the 
superior court’s decision to grant motion for compelled sale of a couple’s home, holding 
that no exceptional circumstances existed.1390   
 
 
Winston v. State, Department of Health and Social Services  
In Winston v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,1391 the supreme 
court held that the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) made reasonable efforts at 
parental re-unification before terminating a father’s parental rights and had good reason 
for believing the children were in need of aid because of the father’s abuse of their 
mother.1392  OCS took Winston’s children away at birth, while he was incarcerated for 
abusing their mother.1393  Winston delayed establishing contact with his children until 
after he had been out of prison for some time.1394  When he did contact OCS about 
establishing contact, OCS referred him to several programs.1395  He did not complete 
these programs, and OCS terminated his parental rights.1396  The trial court upheld the 
termination order, and Winston appealed.1397  The supreme court held that, given the 
father’s varying level of interest in his children, the State did make reasonable efforts to 
unite the family by paying his travel expenses and referring him to programs.1398 Also, 
there was good cause for believing the children were in need of aid, because of Winston’s 
prior abuses of women.1399  The supreme court affirmed the decision of the trial court, 
holding that the State made reasonable efforts at parental re-unification before 
terminating the father’s parental rights and had good reason to believe the children were 
in need of aid due to the father’s prior abuse of the mother.1400   
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XIV.  HEALTH LAW 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Smallwood v. Central Peninsula General Hospital 
 In Smallwood v. Central Peninsula General Hospital,1401 the supreme court held 
that a Medicaid patient had standing to sue a hospital for balance billing in violation of 
the hospital’s contract with Medicaid.1402  Smallwood sued Central Peninsula General 
Hospital after he was billed for amounts exceeding Medicaid reimbursement, in violation 
of the hospital’s contract with Medicaid not to bill recipients.1403  The superior court 
entered judgment against Smallwood, stating it was doubtful that he had a private right of 
action to enforce the balance-billing prohibition.1404  The supreme court held that 
Smallwood had standing as a third-party beneficiary of the contract, because he was the 
intended beneficiary of the clause.1405  The supreme court remanded the case to the 
superior court, holding that Smallwood had standing to sue to enforce the balance-billing 
prohibition.1406 
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XV.  INSURANCE LAW 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Cole v. State Farm Insurance Co.  
In Cole v. State Farm Insurance Co.,1407 the supreme court held that a live-in 
companion was not covered under a car insurance policy that unambiguously defined 
“spouse” as a currently, legally married husband or wife.1408  Cole was divorced from, 
but living with, the insured when a motorist hit and injured him.1409  Cole sued State 
Farm Insurance Co. (“State Farm”) after being denied his claims for medical and 
underinsured motorist payments as a “spouse” under the policy.1410  The superior court 
granted partial summary judgment to State Farm, ruling that Cole was not covered 
because he was not legally married to the policy holder.1411  Cole appealed, arguing that 
the spousal coverage provision of the policy should be broadly construed because its 
terms were ambiguous and for public policy reasons.1412  The supreme court held that a 
reasonable purchaser of the policy would not have expected spousal coverage to extend 
to a cohabitating companion to whom he or she was not legally married, having 
considered the policy language, relevant extrinsic evidence, and precedent interpreting 
similar provisions.1413  The supreme court also rejected Cole’s public policy argument, 
finding that he produced no evidence of marital status discrimination.1414  The supreme 
court affirmed the order of the superior court, holding that Cole was not covered under 
his live-in companion’s car insurance policy that unambiguously defined “spouse” as a 
currently, legally married husband or wife.1415  
 
 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lestenkof 
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lestenkof,1416 the supreme 
court held that, where a policyholder is not underinsured with regard to attorneys’ fees, 
the insurer does not have to pay additional attorneys’ fees.1417  Following a fatal accident 
in which an automobile driven by Odden collided with a motor home, resulting in the 
death of Lestenkof, Lestenkof’s widow pursued a wrongful death claim against 
Odden.1418  State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (“State Farm”), Odden’s 
insurer, paid Lestenkof an advance payment of  over $62,000 pursuant to Odden’s 
uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage.1419  After the parties agreed to 
assume that a hypothetical jury trial would result in a verdict for Lestenkof of 
                                                 
1407 128 P.3d 171 (Alaska 2006). 
1408 Id. at 172–73.  
1409 Id. at 173.  
1410 Id. 
1411 Id. 
1412 Id at 174. 
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1414 Id. at 176. 
1415 Id. at 177–78. 
1416 144 P.3d 504 (Alaska 2006). 
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1419 Id. at 506. 
 109 
$1,000,000, State Farm offered to settle the claim with Lestenkof for approximately 
$172,000, which included attorneys’ fees of $115,600 calculated from the hypothetical 
jury award.1420  Lestenkof accepted this offer, but demanded an additional $110,000 so 
that the UIM coverage offered the same protection as the liability coverage.1421  The 
superior court agreed with Lestenkof, holding that State Farm was required to pay 
additional attorneys’ fees under its UIM coverage, and State Farm appealed.1422  The 
supreme court held that Odden was fully insured with respect to attorneys’ fees and that 
State Farm was therefore not obligated to pay the additional amount.1423  Odden’s policy 
did not contain a valid limitation on attorneys’ fees, so Odden was not underinsured with 
regard to the $115,600 attorneys’ fees.1424  The supreme court reversed the decision of the 
superior court and held that the insurer was not required to pay additional attorneys’ fees 
pursuant to the policyholder’s UIM coverage.1425 
 
                                                 
1420 Id. 
1421 Id. 
1422 Id. at 507. 
1423 Id. at 509. 
1424 Id.  
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XVI.  NATIVE LAW 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Jimerson v. Tetlin Native Corp. 
 In Jimerson v. Tetlin Native Corp.,1426 the supreme court held that a settlement 
agreement between a Native corporation and its directors and shareholders was invalid 
because the agreement violated the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
(“ANCSA”).1427  Tetlin Native Corporation (“TNC”) transferred a large portion of its 
land to the Tetlin Tribal Council.1428  In protest, shareholders Jimerson and David led a 
successful campaign to recall TNC’s board of directors and subsequently filed a 
complaint on behalf of TNC against the shareholders and directors who had been 
involved in the land transfer.1429  A resulting settlement agreement provided dissenting 
TNC shareholders with the opportunity to exchange their TNC ANCSA stock for shares 
in a new corporation formed by TNC.1430  The supreme court held that the settlement 
agreement was unenforceable because it violated ANCSA section 7(h)(1)(B),1431 which 
prohibits the alienation of ANCSA stock.1432  The supreme court further held that the 
settlement agreement did not fit into any of the statutory exceptions to section 
7(h)(1)(B).1433  The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s denial of Jimerson’s 
motion for enforcement, holding that the agreement was invalid because it violated 
ANCSA.1434 
 
 
State, Department of Health and Social Services v. Native Village of Curyung 
In State, Department of Health and Social Services v. Native Village of 
Curyung,1435 the supreme court held that Alaska Native villages can bring suit as parens 
patriae to enforce rights created by the Adoption Assistance Act and the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, but that the villages cannot bring suit on their own behalf or sue the State 
directly.1436  Several Alaska Native villages brought suit against the State and the 
Director of the Division of Family and Youth Services (“Director”), alleging violations of 
the Adoption Assistance Act and the Indian Child Welfare Act.1437  After the superior 
court refused to dismiss several of the villages’ claims, the State filed a petition for 
interlocutory review, arguing that the villages were not proper plaintiffs and that the State 
was not a proper defendant.1438  The supreme court held that the villages could bring a 
claim as parens patriae under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because violations of the Adoption 
                                                 
1426 144 P.3d 470 (Alaska 2006). 
1427 Id. at 471. 
1428 Id.  
1429 Id. 
1430 Id.  
1431 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(1)(B) (2006). 
1432 Jimerson, 144 P.3d at 472. 
1433 Id. at 473–74. 
1434 Id. at 474 . 
1435 151 P.3d 388 (Alaska 2006). 
1436 Id. at 392. 
1437 Id.  
1438 Id. at 395–96. 
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Assistance Act and Indian Child Welfare Act were quasi-sovereign interests that affected 
the well-being of the villages’ families, which was intertwined with the villages’ 
integrity.1439  The Adoption Assistance Act created a right to a state plan and case review 
system that the villages could enforce through a § 1983 action.1440   Similarly, the Indian 
Child Welfare Act created enforceable rights that supplement § 1983.1441  However, the 
villages could not bring a claim on their own behalf because villages cannot use § 1983 to 
enforce sovereign rights.1442  The supreme court also held that while the villages could 
sue the Director in his official capacity, they could not sue the State directly because § 
1983 does not authorize suits against states.1443  The supreme court affirmed the superior 
court’s decision in part, holding that Alaska Native villages can bring suit as parens 
patriae claims under § 1983 and reversed in part, holding that villages cannot bring suit 
on their own behalf or sue the State directly.1444 
 
                                                 
1439 Id. at 402. 
1440 Id. at 407–08. 
1441 Id. at 408. 
1442 Id. at 402. 
1443 Id. at 392, 402–04. 
1444 Id. at 392, 413. 
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XVII.  PROPERTY LAW 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Alaska Construction Equipment, Inc. v. Star Trucking, Inc.  
In Alaska Construction Equipment, Inc. v. Star Trucking, Inc.,1445 the supreme 
court held that a lessor may obtain loss-of-use damages for leased property that is 
completely destroyed.1446  Alaska Construction Equipment, Inc. (“ACE”) leased a rock 
dump truck to Star Trucking, Inc. (“Star”), which Star totaled shortly after the start of the 
lease.1447  ACE agreed to settle its claim against Star, but the parties disagreed about the 
scope of the settlement.1448  Believing the settlement covered only property damage, ACE 
refused to release Star of all liability.1449  Star withheld the settlement check from ACE, 
prompting ACE to sue Star for both the check and loss of use damages.1450  After the trial 
court granted Star’s motion for summary judgment, ACE appealed.1451  The supreme 
court held that loss-of-use damages are available where leased property is totally 
destroyed, finding that this enables damage awards to most accurately reflect the 
expectation interest of a lessor seeking damages.1452  The supreme court reversed the 
superior court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded, holding that a lessor may 
obtain loss-of-use damages for leased property that is completely destroyed.1453     
 
 
Alaska Railroad Corp. v. Native Village of Eklutna 
In Alaska Railroad Corp. v. Native Village of Eklutna,1454 the supreme court held 
that the Alaska Railroad Corp. (“Railroad”) was subject to a local zoning ordinance and 
thus had to apply for a conditional use permit before drilling on culturally sensitive land 
in the Native Village of Eklutna.1455  In a 2004 decision, the supreme court held that the 
Alaska Railroad Corporation Act did not clearly exempt the Railroad from a municipal 
zoning ordinance that restricted drilling on culturally sensitive land, and required the 
Railroad to obtain a conditional use permit before drilling.1456  The Railroad Commission 
responded to the ruling by enacting an emergency regulation permitting the Railroad to 
drill absent the conditional use permit1457 and asked the legislature to clarify that it was 
exempt from municipal zoning laws.1458  The legislature declined to exempt the Railroad, 
setting up a task force to explore the issue further.1459  The Native Village of Eklutna 
                                                 
1445 128 P.3d 164 (Alaska 2006). 
1446 Id. at 171. 
1447 Id. at 165–66. 
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filed suit, alleging that the emergency regulation impermissibly authorized the Railroad 
to drill without a conditional use permit.1460  The superior court entered summary 
judgment for the Native Village of Eklutna.1461  The supreme court held that the Railroad 
did not have statutory power to exempt itself from zoning ordinances because it merely 
has statutory power to regulate third party conduct on its own lands, not the power to 
override local ordinances.1462  Moreover, the court was precluded from reconsidering the 
issue of whether the statute immunized the railroad from municipal zoning ordinances by 
the “law of the case” doctrine.1463  The supreme court affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment, holding that the Railroad was subject to a local zoning ordinance and thus had 
to apply for a conditional use permit before drilling on culturally sensitive land in the 
Native Village of Eklutna.1464 
 
 
Forshee v. Forshee  
In Forshee v. Forshee,1465 the supreme court held that a pro se litigant’s property 
division appeal is reviewed, similarly to a represented litigant, for: abuse of discretion in 
the characterization of property and denial of motions, application of the correct legal 
standard, clear error of the factual findings, and clearly unjust distribution of assets.1466  
After Shan and Jack Forshee’s divorce trial, in which Jack represented himself,1467 Jack 
appealed the superior court’s judgments on the value of various marital assets and its 
decision not to consider additional debts. 1468  The supreme court held that, although less 
stringent standards are applied to pro se litigants, the standard of review remains abuse of 
discretion.1469  The supreme court found that Jack voluntarily proceeded without counsel 
and did not establish that he was unable to represent himself. 1470  The superior court’s 
judgments regarding the value of marital assets and the lack of evidence of fraud and 
duress in the divorce settlement were not clearly erroneous. 1471  Finally, Jack was given 
repeated opportunities to introduce debts and did not. 1472  The supreme court affirmed the 
superior court’s judgments, holding that in considering a pro se litigant’s property 
division, it did not abuse its discretion, it correctly applied the legal standard, it made no 
clear errors in factual findings, and it made no clearly unjust distribution of assets. 1473 
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1462 Id. at 1200. 
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1465 145 P.3d 492 (Alaska 2006). 
1466 Id. at 497–98, 503. 
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1468 Id. at 495–97. 
1469 Id. at 497–98. 
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St. Paul Church, Inc.  v. Board of Trustees of the Alaska Missionary Conference of the 
United Methodist Church, Inc. 
In St. Paul Church, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Alaska Missionary Conference 
of the United Methodist Church, Inc.,1474 the supreme court held that property disputes 
from a schism of two religious groups should be resolved using a neutral principles 
approach and that the new religious group should be entitled to its former name.1475  The 
Board of Trustees of the Alaska Missionary Conference of the United Methodist Church, 
Inc. (“AMC”) is the regional conference of the United Methodist Church (“UMC”).1476  
St. Paul Church, Inc. (“St. Paul Church”) had signed agreements subjecting their property 
to UMC.1477  AMC filed a complaint against St. Paul Church for breach of contract, 
trespass, and other offenses.1478  The supreme court held that the disputed properties 
belonged to AMC under a neutral principles approach,1479 which examines “the deeds to 
the church property, the charter of the local church, the book of order or discipline of the 
general church organization, and the state statutes governing the holding of the church 
property . . . .”1480  Under this approach, the disputed property belonged to AMC despite 
St. Paul Church’s claims that there had not been unequivocal intent or property when the 
trust was formed. 1481  The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s ruling, holding 
that a trust was created by St. Paul that granted UMC ownership of the disputed property. 
1482 
 
 
Young v. Embley 
In Young v. Embley,1483 the supreme court held that a junior lienholder has the 
right to cure a senior interest holder’s default on a deed of trust, and a foreclosure cannot 
occur unless the junior lienholder has had an opportunity to cure the default.1484  Young 
and Dang operated a bed-and-breakfast together, but Dang held sole title to the property 
and executed a deed of trust on it, which eventually came to be held by Embley, without 
the knowledge of Young.1485  Dang defaulted on the deed of trust and, with a foreclosure 
sale pending, granted a lien on the property to Young.1486  Young attempted to stop the 
foreclosure sale, arguing that she had the right to cure the default but was not told the 
amount owed until the morning of the foreclosure sale and thus did not have time to cure 
the default before the property was sold.1487  The supreme court held that deeds of trust, 
like mortgages, also carry the equity of redemption, and this right to equitable redemption 
also extends to junior interest holders, since their interest would be completely cut off at 
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foreclosure.1488  The supreme court then interpreted Alaska Statute section 34.20.070(b) 
to extend the right of cure beyond the obligor.1489  Because Young did not learn the 
amount owed within a reasonable time before foreclosure, the foreclosure sale was 
invalid.1490  The supreme court reversed the grant of summary judgment to Embley, 
holding that the junior lienholder has a right to cure the default on a deed of trust and that 
the junior lienholder must be given a reasonable amount of time to do so before a 
foreclosure sale can be held.1491 
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XVIII.  TAX LAW 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Interior Cabaret, Hotel, Restaurant & Retailers Ass’n v. Fairbanks North Star 
Borough 
In Interior Cabaret, Hotel & Retailers Ass’n  v. Fairbanks North Star 
Borough,1492 the supreme court held that a proposed borough tax on alcohol was legal, 
because it was area-wide and because the non-discrimination statute that requires the 
imposition of other sales taxes is fulfilled by a single hotel tax.1493  The Interior Cabaret, 
Hotel & Retailers Association  (“Association”) sued the Fairbanks North Star Borough 
(“Borough”) to challenge a proposed sales tax on alcohol on grounds that it was not 
“areawide” as required by statute and that it violated a non-discrimination law that 
required another sales tax to be imposed in the area.1494  The superior court granted 
summary judgment for the Borough, and the Association appealed.1495  The supreme 
court held that, though the ordinance exempted alcoholic beverage sales to the extent that 
they were already taxed by cities, the tax was still “areawide” because the exemptions 
were defined by the application of another tax rather than by geography.1496  
Furthermore, the supreme court held that the statute prohibiting municipalities from 
imposing an alcohol tax without taxing at least one other commodity can be fulfilled by 
the imposition of a sales tax on just one single source other than alcohol1497 and was 
fulfilled by the Borough’s room tax on hotels.1498  The supreme court affirmed the 
decision of the superior court, holding that the proposed tax on alcohol was legal because 
it was area-wide and because it was non-discriminatory, since hotel rooms were also 
taxed.1499  
 
 
Northwest Medical Imaging, Inc. v. State, Department of Revenue 
 In Northwest Medical Imaging, Inc. v. State, Department of Revenue,1500 the 
supreme court held that Alaska may tax a corporation if it continues to do business in 
Alaska after it has been administratively dissolved in its state of incorporation.1501  Dr. 
James Pister incorporated Northwest Medical Imaging, Inc. (“Northwest”) under the laws 
of the State of Washington in 1988.1502  Effective 1990, Northwest was administratively 
dissolved by Washington State.1503  However, Northwest continued to act as a 
corporation in Alaska, providing radiology services and signing contracts as a corporation 
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until 1998.1504  The Alaska Department of Revenue sued to collect taxes on corporate 
activity between 1991 and 1995.1505  The Office of Tax Appeals determined that 
Northwest did not have to pay taxes because it had been dissolved, but the superior court 
reversed.1506  The supreme court held that the Office of Tax Appeals had original subject 
matter jurisdiction because it was legislatively created to hear tax disputes, such as the 
question of whether a corporation exists for tax purposes.1507  The Department of 
Revenue, in turn, has the right to hold hearings to decide tax disputes.1508  Federal law 
adopted by Alaska, rather than Washington law, decides when a corporation ceases to 
exist for tax purposes.1509  Under federal law, a corporation ceases to exist when it has 
been dissolved, has stopped business activity, and has relinquished all assets.1510  Here, 
the corporation did not stop business activity.1511  Therefore, it remained a taxable 
corporation despite being administratively dissolved.1512  The supreme court affirmed the 
superior court, holding that Alaska may tax a corporation if it continues to do business in 
Alaska after it has been administratively dissolved in its state of incorporation.1513 
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XIX.  TORT LAW 
 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
In re Exxon Valdez 
In In re Exxon Valdez,1514 the Ninth Circuit held that the ratio of punitive damages 
to harm suffered in the Exxon Valdez oil spill was excessive and ordered a $2 billion 
remittitur of damages, reducing the punitive-damages award to $2.5 billion.1515  The 
original $5 billion punitive-damages award in the Exxon Valdez suit following the 1989 
oil spill had been reduced to $4.5 billion by the district court after two remands, 
representing an 8.93-to-1 ratio of punitive damages to harm suffered.1516  Both parties 
appealed.1517  The Ninth Circuit held that, under BMW v. Gore1518 and State Farm,1519 
punitive damages are reviewed under three guideposts:  (1) reprehensibility of 
misconduct, (2) ratio of punitive damages to harm suffered, and (3) comparable statutory 
penalties.1520  Here, (1) under the State Farm sub-factors, Exxon’s conduct was at a high 
level of reprehensibility, but its mitigation efforts reduced this level to mid-range;1521 (2) 
Exxon’s pre-judgment compensatory payments were properly included in harm when 
calculating the appropriate punitive damages-to-harm ratio,1522 but a ratio above 5-to-1 
would violate due process because the conduct was not intentional and because Exxon 
took mitigating action, including cleanup efforts and monetary compensation;1523 and (3) 
legislatures have taken oil spills seriously.1524  In sum, Exxon’s reckless conduct justified 
severe, but not the most severe, punitive damages, and a ratio of 5-to-1 was 
appropriate.1525  The Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and 
remanded the case, holding that the ratio between punitive damages to harm suffered 
from the Exxon Valdez oil spill exceeded the appropriate ratio by a material factor and 
ordering that the punitive-damage award be reduced to $2.5 billion.1526 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Anderson v. PPCT Management Systems, Inc. 
In Anderson v. PPCT Management Systems, Inc.,1527 the supreme court held that 
damages could not be awarded based on retained control or vicarious liability theories 
because there was no agency or master-servant relationship, but that summary judgment 
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was improperly awarded on the negligence claim because the creator of the training 
programs had a duty of care that could create legal liability.1528  Anderson alleged that 
she was injured during a training program given by an instructor certified by PPCT 
Management Systems, Inc. (“PPCT”).1529  PPCT designs use-of-force training programs 
for use by criminal justice agencies.1530  Rather then send out their own trainers, PPCT 
creates a training manual and trains agency employees on how to teach the course.1531  
Anderson appealed the superior court’s summary judgment rulings with respect to the 
existence of a master-servant relationship, agency, control retained by PPCT, and a 
breach of duty of PPCT towards Anderson.1532  The supreme court held that there was no 
agency or master-servant relationship, primarily because PPCT did not maintain 
sufficient control over the instructors in their work.1533  Specifically, PPCT did not have 
the right to perform safety inspections, order a training stopped or resumed, and, although 
it could make suggestions, the agencies were not required to abide by them.1534  
However, the superior court had framed Anderson’s negligence claim too narrowly, that 
PPCT had a duty of care, and it was a jury question as to whether PPCT had provided 
sufficient warnings and safety precautions for instructor trainers and instructors.1535  The 
supreme court affirmed part and reversed part of the superior court’s summary judgment 
rulings, holding that damages could not be awarded on retained control or vicarious 
liability theories because there was no agency or master-servant relationship, but that 
summary judgment was improperly awarded on the negligence claim because the creator 
of the training programs had a duty of care that could create legal liability.1536 
 
 
B.R. v. State, Department of Corrections 
In B.R. v. State, Department of Corrections,1537 the supreme court held that a 
complaint against the state should not be dismissed if at least one claim falls outside of 
intentional-tort immunity, thus leaving a triable issue.1538  B.R. was a federal prisoner 
who alleged that during a visit to the jail’s medical center, a physician’s assistant (“PA”) 
assaulted her sexually.1539  During a subsequent visit to the medical center, B.R. alleged 
that she was assaulted again and it is unclear whether she was provided a protective 
escort as she had requested.1540  In her suit, B.R. alleged that the Alaska Department of 
Corrections ( “ADC”) was liable for the PA’s assault and was negligent in hiring the 
assistant and in failing to adequately train employees to handle occurrences of such 
misconduct.1541  The ADC invoked intentional-tort immunity, and the superior court 
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granted summary judgment in its favor.1542  The supreme court held that while the state is 
not liable for the actual assault by their employee, it can still be liable for breaching the 
independent duty to protect B.R. from assault.1543  In order for that claim to succeed, it 
must be grounded in a governmental duty that is distinct from the intentional tort duty 
and that exists even if the assailant were not a government employee.1544  The supreme 
court held that B.R.’s complaint had at least one theory of liability based on the ADC’s 
failure to supervise other employees in protecting B.R. from assault, and as such, 
summary judgment was inappropriate.1545  The supreme court reversed the grant of 
summary judgment and remanded the case for trial, holding that the prisoner’s complaint 
presented triable issues as to whether the ADC had violated its duty to protect her from 
assault.1546 
 
 
DeNardo v. Bax  
In DeNardo v. Bax,1547 the supreme court held that there exists a conditional 
privilege for communications among co-workers about personal safety and that a 
showing of ill will on the part of the communicator is not per se evidence that the 
privilege has been abused.1548  DeNardo and Bax were co-workers.1549  Bax made 
statements to her co-workers that she believed DeNardo was stalking her, and as a result 
DeNardo filed a lawsuit claiming that Bax’s statements were maliciously made and 
libelous.1550  The supreme court first held that, because it had previously recognized 
privilege for statements made to protect business interests and also for public safety, there 
should be a conditional privilege when a co-worker makes a statement to another co-
worker concerning the safety of the workplace.1551  Regarding DeNardo’s claim that Bax 
had made the statements maliciously and had thus abused the privilege,1552 it is possible 
for malice to be a violation of the privilege, but even where there is malice, if the proper 
motives are predominant, the publisher’s personal ill will toward the alleged victim does 
not control.1553  The supreme court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Bax, 
holding that there is a conditional privilege for communications among co-workers about 
personal safety and that a showing of malice is not per se evidence that the privilege has 
been abused.1554 
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Hagen Insurance, Inc. v. Roller 
In Hagen Insurance, Inc. v. Roller,1555 the supreme court held that an injured 
worker was eligible for non-economic damages for emotional distress when an insurer’s 
negligence caused physical injury, that allowing expert testimony was not an abuse of 
discretion given the complexity of calculating workers’ compensation benefits, and that it 
was not an error to grant a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages when there 
was no evidence of malice or reckless indifference.1556  Roller applied for workers’ 
compensation insurance through Hagen Insurance, Inc. (“Hagen”), but when Roller was 
injured on the job, the policy had not yet taken effect.1557  A jury found that Hagen was 
negligent in securing the coverage and awarded damages to Roller; Hagen and Roller 
both appealed.1558  Hagen argued that there was insufficient evidence to support an award 
of emotional distress damages and that the testimony of Roller’s expert should have been 
excluded.1559  Roller argued that it was an error for the court to grant a directed verdict 
motion on the issue of punitive damages.1560  The supreme court held that Roller was 
eligible for non-economic damages for emotional distress because the jury could have 
found that Hagen’s negligence prolonged Roller’s physical injury by preventing him 
from receiving treatment or forcing him to return to work prematurely.1561  Also, 
allowing the expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion, because the calculation of 
workers’ compensation benefits was complex.1562  Finally, to recover punitive damages, 
the plaintiff must show malice or reckless indifference, and Roller failed to do so.1563  
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that an injured 
worker was eligible for emotional distress damages when an insurer’s negligence 
prolonged physical injury, that it was not an abuse of discretion to allow expert testimony 
on the complex calculation of workers’ compensation benefits, and that it was not error to 
grant a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages when there was no evidence of 
malice or reckless indifference.1564 
 
 
Harrold v. Artwohl  
In Harrold v. Artwohl,1565 the supreme court held that a patient who was not told 
by the surgeon that a CT scan could rule out the need for an immediate appendectomy 
raised a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial.1566  After a preliminary CT scan, 
Harrold was diagnosed with appendicitis.1567  Artwohl, the surgeon, confirmed the 
diagnosis and recommended immediate surgery without an additional CT scan; Harrold 
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consented, and the appendix was removed but was found to be healthy.1568  The superior 
court, finding that Harrold had enough information and had given informed consent, 
granted Artwohl’s motion for summary judgment.1569  The supreme court held that a 
patient who was not told by his surgeon that a second CT scan could rule out the need for 
an immediate appendectomy raised a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial, 
because a reasonable patient could deem that information crucial to his treatment 
decision.1570  Harrold asserted in an affidavit that no one told him that the second CT scan 
could confirm the diagnosis with ninety-eight percent accuracy, which would have 
changed his treatment decision.1571  Because a reasonable patient could view this 
additional knowledge as important in deciding whether to give consent, the issue must be 
decided at trial.1572  The supreme court reversed the superior court’s grant of summary 
judgment, holding that a patient who was not told by the surgeon that a second CT scan 
could rule out the need for an immediate appendectomy raised a genuine issue of material 
fact requiring a trial.1573 
 
 
Haynes v. McComb 
In Haynes v. McComb,1574 the supreme court held that an attorney was not entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law in a legal malpractice action because the attorney’s 
client’s criminal conviction had been vacated.1575  A former criminal defendant sued his 
attorney and her employer, the Alaska Public Defender Agency (collectively “attorney”), 
for legal malpractice.1576  The superior court granted the attorney’s motion for summary 
judgment based on the affirmative defense of actual guilt, and the client appealed.1577  
Because the attorney relied solely on an appellate court opinion which was subsequently 
vacated, the supreme court held that the appellate opinion could be used neither as a 
collateral estoppel bar nor for evidentiary purposes.1578  As such, the attorney had not 
made a prima facie case of actual guilt, and was thus not entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.1579  The supreme court reversed the judgment of the superior court and remanded 
the case, holding that the attorney was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law in a 
legal malpractice action where the client’s conviction, the sole basis of the attorney’s 
defense, had been vacated.1580  
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Kinegak v. State, Department of Corrections  
In Kinegak v. State, Department of Corrections,1581 the supreme court held that a 
plaintiff’s claim of negligent record keeping was not materially distinct from a false 
imprisonment claim that was blocked by state immunity.1582  Due to an oversight by the 
Department of Corrections (“DOC”), Kinegak was falsely incarcerated for seven days 
past the completion of his sentences.1583  Kinegak filed a civil suit against the DOC 
alleging negligent computation of release date leading to negligent, unjustified continued 
incarceration.1584  The DOC responded by claiming sovereign immunity under a state 
statute authorizing immunity against claims arising out of false imprisonment.1585  The 
superior court granted the DOC summary judgment and Kinegak appealed. 1586 The 
supreme court overruled its own prior case, Zebre v. State,1587 and held that, in order to 
prevail, a plaintiff must claim harm that is materially distinct from claims for which the 
state is entitled to immunity.1588  The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s 
dismissal of the complaint, holding that a plaintiff’s claim of negligent record keeping 
was not materially distinct from a false imprisonment claim that was blocked by state 
immunity.1589 
 
 
Kirk v. Demientieff 
In Kirk v. Demientieff,1590 the supreme court held that an attorney’s attempt to 
intervene in a former client’s appeal was untimely.1591  Demientieff retained Kirk to 
represent her in a tort action against United Companies.1592  Kirk mailed the complaint to 
the court the day before the statute of limitations ran, but the court did not receive 
delivery on time and dismissed the case.1593  Kirk wanted to petition for reconsideration 
because he believed that the complaint was late due to a mishap with the mail; however, 
Demientieff hired other counsel and filed a malpractice suit.1594  Nearly a year after the 
original action, Demientieff agreed to allow Kirk to petition for reconsideration in her 
name.1595  Reconsideration was denied.1596  Demientieff withdrew the suit against United 
Companies, and Kirk tried to intervene by claim of right.1597  The trial court denied the 
intervention because it was untimely.1598  The supreme court held that the intervention 
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was not timely because Kirk had knowledge that his interests had diverged from 
Demientieff’s eighteen months prior to the intervention1599 and because reopening the 
case would be prejudicial to United Companies but not significantly prejudicial to 
Kirk.1600  The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that an 
attorney’s attempt to intervene in a former client’s appeal was untimely.1601 
 
 
Lamb v. Anderson 
In Lamb v. Anderson,1602 the supreme court held that a conviction for a crime 
collaterally estops a defendant in a civil trial from re-litigating the essential elements of 
the crime of which he was convicted.1603  Anderson drove drunk and crashed into Lamb’s 
motorcycle, severely injuring Lamb.1604  Anderson pled no contest to three separate 
criminal charges.1605  Lamb filed a civil suit against Anderson for negligence and sought 
punitive damages for “outrageous or reckless conduct.”1606  Lamb moved for summary 
judgment as to the liability for punitive damages because Anderson had already pled 
guilty to the assault, but the superior court denied the motion.1607  The supreme court held 
that current law already collaterally estopped a civil plaintiff from re-litigating essential 
elements of the crime to which they had pled no contest, and the court extended this to 
apply to civil defendants as well.1608  Under the Scott1609 test, there are three elements to 
collaterally estop a defendant from denying an essential element of the offense: (1) the 
conviction was for a serious criminal offense, (2) the defendant had a full and fair 
hearing, and (3) it was clear to the jury which facts have been determined and which have 
not.1610  All three elements were satisfied in this situation, so Anderson was collaterally 
estopped from denying recklessness, but because punitive damages are available, yet not 
required, the inquiry as to the punitive damages remained open.1611  The supreme court 
held that a plea of no contest in the criminal case prevented defendant from denying the 
elements of that offense in the civil trial but did not necessarily require punitive 
damages.1612 
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Lightle v. State  
In Lightle v. State,1613 the supreme court held that fraudulent misrepresentation 
does not require an intent to deceive, but only knowledge of some falsity of the 
misrepresentation by the maker and intent that the recipient act in reliance.1614   Lightle, a 
real estate agent, listed a house as an “active listing” with a note indicating a previous 
pending offer.1615  When Seeley asked about the house, Lightle stated that the previous 
offer was “dead.” 1616  Seeley made an offer on the house and Lightle eventually assured 
her that the house was hers. 1617  Seeley cancelled her lease and incurred moving 
expenses. 1618  Upon learning that a “Back-up Addendum” had been added, stating that 
Seeley’s offer was only a back-up offer in case the original one fell through, Seeley 
refused to accept the agreement.1619 She filed a claim with the Alaska Real Estate 
Commission’s (“Commission”) real estate surety fund. 1620  The Commission’s hearing 
officer concluded that Lightle had committed fraudulent misrepresentation, and the 
superior court confirmed the conclusion. 1621   The supreme court held that fraudulent 
misrepresentation does not require an intent to deceive, but only knowledge of the 
fraudulence of the statement and that the recipient will act in reliance of that statement. 
1622   Even though Lightle asserted that his statements were literally true at the time, the 
supreme court found that they constituted half-truths, and as such still qualified as 
misrepresentations. 1623   Since Lightle intended that Seely rely on his statements, 
Lightle’s actions did constitute fraudulent misrepresentation. 1624  The supreme court 
affirmed the superior court’s ruling, holding that fraudulent misrepresentation does not 
require an intent to deceive, but only knowledge of some falsity of the misrepresentation 
by the maker and intent that the recipient act in reliance.1625 
 
 
Marsingill v. O’Malley 
 In Marsingill v. O’Malley,1626 the supreme court held that the superior court 
properly instructed the jury on the reasonable patient standard with respect to physician 
informed consent, did not allow inadmissible expert testimony, but awarded excessive 
and improper attorneys’ fees.1627  Marsingill, suffering of stomach pains, called  Dr. 
O’Malley.1628  O’Malley advised her to go to the emergency room, but did not speculate 
                                                 
1613 146 P.3d 980 (Alaska 2006). 
1614 Id. at 981, 986. 
1615 Id. at 981. 
1616 Id. 
1617 Id. at 981–82. 
1618 Id. 
1619 Id. at 982. 
1620 Id. 
1621 Id. 
1622 Id. at 983–84, 986. 
1623 Id. at 985. 
1624 Id. at 986. 
1625 Id. at 981, 986. 
1626 128 P.3d 151 (Alaska 2006). 
1627 Id. at 153. 
1628 Id. 
 126 
as to the seriousness of her condition.1629  Marsingill did not go to the hospital and 
subsequently suffered brain damage and partial paralysis.1630  O’Malley won a jury 
verdict and attorneys’ fees, and Marsingill appealed.1631  The supreme court held that the 
jury instructions properly stated the reasonable patient standard,1632 and that the expert 
evidence of other doctors was relevant because the doctors had expertise due to 
experience in knowing what advice patients desire and respond to.1633  The supreme court 
further found that the attorneys’ fees were excessive, because they included non-
compensable work involving lobbying appellate efforts.1634  The supreme court affirmed 
the decision of the superior court, holding that the superior court properly instructed the 
jury on the reasonable patient standard with respect to physician informed consent and 
did not allow inadmissible expert testimony, but vacated and remanded the improper 
award of attorneys’ fees.1635 
 
 
Pederson v. Barnes 
 In Pederson v. Barnes,1636 the supreme court held that a guardian’s lawyer is 
liable to the ward for the guardian’s wrongdoing only where the lawyer knew or had 
reason to know of the wrongdoing and that pure several liability applies to duty-to-
protect cases.1637  After becoming guardian for his orphaned niece, Aiken was convicted 
of stealing and spending her estate assets.1638  Pederson, Aiken’s attorney, had failed to 
confirm the validity of Aiken’s suspicious financial statements and had refuted claims of 
wrongdoing on Aiken’s behalf.1639  A jury found Pederson forty percent at fault and 
Aiken sixty percent at fault for compensatory damages arising from Aiken’s fraud.1640  
The supreme court held that the proper liability standard for a guardian’s lawyer with 
respect to a ward was the lawyer knowing or having “reason to know” (as opposed to 
“should know”) of wrongdoing.1641  Also, pure several liability applies to duty-to-protect 
cases, and thus damages should have been apportioned between Aiken and Pederson 
according to the jury’s determination of fault.1642  The supreme court vacated the award 
of compensatory damages and remanded the case, holding that a guardian’s lawyer is 
liable to the ward for the guardian’s wrongdoing only where the lawyer knew or had 
reason to know of the wrongdoing and that pure several liability applies to duty-to-
protect cases.1643 
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XX.  TRUSTS AND ESTATES LAW 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Blodgett v. Blodgett 
In Blodgett v. Blodgett,1644 the supreme court held that no manifest injustice 
resulted from applying Alaska’s “slayer statute” to a son who negligently killed his 
father.1645  Richard Blodgett pled no contest to the negligent homicide of his father in 
2003, and then attempted to participate in the probate proceedings for his father’s will.1646  
The other beneficiaries of the will contended that, pursuant to the “slayer statute,”1647—
which prevents an heir from inheriting from a decedent he has killed—Blodgett was 
precluded from benefiting.1648  The superior court agreed, explaining that under the 
statute forfeiture is mandatory for negligent homicides unless there is a showing of 
manifest injustice, which Blodgett failed to prove.1649  The supreme court held that, under 
the “slayer statute,” Blodgett failed to demonstrate manifest injustice sufficient to warrant 
participating in the probate proceedings, because Blodgett failed to show that his conduct 
differed from that of others convicted of negligent homicide.1650  Additionally, the court 
rejected:  (1) Blodgett’s claim of being deprived due process because he was given 
sufficient notice and a hearing;1651 (2) his allegation that forfeiture under the “slayer 
statute” violated the Forfeiture of Estate Clause of the Alaska Constitution because the 
clause is not implicated by the “slayer statute”;1652 and (3) his claim that the ex post facto 
clause of the Alaska Constitution applied to a life insurance policy he procured for his 
father before the “slayer statute” was passed because it concerned a non-probate asset.1653  
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that applying 
Alaska’s “slayer statute” to Richard Blodgett would not result in manifest injustice.1654   
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